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Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation
and the Politics of Power
PENELOPE E. BRYAN*
D IVORCE mediation's seductive marketing rhetoric1 masks a political
agenda: entrenchment. Recently reformed divorce law confers
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1. Proponents market divorce mediation to judicial administrators by employing efficienci rhet-
oric that emphasizes mediation's ability to clear congested court dockets and save disputants time
and money. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?. RESOLVING DISPUTES
WITHOUT LAWYERS 122-27 (1983); CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOL-
OGY AND INSTIrUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 73-77 (1985) (discussing the polit-
ical nature of dispute resolution resource allocations); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of
Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUsTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267,
273-75, 279 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter INFORMAL JUSTICE]; Leonard L. Riskin, Medi-
ation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 31 (1982); Neil Vidmar, The Mediation of Small Claims
Court Disputesr A Critical Perspective, in I RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 187,
188 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION].
However some suggest that the overwhelming majority of divorcing couples privately resolve the
distributional aspects of their divorce disputes and enter the court simply to secure the judicial
imprimatur necessary for formal dissolution. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (citing LEON C.
MARSHALL & GEOFFREY MAY, 1 THE DIVORCE COURT 199 (1932); Id at vol. 2, p.-292; Lawrence
M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courtr Litigation in Alameda and San Benito
Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 267, 270, 280-96 (1976)). See also Jessica Pearson, The Equity of
Mediated Divorce Agreements, 9 MEDIATION Q. 179, 180 (1991) (study indicating that couples using
third-party assistance to resolve their divorce disputes still resolved 40% of the issues themselves). If
filed divorce cases do not consume judicial time, mediation's promise to alleviate congested court
dockets seems tenuous.
Nor does mediation seem particularly efficient for divorcing parties. Studies indicate that, when
compared to more traditional forms of dispute processing, divorce mediation results in only modest
time and cost savings for the divorcing couple. See KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DI-
VORCE: How PROFESSIONALS AND COUPLES NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENTS 189 (1985). Contra Pear-
son, supra, at 193. Even then these modestly supportive findings come from studies with severe
methodological flaws. Id at 184; KRESSEL, supra, at 189-202. The studies' infirmities and un-
remarkable findings, however, have not influenced the rhetoric of divorce mediation proponents. Id
at 184-85. Undoubtedly aware that the continued existence of court affiliated divorce mediation
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greater economic fights upon divorcing women.2 Custody law also fa-
programs depends upon mediation's fulfilling its efficiency promise, proponents continue to advance
the fiction of divorce mediation's efficiency.
Mediation's marketing rhetoric extends beyond efficiency concerns. Proponents also claim that,
compared to other dispute resolution processes, mediation produces more flexible agreements, less
hostile post-divorce relationships, problem solving and communication skills, more rapid emotional
recovery from divorce, agreements with which the parties will comply, and better adjusted children
of divorce. See, e.g., id. at 184-85; Elizabeth J. Koopman, Family Mediation: A Developmental Per-
spective on the Field, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PROBLEM SOLVING: INTER-PERSONAL TO
INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS 119, 120-21 (Dennis Sandole & Ingrid Sandole-Staroste eds., 1987)
[hereinafter CONFLICT MANAGEMENT]; Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation.
Strengths and Weaknesses Over Time, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
51, 54 (Howard Davidson et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE MEANS]. In practice, how-
ever, this rhetoric rings hollow.
While the seductiveness of divorce mediation's rhetoric, as well as its consistency with liberal
ideology's focus on procedure, discourages criticism, see Abel, supra, at 294-95, an increasing
number of commentators express concern about mediation's ability to produce quality agreements.
See, eg., Mandatory Mediation of Child Custody and Child Support Disputes: Interim Hearings on
A. 7135/S.5127 Before the Standing Committee on the Judiciary of the N. Y Assembly, November 7,
1985, (prepared statement of Carol S. Bruch, Professor of Law, Graduate Group in Child Develop-
ment at the University of California, Davis) (available from the National Center on Women & Fam-
ily Law, Inc., 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, New York 10003); Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 727 (1988); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991); Robert J. Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17
FAM. L.Q. 525 (1984). Even Professor Mnookin, an enthusiastic proponent of divorce mediation,
now recognizes that unequal bargaining power between spouses justifies some limitations on private
ordering in the divorce context. Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private
Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015, 1024-31 (1985).
Social science scholars, see, eg., KRESSEL, supra, at 51-56; M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of
Compromis&'A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Winter-Spring 1986-1987, at 163,
168-70; Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Third Parties Within Organizations: A Responsive Commentary, in 1 RE-
SEARCH ON NEGOTIATION, supra, at 271, 272, as well as family law practitioners also express skepti-
cism. Eg., Harriet N. Cohen, Mediation in Divorce: Boon or Bane?, WOMEN'S ADVOC., Mar. 1984,
at 1; Richard E. Crouch, The Dark Side of Mediation: Still Unexplored, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS,
supra, at 339, 343-45; Ann L. Diamond & Madeleine Simborg, Divorce Mediation's Weaknesses,
CAL. LAW., July 1983, at 37; Joanne Schulman & Laurie Woods, LegalAdvocacy v. Mediation in
Family Law, 4 WOMEN'S ADVOC. 3 (1983).
For general critiques of Alternative Dispute Resolution's ("ADR") ability to produce fair out-
comes for the disadvantaged, see, e.g., AUERBACH, supra; Abel, supra; Edward Brunet, Questioning
the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1987) (questioning the general utility
of ADR as a dispute resolution technique); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimiz-
ing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359. Despite these
warnings divorce mediation grows in popularity and use. See Riskin, supra, at 29, 30-31; see gener-
ally NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE
LAW 1 (1987).
2. Laws pertaining to the financial aspects of divorce have changed extensively during the past
two decades. One category of change is what property is considered marital and, therefore, subject
to distribution upon divorce. For instance, twenty years ago if the husband held property solely in
his name, the property was nonmarital and went to him upon divorce regardless of when and how it
was obtained. Today, with the exception of property acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance, all
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vors women.3 Negotiating lawyers rely upon these legal entitlements and
property acquired during the marriage, irrespective of how it is titled, is, considered part of the
marital estate. Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Over-
view, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 522-24 (1990). Some jurisdictions even consider nonmarital property, see,
e.g., Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 156 (1989), or
increases in the value of nonmarital assets, see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(4) (1974), avail-
able for distribution.
Major changes also have taken place in what is considered property. Contrary to their former
stance, courts now acknowledge many intangible assets as property. For example, vested and
nonvested pension plans, see, eg., Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of
Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1989) (discussing vested and
nonvested pension rights as economic assets suitable for division); Joseph W. McKnight, Defining
Property Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 193, 201 & n.34 (1989) (discussing the division
of intangibles such as contingent pension rights); Mary Meers Wenig, Increase in Value of Separate
Property During Marriage: Examination and Proposals, 23 FAM. L.Q. 301, 308-09 (1989) (discussing
the apportionment of retirement benefits in community property states); and a business' goodwill,
see, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution ofAmerican Community Property Law
and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163, 183-84 (1989) now commonly
are considered property capable of community ownership. Additionally, while most jurisdictions
still resist recognizing enhanced earning capacity acquired during the marriage as property available
for distribution, Scott E. Willoughby, Note, Professional Licenses as Marital Property: Responses to
Some of O'Brien's Unanswered Questions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 133, 137 & n.23 (1987), courts tend
to make adjustments in other economic awards in recognition of the unenhanced spouse's contribu-
tion to the other spouse's greater earning capacity. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, The Definition and
Division of Marital Property in California. Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 769,
813 & n.170 (1982); Jean M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching
for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 260-61 (1989) [hereinafter Krauskopf, Division Theo-
ries]. Moreover, because recognition of professional degrees as property creates no more, and per-
haps fewer, valuation problems than acknowledgement of goodwill as property, see Reppy, supra, at
819, and because many cogently argue that enhanced earning capacity should be property, e.g.,
Bruch, supra, at 813-20; Krauskopf, Division Theories, supra at 260-62 & n.26; Jean M. Krauskopf,
Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980) [hereinafter Krauskopf, Marital Investor], one can antici-
pate the courts' future acceptance of increased earning capacity as property.
While law reform has granted divorcing women more property rights than twenty years ago,
more changes are needed before women are treated equitably in the formal system. See generally
Bruch, supra; Fineman, supra (noting the difficulties encountered by dependent wives caught in dis-
tribution schemes based on equality between marital partners and the disadvantage experienced by
more independent wives divorcing in a distribution scheme based on need). Mediation, however, not
only sabotages the reforms that have occurred, it also inhibits needed additional reform. See infra
note 269 for discussion of mediation's affect on legal reform.
3. Women clearly have lost ground in custody matters. The tender years presumption in favor
of the mother's custody has fallen before attacks by fathers' rights groups and the legal system's
commitment to gender neutral principles. Fineman, supra note 1, at 738-39. Joint legal and physi-
cal, rather than sole, custody has gained acceptability. Id at 732-35. A mother can no longer
assume she will retain control over the children of the marriage upon divorce. However, the legal
standards used to determine custody still favor the parent who spends more time caring for the child.
Several legal commentators, for instance, support the primary caretaker standard in custody deter-
minations. See, eg., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1984); Fineman, supra note 1, at 770-74; Richard Neely, The Pri-
mary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv.
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craft divorce agreements reflecting them,4 thereby loosening the control
men traditionally wield over economic resources and the socialization of
children. While mediation proponents employ the obscuring rhetoric of
relatedness,' mediation unobtrusively reduces this threat to patriarchy by
returning men to their former dominant position.' This article explains
168 (1984). Furthermore, several states explicitly recognize the primary caretaker standard. Eg.,
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210 (N.D. 1989); In
re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Moore v. Moore, 574 A.2d 105 (Pa. Super.
1990); Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1984). Since mothers continue to fit the profile of the
primary caretaker far more frequently than fathers, Fineman, supra note 1, at 769, mothers generally
continue to retain greater control over the children at divorce than do fathers.
Substantive custody law used by lawyers in negotiating custody arrangements then fails to grant
fathers the control over the children they desire. As Fineman points out, fathers' rights groups
perceive mediation as more amenable to their concerns and easier to manipulate than attorneys and
judges. Id at 758.
4. Substantive and procedural law significantly affects lawyer negotiations. Eg., Marygold S.
Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault
Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1143-44 (1988); see also Riskin, supra note 1, at 43-46 (discuss-
ing how the lawyer's standard philosophical map encourages reliance on legal rules).
5. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 313-14 (1985) [hereinafter Dis-
PuTE RESOLUTION] (categorizing mediation as particularly suitable in family cases because of its
focus on relationships). As one family mediator states:
There is nothing more fulfilling than to work and sweat with a couple through the medi-
ation process, and then to see them leave knowing that, although they will never again
live together as husband and wife, they can still respect each other and be friends, and
continue to work together as parents of the same children.
Lawrence D. Gaughan, Divorce and Family Mediation, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 1,
at 107, 109.
6. The threat to patriarchy posed by reforms in divorce law that favor women takes on added
significance when coupled with a high divorce rate. The divorce rate in the United States more than
doubled between 1970 and 1980, more than a million divorces occur every year, and the divorce rate
promises to remain stable at approximately 50%. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (106th ed. 1986); TERRY
ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE 1 (1986); John N. Edwards, Changing Family Structure and
Youthful Well-Being, 8 J. FAM. ISSUES 355, 357 (1987).
Other commentators note that informalism is a reaction to progressive reforms in the formal legal
system. See AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 124-25 (informalism is a backlash to progressive legal
reforms); Richard L. Abel, Introduction to INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that one
explanation for the ADR movement is state reaction to the progressive victories of the early 1960's
and 1970's); Abel, supra note 1, at 297 (informalism disadvantages the less powerful by denying
them the "sword of formality"); Marilyn L. Ray & Carol Bohmer, Public and Private Ordering
Within the Context of Divorce (unpublished manuscript available from Marilyn Ray, Executive
Director, The Finger Lakes Law & Social Policy Center, Inc., 96 Besemer Road, Ithaca, New York,
New York 14850); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing Nature of
State Power in Late Capitalism, in INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 260-61 (arguing that in-
formalism stabilizes social relations by focusing on harmony and consensus and failing to provide
coercive power to redress inequities experienced by the disadvantaged); Laurie Woods, Mediation: 4
Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 1985 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431.
1992] POLITICS OF POWER
how mediation accomplishes this feat.'
Proponents proclaim mediation's superiority to lawyer negotiation
of divorce disputes' because mediation purportedly enhances autonomy
and individual dignity by empowering the couple to order their post di-
vorce lives.9 The first Part of this article, however, explores power dis-
parities between husbands and wives and the impact these disparities
have on the spouses' relative negotiating abilities. This exposition clari-
fies that, absent mediator, lawyer, or judicial intervention, mediation em-
powers only the already more powerful husband. 10
7. This article is the first in a trilogy that demystifies the rhetoric used to market divorce media-
tion in order to develop a different and less problematic model for resolving divorce disputes. This
text critiques mediation's promise to produce greater distributive justice than dispute resolution
through lawyer negotiation. The second article, currently in progress, explores whether mediation
provides greater procedural justice than more traditional forms of divorce dispute resolution. While
most of the claims made by mediation advocates remain unfulfilled in practice, some aspects of
divorce mediation, such as party participation in decisionmaking, prove worthwhile. As contem-
plated, the third article will set forth a dispute resolution system for divorce cases that preserves the
good aspects of mediation while minimizing risks to weaker parties and maximizing the legal sys-
tem's legitimacy.
8. I compare divorce mediation to lawyer negotiation rather than judicial decision because ne-
gotiating lawyers rather than judges resolve over 90% of all divorce disputes. Marc Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95,
108 (1974). But see Melli et al., supra note 4, at 1157 (approximately 17% of the divorce cases
studied (58 of 349 cases) went to trial, however, 13 of the 58 cases were contested on personal
jurisdiction grounds and another 13 cases involved an issue created by the state's Child Support
Enforcement Agency rather than the parties).
9. Eg., JAY FOLBERG & ALLISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICT WITHOUT LITIGATION 7-8, 35-36 (1984); David Greatbatch & Robert
Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce
Mediators, 23 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 613, 615 (1989) (discussing how various mediation techniques
differ in the degree to which they place the divorcing couple in control of the decisionmaking pro-
cess); John M. Haynes, A Conceptual Model of the Process of Family Mediation: Implications for
Training, 10 Am. J. FAM. THERAPY 5, 10 (1982) (mediator must be committed to the client's right
of self-determination). But see infra notes 214-41 and accompanying text for discussion of how the
mediator controls custody decisions.
Others argue that informalism extends, rather than limits, state intrusion. Eg., Richard
Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American Capitalism: A Per-
spective, in INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 238-41 (suggesting that informalism actually ex-
pands state control by allowing the mediating third party to delve more deeply into the disputants'
characters and feelings and to refer the disputants to other state sponsored social services); Santos,
supra note 6, at 262 (through informalism the state controls actions and social relations that formal
law cannot reach).
10. History provides numerous examples of informality in dispute resolution working to the
advantage of the more powerful. The movement, for instance, to informality in the juvenile justice
system resulted in gross injustice for the relatively powerless youngsters. AUERBACH, supra note 1,
at 127; Abel, supra note 6, at 11. Likewise, tenants in a newly established informal Housing Court in
the South Bronx found the strong position they previously had established through use of formal
court procedures quickly subverted by the more powerful landlords. Mark H. Lazerson, In the
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Moreover, mediator intervention does not protect the lesser pow-
ered wife from disadvantageous outcomes. Part II of this article exposes
how divorcing mothers' sex role ideology and mediators' biased interven-
tion result in custody agreements more favorable to fathers than those
obtained through lawyer negotiation. Mediator intervention also fails to
protect the divorcing wife from the husband's control over financial is-
sues. Part III shows how the complicated interplay between spousal
power disparities, sex role ideology, mediator deficiencies and bias, medi-
ation marketing rhetoric and program design, and the legal system's effi-
ciency concerns prevents mediator intervention on financial issues. Part
III also explains why lawyer and judicial review of mediated agreements
provide inadequate protection for the disadvantaged wife. Finally, Part
IV briefly discusses why lawyer negotiation should produce agreements
more advantageous for divorcing women than mediation and concludes
that the shift from lawyer negotiation to mediation of divorce disputes
reinforces patriarchy.
I. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES
During negotiation the parties explore their relative power" and
reach agreements reflecting their strengths and weaknesses. 12 Since the
Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in INFORMAL JuSTICE, supra note 1, at 119. Turn-
ing back the clock to the early years of the twentieth century, the movement toward industrial
arbitration of employer and individual worker disputes proved disadvantageous for the employee.
AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 63-65.
The rhetoric used by the employers in the industrial arbitration movement has an eerie similarity
to the rhetoric currently used to market divorce mediation to the public. Employers likened the
industrial relations between labor and management to family relations and claimed industrial dis-
putes were merely "family differences." The rhetoric obscured the inherently conflictual nature of
management and labor interests as well as the unequal wealth and power of the disputants. Id. In a
similar fashion, divorce mediation's focus on preserving relationships obscures the conflictual nature
of the husband and wife's economic and child-related interests and trivializes the importance of
power disparity between the spouses.
11. Although power has resisted precise definition, most equate power with the ability of one
party to influence another to behave according to the first party's preferences. See MORTON
DEutSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 84 (1973); P. H. GULLIVER, DIsPUTEs AND NEGOTIA-
TIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 186-90 (1979); DEAN G. PRuI-r, NEGOTIATION BE-
HAVIOR 87 (1981); R. H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 159 (1964); MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 152 (1947).
12. GULLIVER, supra note 11, at 186-207. The empowerment model of conflict regulation also
recognizes that a balance of power between disputants is desirable in any conflict situation to prevent
unrestrained behavior by the more powerful party and/or desperation in the weaker party. PAUL
WEHR, CONFLICT REGULATION 26, 37-38 (1979). See also DEUTSCH, supra note 11, at 382 (noting
that disputants are more likely to face their conflicts openly, rather than suppress them, when the
balance of power between them is symmetrical); Maire A. Dugan, Intervenor Roles and Conflict
Pathologies, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 57, 58; Joseph A. Scimecca, Conflict
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husband and wife negotiate directly with each other in divorce media-
tion, absent active mediator intervention, outcomes should reflect power
differences between them.
Possession of tangible and intangible resources creates negotiating
power.13 Part I first explores how the tangible resources of income, edu-
cation, and occupation are distributed between men and women, as well
as the effects distributional disparities have on the wife's ability to negoti-
ate effectively with her husband. Next I discuss how the intangible dif-
ferences between men and women in status, dominance, depression, self-
esteem, reward expectations, and fear of achievement affect their abilities
to negotiate in mediation.
Throughout this article, the mediation model I contemplate offers
an informal conflict resolution process in which a neutral mediator helps
the husband and wife negotiate the disputed issues in their divorce.14
The mediator guards the process,15 while the parties determine the sub-
stance of the divorce agreement.16 Substantive law does not control the
divorce settlement's terms.' 7 Rather the mediator encourages the couple
Resolution: The Basis for Social Control or Social Change?, in CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note
1, at 30, 31-32.
13. Social science researchers and theorists explain that negotiating power is based on posses-
sion of tangible and intangible resources, as well as macrosocietal conditions such as prevailing ideol-
ogies or norms. E.g., DEUTSCH, supra note 11, at 85, 87; GULLIVER, supra note 11, at 179-207.
Another widely accepted approach posits six bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent,
expert, and information. See John R. P. French & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in
STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150-67 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959); Bertram H. Raven, Social Influ-
ence and Power, in CURRENT STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 371-82 (Ivan D. Steiner & Martin
Fishbein eds., 1965) [hereinafter CURRENT STUDIES]. The concept of power used in this paper
subsumes each of these power bases. And, finally, in his theorizing and research on negotiations
between spouses, Professor John Scanzoni has found income, education, occupation, self-esteem and
sex role ideology important power bases. See LETHA D. SCANZONI & JOHN H. SCANZONI, MEN,
VOMEN, AND CHANGE: A SOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 361-418 (1988); JOHN H.
SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING: POWER POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING]; JOHN H. SCANZONI & MAXIMILIANE SZINOVACZ,
FAMILY DECISION-MAKING: A DEVELOPMENTAL SEX ROLE MODEL 15-44, 85-104 (1980); JOHN
H. SCANZONI, OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 26-78 (1970).
14. See, eg., Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308
(1971); Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L.
REV. 329 (1984).
15. See generally Abel, supra note 1, at 294-95 (informal justice focuses on procedure); Brunet,
supra note 1, at 13-14 (the focus on process, to the exclusion of concern with substantive outcomes,
pervades informal justice).
16. Eg., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 7-8; Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History
and Dimensions of Practice, MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1983, at 3, 9-10 (1983); Lois Vanderkooi & Jes-
sica Pearson, Mediating Divorce Disputes: Mediator Behaviors, Styles and Roles, 32 FAM. REL. 557,
560 (1983).
17. E.g., Janet Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW &
1992]
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to design an agreement that reflects their particular needs and interests.18
While some variation exists, this model captures most divorce mediation.
Moreover, because most divorce mediation occurs in court affiliated pro-
grams19 and most divorce mediators have mental health backgrounds,
20
this article anticipates a mediation program with these characteristics.
Before beginning, I want to acknowledge that Part I presents a
dreary picture of women's position in society, as well as the effect this
position has on women's psychology. As sobering as I find some of my
own statements, I choose to recognize, rather than ignore, the burdens
under which women labor in their struggle for equality. In no manner
does this Part imply women's inferiority. The hostile world in which
women live, not women's inherent weakness, creates each of the tangible
and intangible differences I describe. Recognition of women's oppression
does not diminish their dignity; rather, their simple survival becomes at-
tributable to that dignity and to women's strength. Moreover, those who
INEQUALITY 21, 27 (1984) (law is an irrelevant constraint on the mediator's ability to bring parties
to agreement).
18. See Brunet, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that alternative dispute resolution proponents per-
ceive substantive law as "frustrating creative results").
19. See Susan Myers et al., Divorce Mediation in the States. Institutionalization, Use, and Assess-
ment, STATE Cr. J., Fall 1988, at 17, 20 (86% of mediation programs responding to nationwide
survey indicated strong institutional connection to the courts: 42% were court annexed and 44%
were court sponsored); Jessica Pearson et al., The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who
Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Custody and Visitation Issues, J. DIVORCE,
Fall-winter 1982, at 17,'21 (1982) [hereinafter Pearson et al., Decision to Mediate] (private divorce
mediators report low case volumes and continual problems attracting mediation clients); Jessica
Pearson et. al., 4 Portrait of Divorce Mediation Services in the Public and Private Sector, CONCILIA-
TION CTS. REV., June 1983, at 1, 10-12 [hereinafter Pearson et al., Portrait of Divorce Mediation]
(1981 survey of public and private mediation services revealed 93% of private mediation services
conducted fewer than fifty mediations annually and 51.3% handled fewer than ten cases annually).
Differences exist in how divorcing couples enter court-affiliated mediation programs. Some pro-
grams simply offer mediation services to divorcing parties. Participation, although encouraged, is
voluntary. More commonly, court-affiliated programs mandate that all or selected divorcing spouses
make a good faith attempt to mediate before access to the courts is granted. See ROGERS & SALEM,
supra note 1, at 224-26. Regardless of how the parties enter court-affiliated programs, however, the
programs' main focus remains efficiency. Id. at 226-28.
20. E.g., Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or Social
Control, 3 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 134, 141 (1989); Grillo, supra note 1, at 1553 (custody
mediators in California's mandatory custody mediation program are required to have a master's
degree in one of the behavioral sciences); Myers et al., supra note 19, at 23 (with 74 mediation
programs responding to the nationwide survey, only 12 mediators were attorneys, whereas 62
mediators were social workers or court service officers); Pearson et al., Portrait of Divorce Mediation,
supra note 19, at 8, Table 4 (survey revealed approximately 78% of private sector mediators and
approximately 90% of public sector mediators are mental health professionals (i.e. social workers,
therapists, psychologists and psychiatrists), whereas approximately 15% of private sector mediators
and I% of public sector mediators are lawyers).
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design dispute resolution systems harbor a moral responsibility to pro-
mote the equality between men and women this society allegedly reveres.
Without acknowledging the world in which most, if not all, women live
and struggle, this responsibility goes unfulfilled. In the hope then of pro-
moting genuine, rather than formal, equality, I now turn to the tangible
and intangible differences between spouses that create serious risks for
wives in divorce mediation.
A. Tangible Resources
The spouse with greater income has several advantages in negotia-
tion. He more easily can hire experts to advise him on how to negotiate
or how to structure an agreement to maximize his, and minimize the
other party's, interests. Moreover, due to greater self-sufficiency, he
more credibly can threaten to terminate or extend the length of negotia-
tions if the other party fails to meet his demands. Income disparity be-
tween negotiating spouses then affects their negotiating strength.
In the United States men earn much more than women.21 The wage
gap between husbands and wives is even wider than between men and
women generally. Approximately fifty percent of married women22 and
married women with children in the home23 earn no income because they
21. The difference between male and female earnings is very wide and has changed little in the
past fifty years despite the women's liberation movement and women's increased workforce partici-
pation. In 1939 women earned sixty-three cents to a man's dollar, whereas in 1985 they earned just
sixty-four cents to a man's dollar. Furthermore, in 1984 the median earnings of women who worked
full-time all year were $14,479, while similarly employed men earned $23,218. As recently as 1984,
employed women with college educations earned less than employed male high-school dropouts.
SYLVIA A. HEWLETr, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 71-72
(1986). This wage disparity is reflected in nearly every occupation. For example, according to 1980
census data, female attorneys between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age earned, on average,
$20,573, while their male counterparts earned $27,563. Male bus drivers averaged a yearly income
of $15,611, while female bus drivers earned only $9,903, and male retail salespersons averaged
$13,002, while similarly employed women averaged only $7,479. Id at 72.
The wage gap is greater and more intractable in the United States than in other advanced indus-
trialized countries. Contrary to the United States' experience, during the 1970's the wage gap in
many other countries narrowed significantly. In Sweden in 1970 women earned 71% of male earn-
ings, but by 1980 they earned 81%. During the 1970's the wage gap between British men and
women narrowed by 12%, even though British women are among the lowest paid in Europe. Simi-
larly, the wage gap in Italy and Denmark also narrowed by 12%, leaving the income of Italian
women at 86% and the income of Danish women at 86% of male earnings in 1982. By 1982 in
Germany and France women earned 73% and 78%, respectively, of male earnings. Id. at 73.
22. In 1987, 51% of married women were not participating in the paid labor force. ARLENE F.
SALUTER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 163, CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 18 (1989).
23. JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLES AND POWER 163 (1984) (in 1981 the wife/mother
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do not participate in the paid labor force.24 Even when married women
work outside the home, they average less than half the income of married
men.25 More specifically, in 1980 wives' earnings, on the average, ac-
counted for only twenty-six percent of total family income, and the me-
dian contribution to the total family income of wives with full-time, year
round employment was only thirty-eight percent. 6 Wives with children
whose births are spaced over many years and wives with many children
have the lowest wages of all wives.2 7 While certainly some spouses will
have equivalent incomes and a few wives' incomes will exceed that of
their husbands, most marriages will reflect the pattern these statistics re-
veal: the wife, if employed at all, will earn much less than her husband.
The husband thus is better able to purchase expert advice and to threaten
termination or extension of negotiations - significant advantages in the
mediation process that promises empowerment to both parties.
Educational superiority also can create negotiating power. The indi-
vidual with more education may have important knowledge, such as the
tax consequences of property distribution, that enables him to negotiate
an agreement more favorable to him than the other spouse suspects. Ad-
vanced education also might provide training in negotiation skills. More-
over, the better educated individual can control outcomes because his
exposure to a wider range of ideas helps him generate more alternatives
during negotiation. Higher education, too, implies a superior ability to
understand what occurs in mediation. Tellingly, in one custody media-
tion program, only the women with graduate educations and/or women
over forty-five years of age failed to complain of jumbled and confused
thoughts during negotiations with their husbands.2"
In the United States men and women tend to marry those of similar
did not participate in the labor force in 40% of married-couple families with children under age
eighteen).
24. SALUTER, supra note 22, at 23. A number of factors influence the low employment rate of
wives besides unequal access to the opportunity structure. Incompatibility of employment and fam-
ily responsibilities, the husband's disapproval of his wife's employment, and long-standing societal
disapproval of working wives are three of the most salient factors. While public attitudes toward
working wives have become more tolerant in recent decades, women still sense and are influenced by
the social prescription that their highest calling is home and hearth. See Sharon K. Araji, Married
White Women Occupational Mobility and Earnings of Part-Time m Full-Time Workers, HUM-
BOLDT J. Soc. REL., Spring-Summer 1983, at 61; Elaine R. Ognibene, Moving Beyond "True Wo-
men" Myths: Women and Work, HUMBOLDT J. Soc. REL., Spring-Summer 1983, at 7.
25. HEWLETT, supra note 21, at 82. This statistic contrasts sharply with never-married women
who have complete wage parity with never-married men. Id.
26. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 165.
27. HEWLETT, supra note 21, at 81-83.
28. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research 21-22
[Vol. 40
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educational levels.2 9 However, where a difference exists, women more
than men marry people with higher educational attainment.3° When this
occurs the husband has further advantages in divorce mediation. 31 One's
(April 1985) (unpublished manuscript, available from the authors at Center for Policy Research,
1720 Emerson Street, Denver, Colorado 80218).
29. Eg., Steven Rytina et al., Inequality and Intermarriage: A Paradox of Motive and Con-
straint, 66 Soc. FORCES 645 (1988); Gillian Stevens et al., Education and Attractiveness in Marriage
Choices, 53 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 62 (1990); Gillian Stevens & Robert Schoen, Linguistic Intermarriage
in the United States, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 267 (1988).
30. For instance, Stevens, Owens and Schaefer recently conducted a study of newly married
couples in a geographic area offering both a major university and a community college. They found
the mean post-secondary education of the grooms to be 2.14 years, whereas the mean post-secondary
education of the brides was 1.90 years. Stevens et al., supra note 29, at 66. Additionally, data
collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1983 showed that married white men aged 25 to 34
years old had a mean of 13.3 years of education, whereas married white women aged 25 to 34 years
old had a mean of 13.0 years of education. Id. at 66 n.8.
The tendency for women to marry men with higher educational levels than themselves is linked to
women's tendency to pay more attention to the economic characteristics of their prospective marital
partners than men. Paul DiMaggio & John Mohr, Cultural Capital, Educational Attainment, and
Marital Selection, 90 AM. J. Soc. 1231 (1985). However, some evidence exists that younger women,
because of their greater opportunity for economic independence, pay less attention to economic char-
acteristics of prospective husbands than do older women. Stevens et al., supra note 29, at 68.
Old attitudes, however, die hard. Husbands who feel their wives are "over-educated" tend to
report their marriages as "stressful," whereas achievement-oriented wives tend to find marriage
"satisfying" when they are married to men they perceive as "overeducated." Carlton A. Hornung &
B. Claire McCullough, Status Relationships in Dual-Employment Marriages: Consequences for Psy-
chological Well-Being, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 125, 138 (1981).
31. A small educational disparity between the husband and wife, while itself insignificant, may
mask significant power differences. Education correlates more closely with power for men than
women because men, unlike women, have converted their educational capital into greater earnings
and/or higher occupational levels. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 167. For instance, one study
found that education correlated with securing positions of authority, but the relationship proved
three times stronger for men than for women. Belle Rose Ragins & Eric Sundstrom, Gender and
Power in Organizations: A Longitudinal Perspective, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 51, 68 (1989) (citing M.S.
Hill, Authority at Work- How Men and Women Differ, in 7 FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES:
PATrERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 107-46 (G.J. Duncan & J.N. Morgan eds., 1980). Thus, while
educational differences between husbands and wives might be minimal, they reflect power disparities
between spouses because of the systematically different impacts on husbands' and wives' access to
other power resources.
Educational attainment carries additional importance to women in divorce mediation because it is
associated with at least two intangible psychological power bases. See infra notes 123-41 and accom-
panying text for discussion of self-esteem as an intangible power base; see also infra notes 96-122 and
accompanying text for discussion of depression as an intangible power base. Women with higher
educational attainment are less depressed and have higher self-esteem than women with lower educa-
tional achievement. Patricia M. Ulbrich, The Determinants of Depression in Two-Income Marriages,
50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 121, 128-29 (1988). Consequently, while a well-educated wife may not
have the same access to income as her well-educated husband, she may possess greater self-esteem
and be less depressed than less educated wives. She may still have difficulty negotiating effectively
with her powerful husband, but she should have less difficulty than a wife with lower educational
achievement. Furthermore, highly educated wives, as opposed to wives with lower education, more
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occupation also can increase one's negotiating strength by providing
training or information relevant to divorce issues. If the husband is an
attorney or a corporate financial officer, his occupation provides him
knowledge of legal rights and finances. Moreover, some occupations re-
quire negotiation skills. A construction foreman, for instance, must
negotiate.
In contrast to the negotiating strength husbands acquire through
their work, fifty percent of married women have no employment outside
the home. The knowledge and skill these wives gain through homemak-
ing and child rearing do not prepare them for divorce negotiations on
financial issues. Moreover, while mothers have knowledge that creates
negotiating strength on child issues, as I explain in Part II, mediator
coercion and bias deprive the mother of this child-centered power base.32
Women who do work remain segregated into female-typed occupa-
tions that require only minimal levels of the knowledge and skills helpful
in divorce negotiations. 3s Even if the wife works outside the home then
her occupation likely will not provide her with knowledge and negotia-
tion skill equivalent to her husband's. Unsurprisingly, divorce mediators
acknowledge that the husband's greater financial expertise34 and his oc-
cupational experience can make him a significantly more effective negoti-
likely prefer working outside the home, encounter less husband resistance to their working, and
believe their husbands favor their employment. Id. at 127. Well-educated wives, then, should tend
to work with greater frequency and possess more income and occupational prestige than less edu-
cated wives.
32. See infra notes 211-41 and accompanying text.
33. For instance, in 1981 women clustered into a few occupational categories: 34.7% of all
employed women were clerical workers; 25% were in education (except higher education), health
care (except medicine), and food and domestic service; another 17% were professional and technical
workers with 4.9% health workers, 5.3% noncollege teachers, and 6.8% other professional and
technical workers; and only 13.5% employed women had managed to penetrate blue-collar occupa-
tions. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 169.
Turning to professions that might require knowledge and skills helpful in divorce negotiation, in
1980 women represented 13.4% of physicians, 12.8% of lawyers and 8.6% of industrial engineers.
Although these percentages represent significant increases since 1970, they clearly fall short of equal-
ity with men. Id.
Women are concentrated in the lowest ranks of organizations, and are underrepresented in rela-
tively powerful managerial positions. Some estimate that women occupy 15% of entry-level man-
ager positions, only 5% of all middle level manager slots, and just 1% of top management positions.
Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 51. Promotion from lower to higher ranks in a labor market
category also can prove more difficult for women than for men. Thomas A. DiPrete & Whitman T.
Soule, Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job Ladder Systems, 53 AM. Soc. REV. 26 (1988).
34. As Kressel observed from his studies on divorce mediation: "Although husbands were fre-
quently uninformed about financial matters, they were paragons of financial expertise in comparison
to their wives." KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 53.
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ator than his wife.35
B. Effects of Tangible Resource Power On Mediated Outcomes
Research on divorce mediation focuses on efficiency concerns that
appeal to formal justice system administrators,36 rather than on the diffi-
cult, and potentially embarrassing, question of how power imbalances
between negotiating spouses affect mediated outcomes. Marital decision-
making research, however, provides insight into how tangible resource
power affects mediated outcomes because spouses bring their marital
conflict resolution and communication styles with them into divorce me-
diation,37 where these patterns resist change.3 8
35. Isolina Ricci, Mediator's Notebook- Reflections on Promoting Equal Empowerment and Enti-
tlements for Women, J. DIVORCE, Spring-Summer 1985, at 49, 57. Richard Curtis suggests that
men's negotiating advantage in the family extends to interpersonal as well as financial issues. He
explains that men's power in families exceeds what one would expect based solely on men's posses-
sion of more tangible resources because men have acquired skills in interpersonal exchanges from
their work:
The "resource" theory of family power can be used to misconstrue the significance of
extra-familial resources by proceeding as if intra-familial exchanges follow the economic
set of rules. The present argument is that [the] rules governing family bargaining are
largely noneconomic and that in this interaction men are often in the position of pitting
organizational skills learned in the family and in larger organizational settings against
skills learned by the women within the family only.
Richard F. Curtis, Household and Family in Theory on Inequality, 51 Am. Soc. REv. 168, 179
(1986) (citation omitted).
36. See, ag., HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 141-44; RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD
JUSTICE IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE xxvi-xxvii (1987);
KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 185-202; Koopman, supra note 1, at 125; Levy, supra note 1.
37. Many commentators specifically note that couples bring prior marital conflict resolution
styles and communication patterns into divorce mediation. Eg., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9,
at 184-85 (mediation participants bring with them preexisting "patterns of dominance and submis-
sion, deference and competition, and dependence [and] competence" and can be expected to resort to
familiar and comfortable power patterns during negotiations in mediation); KRESSEL, supra note I,
at 38-39; Emily M. Brown, The Emotional Context of Divorce. Implications for Mediation, in ALTER-
NATIVE MEANS, supra note 1, at 43, 45; Howard H. Irving & Michael Benjamin, Therapeutic Family
Mediation: Fitting the Service to the Interactional Diversity of Client Couples, MEDIATION Q., Winter
1989, at 115-16, 122. This tendency for personal stability of conflict resolution style also has been
recognized in conflict resolution research. Eg., Robert J. Sternberg & Diane M. Dobson, Resolving
Interpersonal Conflicts" An Analysis of Stylistic Consistency, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
794 (1987); Robert J. Sternberg & Lawrence J. Soriano, Styles of Conflict Resolution, 47 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 115 (1984).
Many other writers discussing divorce mediation techniques implicitly recognize the persistence
of preexisting communication patterns when they attempt to explain how to interrupt and change
these patterns during mediation. Eg., George Sargent & Bleema Moss, Ericksonian Approaches in
Family Therapy and Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1986-Spring 1987, at 87; Richard B. Stuart
& Barbara Jacobson, Principles of Divorce Mediation: A Social Learning Theory Approach, MEDIA-
TION Q., Winter 1986-Spring 1987, at 71, 79-80.
38. As noted by Bruch, "In less dramatic cases, too, established patterns of spousal interaction
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Research on marital negotiations shows that the greater income and
education and the higher occupational level of husbands, compared to
wives, confers upon husbands greater power over routine decisions and
decisions on issues over which the couple frequently disagrees. 9 More-
over, husbands believe they control decisions over important financial
issues,' whereas they perceive as shared or wife-dominated less impor-
are virtually impossible for a weaker spouse to overcome under the emotional pressure of unaccom-
panied face-to-face negotiations." Carol S. Bruch, And How are the Children? The Effects of Ideol-
ogy and Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 8 INT'L
J.L. & FAM. 106, 120 (1988).
Two therapeutic family mediators felt four to eight two-hour sessions were necessary for them to
successfully alter preexisting marital communication patterns of their relatively elite clientele, who
present fewer problems than clients in court affiliated programs. Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37,
at 116, 123. However, most mediation takes place in court affiliated mediation programs, Myers et
al., supra note 19, at 20; Pearson et al., Decision to Mediate, supra note 19, at 21, and the average
time taken to complete a mediation in such programs is significantly shorter than the time needed by
Irving and Benjamin to simply alter the spouses' preexisting communication patterns. Pearson &
Thoennes, supra note 1. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text for fuller discussion of this
issue.
39. In their research on marital decisionmaking, Blood and Wolfe asked respondents whether
the husband or wife usually made the "final" decision about: (1) what car to buy; (2) whether or not
to buy life insurance; (3) what house or apartment to take; (4) what job (the husband) should take;
(5) whether or not (the wife) should go to work or quit work; (6) how much money the family can
afford to spend per week on food; (7) what doctor to have when someone is sick; (8) where to go on
vacation. ROBERT 0. BLOOD & DONALD M. WOLFE, HUSBANDS AND WIVES: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARRIED LIVING 282 (1964). The responses to these questions were then collapsed into an index
measuring family decisionmaking. This index has produced quite consistent results in the United
States and Western Europe: husbands have greater decisional power than their wives, e.g.,
SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra note 13 at 68, and that power is rooted in possession of
greater income, education and occupational status. Eg., Richard Centers et al., Conjugal Power
Structure" A Re-Examination, 36 AM. Soc. REV. 264 (1971); Dair L. Gillespie, Who Has the Power?
The Marital Struggle, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 445, 451 (1971); see also Rene Konig, Family and
Authority: The German Father in 1955, 5 Soc. REv. 107, 124 (1957); Eugene Lupri, Contemporary
Authority Patterns in the West German Family: A Study in Cross-National Validation, 31 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 134 (1969); Andree Michel, Comparative Data Concerning the Interaction in French
and American Families, 29 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 337 (1967); cf Denise B. Kandel & Gerald S.
Lesser, Marital Decision-Making in American and Danish Urban Families: A Research Note, 34 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 134 (1972) (contending that educational attainment and not occupational status
is strongly related to spousal bargaining power). But see Glenn R. Hawkes & Minna Taylor, Power
Structure in Mexican and Mexican-American Farm Labor Families, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 807
(1975) (egalitarianism found to be the most common mode of marital decisioning in farm labor
families).
Other research addressing which spouse more frequently resolves often contested issues in his or
her favor reveals similar results: husbands more frequently than wives resolve heavily conflicted
issues in their favor. SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra note 13, at 68-69.
40. Husbands tend to perceive themselves controlling decisions related to: (1) the type ofjob the
husband will take; (2) the purchase of life insurance; (3) the use of available money; and (4) the
purchase of a car. Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Family Sociology or Wives' Family Sociology? A
Cross-Cultural Examination of Decision-Making, 31 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 290, 297 (1969).
1992] POLITICS OF POWER
tant financial decisions or mundane decisions requiring time to imple-
ment.41 That employed wives have more decisional power relative to
their husbands than unemployed wives,42 further illustrates the impor-
tance of tangible resources to marital negotiating power.43
41. As an example, husbands tend to perceive the power over decisionmaking pertaining to
what house or apartment to buy, what doctor to consult, how many children to have, and choice of
friends as shared with their wives. They see their wives as having greater power only over decisions
related to purchasing food, clothing, furniture or household items, relations with in-laws, and rear-
ing children. As indicated by Safilios-Rothschild:
This pattern may not be a mere coincidence but rather an indication that American
husbands do not wish to take on "bothersome" decisions which are not crucial (with the
exception of the child-rearing decision) and take too much of the time and energy that
they prefer to dedicate to their work or leisure-time activities.
Id.
42. Eg., Robert 0. Blood, Jr. & Robert L. Hamblin, The Effects of the Wife's Employment on
the Family Power Structure, 36 Soc. FORCES 347 (1958); Rae L. Blumberg & Marion T. Coleman, A
Theoretical Look at the Gender Balance of Power in the American Couple, 10 J. FAM. ISSuES 225
(1989); David M. Heer, Dominance and the Working Wife, 36 Soc. FORCES 341 (1958); Sarah Ro-
senfield, The Effects of Women's Employment: Personal Control and Sex Differences in Mental
Health, 30 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 77, 78 (1989); Scott J. South, Sex Ratios, Economic Power,
and Women's Roles: A Theoretical Extension and Empirical Test, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 19
(1988); Glenna Spitze, Women's Employment and Family Relations: A Review, 50 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 595, 602 (1988).
One researcher suggests that this greater decisional power within marriage may account for the
tendency of wives to prefer their outside employment more than their husbands prefer their own
even though that employment produces work overloads for employed wives. Marianne A. Ferber,
Labor Market Participation of Young Married Women: Causes and Effects, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
457, 465 (1982).
43. David Heer suggests wives with children have less power than their childless counterparts
because the child care responsibilities inhibit their ability to mobilize the options or resources that
might otherwise give them power. David M. Heer, The Measurement and Bases of Family Power: An
Overview, MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING, May 1963, at 133, 137-39 [hereinafter Heer, Family Power].
As Judith Laws suggests, Heer's explanation fits nicely into social exchange theory that posits the
partner with fewer alternatives (a lower comparison level of alternatives), as more dependent, and
thus less powerful, than the partner with more numerous attractive options. Judith L. Laws, A
Feminist Review of Marital Adjustment Literature: The Rape of the Locke, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAm.
483, 492 (1971). Social exchange theory also anticipates that coalition formation by the less power-
ful person will curb exploitation by the more powerful individual. In the isolation and privacy of the
family, however, the wife with children cannot readily form coalitions to avoid exploitation. Iad
Laws, thus, agrees:
[C]hildbearing is used as a mechanism for the suppression of women's exercise of their
talents and rights to determine the conditions of their lives. Heer's analysis makes it
clear that a woman is not esteemed, in the culture or in the small society of her family, in
proportion to her exercise of her "glory," childbearing .... The data on working wives
and on family power tell us... that to the extent that a woman is unable to exercise her
options (e.g., working), her status is depressed. She is least able to do this when she has
young children; and the more children she has, the more this is true. Completing the
vicious circle, of course, is the probability that in the absence of viable alternatives the
young wife decides to have yet another baby, and thereby perpetuate her powerlessness.
Id. at 493.
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Tangible resources probably create more power for the husband in
divorce negotiations than marital decisionmaking research indicates.
Spouses inevitably develop psychological and emotional interdependen-
cies.' A wife then has some power over her husband during marriage
because of his dependence on her for emotional and psychological sup-
port, as well as sexual gratification.4  At divorce these sources of power
evaporate.4 Thus, tangible resources probably have even more influence
in divorce than in marital negotiations.
In summary, marital decisionmaking research suggests that, unless
the mediator intervenes, the husband's greater tangible resources will
grant him the lion's share of power in divorce negotiations, particularly
over critical financial issues.4 7 Differences in possession of tangible re-
44. People in all types of relatively long-term social relationships develop these interdependen-
cies. See, e.g., ROBERT L. BURGESS & TED L. HUSTON, SOCIAL EXCHANGE IN DEVELOPING RE-
LATIONSHIPS (1979); JOHN H. SCANZONI ET AL., THE SEXUAL BOND: RETHINKING FAMILIES AND
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS (1989); Blumberg & Coleman, supra note 42, at 235.
45. See Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, A Macro- and Micro-Examination of Family Power and
Love.. An Exchange Model, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 355 (1976).
46. Mediator Isolina Ricci acknowledges: "[Tihe reciprocity on the emotional investment she
assumed she generated in her past family relationships with her husband is not uniformly honored in
the business world of divorce, where facts, figures, projections and written agreements are the norm,
rather than attentiveness to interpersonal feelings or attitudes. Ricci, supra note 35, at 53. She also
notes that husbands may become reluctant to pay spousal maintenance because their wives no longer
provide them with emotional nurturance. Id. at 58.
47. While research shows husbands exercising more decisional control than wives, some suggest
that methodological problems have prevented marital decisionmaking research from revealing the
full extent of the husband's decisional control. Gillespie argues that Blood and Wolfe failed to ex-
pose the full extent of husband dominance because they gave all decisions equal weight. Thus, deter-
mining which doctor to use, typically the wife's decision, may not indicate the same level of power as
determining what job the husband should take, typically the husband's decision. In Blood and
Wolfe's research, however, the respective control of the husband and wife over these two decisional
spheres would indicate that they possess equivalent power. Gillespie argues that the researchers
failed to consider that a decision on what food to buy, usually the wife's decision, would be made
with far greater frequency than a decision regarding the wife's employment, usually controlled by
the husband. The greater frequency of food decisions thus would inaccurately inflate the estimation
of the wife's power relative to her husband's. Gillespie, supra note 39, at 446.
Others have criticized marital decisionmaking research for theoretical, as well as methodological,
weaknesses. Eg., Gerald W. McDonald, Family Power. The Assessment ofa Decade of Theory and
Research, 1970-1979, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 841 (1980); Daisy Quarm, Random Measurement
Error as a Source of Discrepancies Between the Reports of Wives and Husbands Concerning Marital
Power and Task Allocation, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 521 (1981). Furthermore, the research has
failed to explore sufficiently the distinctions between power dynamics in ethnic minority marriages
and predominantly white majoritarian families. See, eg., Vicky L. Cromwell & Ronald E. Crom-
well, Perceived Dominance in Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution Among Anglo, Black and
Chicano Couples, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 749 (1978).
Despite these criticisms, however, those studying marital power generally have come to accept
the importance of tangible resources to power in marital decisionmaking. E.g., Blumberg & Cole-
man, supra note 42; Centers et al., supra note 39; Spitze, supra note 42, at 602.
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sources, however, are only one source of inequality between spouses. In-
tangible factors such as status, dominance, depression, self esteem,
reward expectation and fear of achievement further empower the hus-
band during divorce mediation. My next section explores these intangi-
ble factors and their contribution to inequality in divorce negotiations.
C. Intangible Resources
1. Introduction. Numerous experts recognize the importance of
intangible factors in negotiations.48 Mediation literature itself acknowl-
edges several that affect the power of mediating spouses: (1) guilt at initi-
ating the divorce;49 (2) diminished self-worth caused by rejection;50 and
(3) risk aversiveness. 51 These acknowledged attributes do not, however,
suggest systematic disadvantages to either wives or husbands because
they have potentially contradictory effects on divorce negotiations. For
instance, guilt may cause the initiating spouse to "give away the farm,"
or to lash out in anger at the perceived victim spouse.52 Moreover, these
characteristics are not found more commonly in one sex than the other.1
3
Consequently, while these particular intangible factors might create
48. Eg., KREssEL, supra note 1, at 125; PRUrrr, supra note 11, at 45; Donald G. Gifford, A
Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 Omio ST. L.J. 41, 67 (1985).
49. KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 82.
50. Id. at 83.
51. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 969-71, 978-79. Characteristic of mediation pro-
ponents, Professor Mnookin fails to recognize other psychological variables that might affect an
individual's ability to negotiate effectively. He does acknowledge that a party's capacity to negotiate
might be affected adversely by the emotional trauma of divorce. Id. at 971-72. He leaves unex-
plored, however, how men and women might differ in their emotional response to divorce and how
that difference might affect their respective abilities to negotiate effectively.
52. KRESSEL, supra note I, at 83. Kressel provides another example of the unpredictability of
these characteristics in negotiations. He notes that diminished self-worth potentially can cause the
rejected spouse to abjectly accept whatever the initiating spouse offers. Id. On the other hand, the
rejected spouse also might take an extreme position on an issue in an attempt to save face or sabotage
negotiations in hopes of preventing divorce. Id at 223. The first response would disadvantage the
rejected spouse, whereas the latter reaction might well produce significant concessions from an over-
anxious initiator.
53. Predicting whether husbands are more likely than wives to feel guilt at having initiated the
divorce is difficult because research is inconclusive as to whether husbands or wives more frequently
file for divorce. Several studies reveal that after the passage of no-fault divorce laws husbands filed
for divorce more frequently than their wives. Compare B.G. Gunter & Doyle P. Johnson, Divorce
Filings as Role Behavior Effect of No-Fault Law on Divorce Filing Patterns, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
571 (1978) and B.G. Gunter, Notes on Divorce Filing as Role Behavior, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 95
(1977) with Ruth B. Dixon & Lenore J. Weitzman, When Husbands File for Divorce, 44 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 103 (1982) (indicating the percentage of husbands filing for divorce in California
jurisdictions increased dramatically after implementation of no-fault divorce, but the percentage of
wives filing still exceeded the percentage of husbands). Filing behavior, however, does not necessar-
ily indicate which spouse actually made the decision to divorce. See Antonette M. Zeiss et al., Sex
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power differences in an individual marriage, they provide little insight
into how mediation systematically disadvantages wives or husbands.
Some intangible factors,54 however, do differ between males and fe-
males,55 and knowledge exists on how these factors affect negotiating or
decisionmaking ability. This section explores these known intangible dif-
ferences between men and women and shows how these differences sys-
tematically disadvantage wives in divorce mediation. Remarkably, no
known factor systemically disadvantages men, with the possible excep-
tion of sex role ideology's impact on men's control over children that is
treated in Part II.
2. Status. Income, education, occupational rank, and sex deter-
mine an individual's status. Status disparity between husbands and wives
becomes important in divorce mediation because high status people have
authority,56 command automatic deference, and exert subtle and covert
control over lower status people.5 7 As already shown, husbands earn far
Differences in Initiation of and Adjustment to Divorce, J. DIVORCE, Winter 1980, at 21 (an Oregon
study revealing wives made the decision to divorce more frequently than their husbands).
Furthermore, while one intuitively might expect husbands to be less risk aversive than their wives
because of their superior power bases, other factors suggest just the opposite. Husbands might be
more risk aversive than wives simply because they may have more to lose in financial negotiations.
Additionally, women tend to attribute their successes and failures in life to forces outside themselves,
such as luck. See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text for discussion of this point. Conse-
quently, having grown comfortable with the idea of lack of control, women might be less reluctant
than men to pursue a course of action in which success depends on luck. Hence, contrary to intui-
tion, women might be less risk aversive than men. Some support for this conclusion lies in research
indicating that women prefer activities involving luck, whereas men prefer activities which depend
upon skill. Kay Deaux, From Individual Differences to Social Categories: Analysis of a Decade's
Research on Gender, 39 AM. PSYCHOLoGisr 105, 106 (1984).
54. Some recognize that women possess and rely upon "individual" resources such as intelli-
gence, wit, beauty, sexuality, youth, potential parenthood, nurturance, charm, and gentleness to
secure power in interpersonal relationships. See LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 21. However,
no systematic disparity exists between the intelligence of women and men that would advantage
women in divorce negotiations. Furthermore, because of their exchange value, the other resources
mentioned above may prove important power bases during the development and duration of an
interpersonal relationship. During divorce, however, the husband no longer depends upon his future
ex-wife for the provision of these resources, and these resources no longer provide the wife bases of
power.
55. Research largely fails to investigate distinctions between white and minority women in their
possession of intangible factors explored in this section. The data presented here thus must be inter-
preted accordingly.
56. Alice H. Eagly, Gender and Social Influence, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 971 (1983). See also
SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra note 13, at 82-83.
57. Joseph Berger & Morris Zelditch, Jr., Artifacts and Challenges: A Comment on Lee and
Ofshe, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 59 (1983); Eagly, supra note 56; McDonald, supra note 47; Charlan
Jeanne Nemeth, Reflections on the Dialogue Between Status and Style: Influence Processes of Social
Control and Social Change, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 70 (1983); Aysan Tuzlak & James C. Moore, Jr.,
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more income than wives and, while only small educational disparities
exist between spouses, the resulting status distinctions can be large. For
instance, the husband with a four-year college degree has far greater sta-
tus than his wife who completed three years of college.
Women also remain segregated in lower status occupations.5 8 In
1981 almost eighty percent of all working women held low status jobs,59
whereas men occupy positions throughout all occupational ranks.' In
1980 fifty-one percent of employed women worked in female-typed occu-
pations6" that provide less pay, power, and prestige than male-typed oc-
cupations.62 When women do infiltrate high status occupations, they
remain underrepresented at the highest levels,63 and even the few women
who do occupy high status male-typed positions do not acquire the same
status as males occupying those positions."
The disparity in occupational status between men and women be-
comes more pronounced in many marriages. 5 Fifty percent of married
women have no occupation other than homemaker 66 - an occupation
with a status roughly equivalent to that of a skilled clerk in a female-
dominated occupation.67 Moreover, when a highly educated wife does
work outside the home, she tends to hold a lower status job than her
husband because of perceived incompatibility of career and family
Status, Demeanor and Influence: An Empirical Reassessment, 47 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 178 (1984). For
instance, French and Raven describe legitimate power as a leader's ability to influence another's
behavior regardless of the leader's actual competence or the leader's potential benefit to the other.
The more the leader's influence attempts are perceived as legitimate, the less likely the individual at
whom they are directed will resist. French & Raven, supra note 13, at 158-67.
58. See supra note 33.
59. Nancy Reeves, Reality Gap, HUMBOLDT J. Soc. REL., Spring-Summer 1983, at 215, 219
(women occupied low-paying, low-skilled jobs).
60. Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 56.
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 56; JANET SALTZMAN, SEX AND ADVANTAGE 14 (1984).
63. For instance, in organizations women are concentrated in the lowest ranks and are under-
represented in relatively powerful managerial positions. Some estimate that women occupy 15% of
entry level manager positions, only 5% of middle level manager slots, and just 1% of top manage-
ment positions. Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 51. In other prestigious male-typed profes-
sions the researchers observe that women "may still be segregated into female-typed specialties that
offer fewer resources for power than do male-typed specialties." Id. at 56.
64. Id.
65. Beth Ensminger Vanfossen, Sexual Stratification and Sex-Role Socialization, 39 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 563 (1977).
66. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
67. Linda Burzotta Nilson, The Social Standing of a Housewife, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 541
(1978). Moreover, homemaker status likely will decline in the future because young people value the
role less than older people. Id.
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responsibilities.68
Men also have more status simply because they are male. Although
men's greater status has historical roots in possession of more income,
education, and occupational status,69 maleness now has acquired in-
dependent salience as a status cue.70 That both males and females per-
ceive an occupation as less desirable when they anticipate increased
female participation 71 reflects the lower status attributed to females.
Husbands thus have more status than their wives due to their sex.
Because divorce mediation primarily is task-oriented,72 research on
68. See HEwLETr, supra note 21, at 77-88; Denise Del Vento Bielby & William T. Bielby, Work
Commitment, Sex-Role Attitudes, and Women's Employment, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 234, 245 (1984).
But see Jon LorenceA Test of "Gender" and "Job"Models of Sex Differences in Job Involvement, 66
Soc. FORCES 121 (1987) (characteristics of the job setting influence female and male job
involvement).
69. Eg., Joseph Berger et al., Status Organizing Processes, 1980 ANN. REv. Soc. 479; Alice H.
Eagly & Wendy Wood, Inferred Sex Differences in Status as a Determinant of Gender Stereotypes
about Social Influence, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 915 (1982); Wendy Wood & Stephen J.
Karten, Sex Differences in Interaction Style as a Product of Perceived Sex Differences in Competence,
50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 341 (1986).
70. Berger et al., supra note 69; Eagly & Wood, supra note 69; Catherine Radecki & Joyce
Jennings (Walstedt), Sex as a Status Variable in Work Settings: Female and Male Reports of Domi.
nance Behavior, 10 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 71 (1980).
For instance, studies indicate that lower class husbands, who do not possess high levels of tangi-
ble resources compared to their wives, exert a high degree of control over their spouses. SCANZONI,
SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra note 13, at 81. In addition to the power inherent in being male, some
of this control likely stems from lower class couples' adherence to traditional sex role ideology. See
infra notes 174-241 and accompanying text for discussion of sex role ideology and marital power.
Studies also reveal that peers consistently evaluate male leaders more positively than female lead-
ers. Virginia Brown & Florence L. Geis, Turning Lead into Gold: Evaluations of Men and Women
Leaders and the Alchemy of Social Consensus, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1984);
Jeffrey A. Kelly et al., Gender and Sex Role Differences in Group Decision-Making Social Interac-
tions: A BehavioralAnalysis, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 112 (1982); Wood & Karten, supra note
69. This gender-biased evaluation occurs even when both sexes perform identical behaviors. Brown
& Geis, supra. The relatively negative evaluation of females appears rooted in the belief that males
are more competent than females. Wood & Karten, supra note 69.
Research in the corporate arena, likewise, indicates that male managers perceive female managers
as less powerful than their male counterparts and less likely to have future upward mobility within
the organization. Mary Glenn Wiley & Arlene Eskilson, Scaling the Corporate Ladder: Sex Differ-
ences in Expectations for Performance, Power and Mobility, 47 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 351 (1983) [herein.
after, Wiley & Eskilson, Scaling the Corporate Ladder]; Mary Glenn Wiley & Arlene Eskilson,
Coping in the Corporation: Sex Role Constraints, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
Wiley, & Eskilson, Sex Role Constraints].
71. John C. Touchey, Effects of Additional Women Professionals on Ratings of Occupational
Prestige and Desirability, 29 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 86 (1974).
72. Although a couple may process some emotional problems during divorce mediation, their
main goal is to reach an agreement. See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text for discussion of
mediation's task orientation. See also Haynes, supra note 9 (a task-oriented description of the ideal
mediation process).
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influence in task-oriented small groups7" provides insight into status ef-
fects in divorce mediation.74 In task-oriented groups men's greater status
enables them to participate more and engage in more task-oriented be-
havior than women. 7 ' These behaviors facilitate men's becoming group
leaders.7 6 Men's greater status also leads other group members to expect
73. The reconceptualization of mediation as a task-oriented small group phenomenon receives
support from Vanderkooi and Pearson's research on the Denver Mediation Project. They note that
many mediators who begin with a therapeutic approach tend to become more task-oriented as they
gain experience. Lois Vanderkooi & Jessica Pearson, Mediating Divorce Disputes: Mediator Behav-
iors, Styles and Roles, 32 FAM. REL. 557, 565 (1983). Furthermore, after noting that mediators of
custody/visitation disputes frequently participate actively in formulating the agreement, they state:
"tMediation may be more aptly characterized as a participatory forum for disputants and mediators
together to attempt to generate answers to difficult, painful and terribly important questions." Id.
74. This analogy poses some difficulty. Most frequently the research on status influence con-
cers newly-formed groups of strangers, rather than groups where the participants have prior knowl-
edge of one another, as is true of divorce mediation. Two studies conducted in the early 1960's also
suggested that the effect of status upon influence decreased as the prior acquaintance of the group's
members increased. Berger et al., supra note 69, at 480. However, even though the effect decreased,
it did not disappear. Moreover, the strongest and central findings of the research support this anal-
ogy. As noted by Berger, Rosenholtz and Zelditch, when groups contained participants initially
unequal in power,
[i]nequalities significant outside the group were maintained inside the group. The
power-prestige order of the group correlated with external status differences; more im-
portant, it appeared to be "instantaneously" created instead of evolving out of the face-
to-face interaction of the members of the group. It did not seem to make much differ-
ence what kind of status differentiated the group: [t]he same effect was found for age,
sex, race, occupation, ethnicity, education, and organizational office .... But, most
importantly, it did not make any difference whether or not the status characteristic had
any prior, established association with the goal or task of the group.
Id. See also Linda D. Molm, Gender, Power, and Legitimation: A Test of Three Theories, 91 AM. J.
Soc. 1356, 1363-64 (1986) (making a similar argument for the validity of extending expectation
states theory to dyadic interaction). Family decisionmaking research and theory also supports the
viability of the analogy. While most husbands exercise more marital decisionmaking power than
their wives, the most powerful husbands are those with high status. SCANZONI, SEXuAL BARGAIN-
ING, supra note 13, at 69-70, 79-83.
75. Eg., B.F. Meeker & P.A. Weitzel-O'Neill, Sex Roles and Interpersonal Behavior in Task-
Oriented Groups, 42 AM. Soc. REv. 91 (1977); Berger et al., supra note 69, at 494-96; see generally
Wood & Karten, supra note 69. Of course, status is not the only factor which increases men's
leadership potential in task-oriented groups. Their sex role socialization encourages dominance, self-
expression and assertiveness. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the liter-
ature on influence in small groups suggests that one's demeanor also affects one's ability to influence.
See Margaret T. Lee & Richard Ofshe, The Impact of Behavioral Style and Status Characteristics on
Social Influence: A Test of Two Competing Theories, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 73 (1981); Aysan Sev'er,
Simultaneous Effects of Status and Task Cuea Combining, Eliminating, or Buffering?, 52 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 327 (1989); see generally Nemeth, supra note 57.
76. Eg., Edwin I. Megaree, Influence of Sex Roles on the Manifestation of Leadership, 53 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 377 (1969); Cecelia L. Ridgeway, Status in Groups: The Importance of Motiva-
tion, 47 AM. Soc. Ray. 76 (1982); see generally Wood & Karten, supra note 69.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
greater competence from men than from lesser status women, 7 and cre-
ates their willing deference to men's leadership attempts. 8 Men thus
exercise greater influence over results than lower status women.
The lower status of women, relative to men, also leads to women's
greater influenceability79 and conformity. 80 Moreover, women seem
77. Wood & Karten, supra note 69, at 341.
For instance, Molm states:
Expectation states theory proposes that differences in external status characteristics such
as sex, race and age are used by group members to form initial expectations about the
relative competencies of individuals working on a group task. These expectations in turn
will affect important features of group interaction. In the absence of information to the
contrary, groups will assume that members who are higher on the status characteristic
will be more competent at the task than those of lower status. These expectations essen-
tially act as a self-fulfilling prophecy: [t]he persons for whom higher performance expec-
tations are held will get more opportunities to participate, initiate more actions, receive
more positive reactions from other group members and have more influence on group
decisions. As a result, they will achieve higher status and power within the group, thus
perpetuating the members' original beliefs about the relations between the status charac-
teristic and attributes of the individual members. A large number of carefully controlled
experiments, using a standardized setting, have provided support for the assumptions of
the theory.
Linda D. Molm, Gender and Power Use. An Experimental Analysis of Behavior and Perceptions, 48
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 286 (1985) (citations omitted).
78. A recent study by Eagly and Wood illustrates how sexual and occupational status are re-
lated to people's expectations of one's ability to influence another. The researchers found that when
subjects were shown scenarios depicting a man attempting to influence a woman or a woman trying
to influence a man, subjects believed that the woman held a lower status job than the man and that
the woman was more likely to behaviorally comply with the man's influence attempt than the man
was to comply with such an attempt by the woman. However, when subjects were given job status
information, they then rated the relative power of the man and woman on the basis of job status
rather than sex role expectations. Eagly & Wood, supra note 69, at 920. If one places these dynam-
ics in the context of divorce negotiations, the mediator and the wife would expect the husband,
because of his sex and his probable higher occupational status, to influence them and that expecta-
tion would encourage the husband to engage in influence attempts.
One should not make too much, however, of the implications in this study that other status cues,
such as occupational prestige, can totally erase the higher status normally imputed to males. On this
point, Eagly herself has questioned the applicability of the study beyond the organizational context,
as well as its validity in the organizational context. Eagly, supra note 56, at 975.
79. While researchers have sometimes questioned whether studies actually establish sex differ-
ences in influenceability, eg., Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in Influenceability, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL.
86 (1978) [hereinafter Eagly, Sex Differences], more recent and statistically sophisticated studies
have generated acceptance of this finding. For instance, in an earlier review, Eagly found that,
although textbooks typically expressed the view that women are more easily influenced than men,
the majority of studies conducted reported no significant sex differences in influenceability. Id. at 86-
89. More recently she has been convinced by research which aggregates the findings of numerous
studies and conclude that findings of sex differences in influenceability rise to levels of statistical
significance. Eagly, supra note 56, at 976. However, while the average differences between the sexes
may be small, Deaux notes, "differences in the proportions of males and females occurring at the
extremes of the distribution or even the percentages above the median may be quite substantial and
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most influenceable in settings, like divorce mediation, requiring ongoing
interaction between the sexes."1 Thus, while the higher status of men
enhances their ability to influence,8" the corresponding lesser status of
women promotes their greater influenceability.83 Unsurprisingly, re-
search on marital power indicates high status husbands possess the most
power of all husbands over marital decisions.8 4 Taken together, this re-
search on status effects strongly suggests that husbands will act as influ-
ential leaders and that wives will defer to husbands during divorce
mediation.
3. Dominance. Men's greater status also promotes dominance be-
haviors85 important in divorce negotiations.8 6 For instance, men engage
thus have some practical significance." Kay Deaux, Sex and Gender, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 49,
62 (1985). The debate thus goes on.
80. Eagly, supra note 56, at 976-77. An alternative explanation for the women's, as opposed to
men's, greater influenceability is the greater concern of women with the relationships among group
members. Eg., Eagly, Sex Differences, supra note 79, at 103-04; Douglas M. Tuthill & Donelson R.
Forsyth, Sex Differences in Opinion Conformity and Dissent, 116 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 205 (1982).
81. The tendency for men to exert more influence than women appears stronger in studies al-
lowing for actual interaction between the sexes than in studies where subjects are merely requested to
relate their expectations regarding the influence of the different sexes. Subjects in the former experi-
ments are thought to conform more to stereotypical expectations because of group pressures. Eagly,
supra note 56, at 976-77.
82. Curtis argues that men in families gain power not just from their greater authority, but also
from the greater experience in larger scale authority systems outside the family. Curtis, supra note
35, at 172.
83. While this deference to men because of their higher status has been well documented in
research on expectation states theory, other research suggests that the effect of male status can be
neutralized if a woman is shown to be "more" competent than her male counterparts at a task
related to, but distinct from, the task at hand. M.D. Pugh & Ralph Wahrman, Neutralizing Sexism
in Mixed-Sex Groups: Do Women Have to Be Better than Men?, 88 AM. J. Soc. 746 (1983). See also
David G. Wagner et al., Can Gender Inequalities Be Reduced, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 47 (1986) (gender-
based status expectations could be reversed by introduction of evidence of female competence).
84. SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra note 13, at 69, 81-83; Gillespie, supra note 39, at
451. See also John Mirowsky, Depression and Marital Power. An Equity Model, 91 Am. J. Soc. 557,
587 (1985) (the more a husband earns, the more his wife perceives his marital power is justified);
Vanfossen, supra note 65, at 569 (results revealed that high status fathers were more likely to domi-
nate their families than lower status fathers).
85. Certain behaviors are recognized as expressions of dominance, i.e., the ability to impose
one's will upon another. See, eg., Anne K. McCarrick et al., Gender Differences in Competition and
Dominance During Married-Couples Group Therapy, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 164, 164-65 (1981) (ex-
amining competition and dominance behaviors in male-female verbal interaction).
86. The unequal status positions of men and women, and their socialization into different sex
roles, are thought to contribute to men's tendency to exhibit far more dominance behaviors.
As noted by Ridgeway and Berger:
The extent to which members treat positions in a behavioral power and prestige order as
legitimate has been shown to have a number of effects on task group status processes.
First of all, it appears to affect the type of power use high ranking members may success-
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in verbal dominance more frequently than women.87 They tend to con-
trol conversations with women by monopolizing conversation time and
interrupting frequently,88 particularly when the topic concerns a tradi-
tionally male dominated area, such as automobile repair or finances. 9 In
the marital context, husbands dominate conversation time and interrupt
their wives far more frequently than their wives interrupt them.9" One
study of distressed married couples suggests that wives have more diffi-
culty asserting themselves in conversations with their husbands than they
do in conversations with other males.91
fully engage in, although it may also reduce their need to use power. With legitimacy,
high ranking members appear able to engage more effectively in directive or domineering
behaviors.
Cecelia L. Ridgeway & Joseph Berger, Expectations, Legitimation, and Dominance Behavior in Task
Groups, 51 AM. Soc. RPv. 603, 603 (1986) (citations omitted). See also Kathrynn A. Adams &
Audrey D. Landers, Sex Differences in Dominance Behavior, 4 SEx ROLES 215 (1978) (study investi-
gating sex differences in dominance as a function of a challenger's sex); McCarrick et a., supra note
85 (examining dominance patterns during verbal interaction).
87. Kg., HILARY M. Lips, WOMEN, MEN, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER 100-101 (1982).
Many other differences exist between male and female dominance behaviors. To mention but a few:
males tend to occupy larger areas of personal space than females; fathers are more likely than
mothers to have a special room in the house; women, far more frequently than men, yield space and
choose body postures designed to minimize space utilization; males exhibit facial expressions associ-
ated with dominance, such as stem, non-expressive stares or clenched jaws, whereas females more
frequently display facial expressions associated with submissiveness, such as smiling or lowering of
gaze; men use expansive, relaxed gestures, while women tend to be more proper and constricted in
their body movements; and men hold their head erect during conversations, whereas women fre-
quently tilt their heads in deference. Id. at 97-100.
88. Kg., Peter Kollock et al., Sex and Power in Interaction: Conversational Privileges and Duties,
50 AM. Soc. REv. 34 (1985); McCarrick et al., supra note 85.
89. For instance, from their research conducted on decisionmaking in mixed sex groups, Kelly,
Wildman and Urey found females' social behavior more inhibited than that of males during a deci-
sionmaking process regarding car accessories. They explained their results as follows:
[P]reference for car accessories taps the historically more male-stereotyped domain of
activities dealing with automobiles. In spite of the fact that the decision-making process
during the car task involved the expression of opinions about very common accessories
familiar to both male and female subjects (radios, power steering, vinyl roofs, etc.), fe-
males' social behavior was more inhibited during this decisionmaking interaction relative
to that of males. One might surmise that the relative denial of social opportunities to
engage in instrumental decisionmaking, and sex-stereotypes which may inhibit many
females from even offering opinions in familiar but traditionally male-dominated content
areas, were responsible for this finding.
Kelly et al., supra note 70, at 123-24. See also Joyce L. Carbonell, Sex Roles and Leadership Revis-
ited, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 44 (1984) (high-dominant women tended to defer to low-dominant
men in masculine task situations, but became leaders 56% of the time when the tasks appeared
feminine in nature).
90. This verbal dominance is thought to establish and reinforce hierarchy within the marital
relationship. McCarrick et al., supra note 85, at 164-65; Ridgeway & Berger, supra note 86, at 613.
91. McCarrick et al., supra note 85. Note that since the couples studied here were undergoing
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Although women are capable of dominance behaviors, in mixed-sex
groups they exhibit socially inhibited and submissive behavior toward
men during problem-solving92 and decisionmaking. Even women who
demonstrate high dominance propensities tend to defer to both high and
low dominant men in mixed-sex decisionmaking groups.93 And, some
women who do express their dominant tendencies do so primarily
through group-oriented, rather than individually focused, actions.94
Thus, during divorce negotiations husbands likely will attempt domina-
tion and their wives, even those with high-dominance propensities, likely
will engage in inhibited and submissive behaviors with respect to prob-
lem-solving and decisionmaking, particularly in the male dominated fi-
nancial sphere. 95
therapy for troubled marriages, their communication patterns may be more representative of divorc-
ing couples than of nondistressed couples.
92. Eg., Cornelius Riordan, Sex as a General Status Characteristic, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 261,
261-62 (1983).
93. In Nyquist and Spence's study they paired a high-dominant person with a low-dominant
person and had them work on a gender-neutral task. In same-sex pairs 73% of the high-dominant
individuals assumed the leadership role. In mixed-sex dyads where the high-dominant person was a
male, 93% of high-dominant males became leaders. However, in mixed-sex pairs where the high-
dominant individual was a women, only 35% of the high-dominant women assumed the leadership
role. Linda V. Nyquist & Janet T. Spence, Effects of Dispositional Dominance and Sex Role Expecta-
tions on Leadership Behaviors, 50 J. PERSONALrrY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 87 (1986). This study repli-
cated an earlier study by Megargee that reached essentially the same result. Megargee, supra note
76. A recent study found that 50% of the high-dominant women became leaders when paired with
low-dominant men. Robin A. Fleischer & Jerome M. Chertkoff, Effects of Dominance and Sex on
Leadership Selection in Dyadic Work Groups, 50 J. PERSONALrrY SOC. PSYCHOL. 94 (1986). These
researchers suggest that their results might differ from those of Nyquist and Spence because their
study was conducted in the Midwest, whereas Nyquist and Spence's study, as well as Megargee's,
was performed in the Southwest. Id. at 98. Furthermore, while high-dominant women emerged as
leaders 50% of the time when paired with low-dominant men, indicating an increase over Nyquist
and Spence's results, high-dominant women assumed this leadership role far less frequently than did
high-dominant men when paired with low-dominant women (i.e. 86% for high-dominant men and
63% for high-dominant women). In the latter situation, high-dominant men became leaders 85% of
the time. Id. at 97.
94. David M. Buss, Sex Differences in the Evaluation and Performance of Dominant Acts, 40 J.
PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 147 (1981).
95. One might think that upper class women would fare better than middle or lower class wo-
men regarding status disparities between husbands and wives. However, the status differences be-
tween men and women in the upper class frequently are greater than in the lower classes. While
middle and lower class women may tend to participate, out of necessity, in economically productive
activity that generates some status for them relative to their husbands, upper class women frequently
are encouraged to lead lives of leisure and conspicuous consumption. Unless independently wealthy,
they lack the status, relative to their husbands, of their lower class counterparts. Consequently,
upper class women are frequently dependent upon their husbands' positions for whatever status they
have. Divorce, of course, deprives such women of this imputed status, leaving them potentially more
vulnerable, on the basis of status, in divorce negotiations than lower class wives. See generally JA-
NET SALTZMAN CHAFETZ, SEX AND ADVANTAGE: A COMPARATIVE, MACRO-STRUCTURAL THE-
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4. Depression. Depression has a devastating effect on negotiating
ability. Learned helplessness theory explains that depression results from
frequent exposure to outcomes over which one lacks control and the cor-
responding expectation that nothing one does can alter circumstances.
The person's ability to see how to produce desired outcomes (the cogni-
tive deficit) and the person's motivation to engage in outcome producing
behaviors (the motivational deficit) become inhibited or blocked. The
depressed spouse thus will have difficulty perceiving how to achieve de-
sired outcomes and engaging in effective negotiation.96 Depressed peo-
ple's self perceptions increase their reluctance to engage in negotiations.
For example, negotiation requires skill, intelligence, common sense, and
social sensitivity. Depressed individuals, however, see themselves as
helpless in skilled situations,97 and expect themselves to perform poorly
in situations requiring intelligence, common sense, and social adept-
ORY OF SEX STRATIFICATION 8 (1984) (discussing the lower status for upper class women relative to
upper class men).
Perhaps, along with resource disparity, this status distinction between lower class and upper class
women, relative to their husbands, helps explain studies in marital power that indicate working
wives in working-class families wield more power than working wives in middle class families. See
Heer, supra note 42; see also Hawkes & Taylor, supra note 39 (egalitarianism found to be the most
common mode of decisionmaking in Mexican and Mexican-American farm labor families). How-
ever, other studies indicate that lower class blue-collar husbands, contrary to middle-class or higher
class blue-collar husbands, have more power than their wives even if their wives possess superior
educations, and thus, potentially greater status. A possible explanation for this seeming anomaly is
the less-educated couple's greater adherence to traditional sex role ideology that grants the husband
ultimate authority within his family. Gillespie, supra note 39, at 452. See infra notes 174-210 and
accompanying text for discussion of the power implications of sex role ideology in divorce
mediation.
96. See Rosenfield, supra note 42, at 77. However, the learned helplessness theory of depression
has its detractors among those who find depressed subjects have more accurate perceptions than
nondepressed subjects of their control over certain events. Ivan H. Gotlib & Robert F. Asarnow,
Interpersonal and Impersonal Problem-Solving Skills in Mildly and Clinically Depressed University
Students, 47 . CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 86 (1979); Carmelo Vazquez, Judgment of
Contingency: Cognitive Biases in Depressed and Nondepressed Subjects, 52 . PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 419 (1987). Others who argue against the learned helplessness theory of depression urge a
somewhat different explanation of depression in humans. Eg., Arthur Frankel & Melven L. Snyder,
Poor Performance Following Unsolvable Problems: Learned Helplessness or Egotism?, 36 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1415 (1978); David C. Zuroff, Learned Helplessness in Humans: An Analy-
sis of Learning Processes and the Roles of Individual and Situational Differences, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 130 (1980). Nevertheless, the learned helplessness theory of depression seems
particularly appropriate to understanding women's depression because of its relationship to women's
and the public's attributional patterns, see infra notes 127, 129-30 and accompanying text. More-
over, much research specifically has addressed learned helplessness in women. See, e.g., Donald H.
Baucom & Bahr Weiss, Peers' Granting of Control to Women with Different Sex Role Identities:
Implications for Depression, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1075 (1986).
97. Judy Garber & Steven D. Hollon, Universal Versus Personal Helplessness in Depression: Be-
lief in Controllability or Incompetence?, 89 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 56 (1980).
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ness.9s These self perceptions will decrease the depressed person's moti-
vation to engage in the very behaviors necessary for effective negotiation.
Moreover, depressed individuals display a greater reluctance than
nondepressed people to make risky decisions that potentially expose
them to social risks, such as embarrassment or conflict, as well as risky
decisions that concern important and potentially long-term social con-
tact. 99 Depressed people, especially depressed wives,"°o also demonstrate
less interpersonal problem-solving ability than nondepressed people. 101
Divorce negotiations, however, require problem solving as well as risky
decisions that provoke conflict and concern long-term social contact, es-
pecially with children. Consequently, a depressed individual will experi-
ence extreme disadvantage in divorce negotiations.
Far more women than men suffer from depression."°2 As noted by
Rosenfield: "These differences are found across cultures, over time, in
different age groups, in rural as well as urban areas, and in treated as well
as untreated populations. Researchers estimate that women have as
much as twice the rate of distress and depression as men."103 Two differ-
ent, yet interrelated, factors explain women's higher depression rates:
learned helplessness"° and sex role identity. 105 Women, because of their
98. Peter M. Lewinsohn et al., The Measurement of Expectancies and Other Cognitions in De-
pressed Individuals, 6 COGNITIVE THERAPY & REs. 437, 444 (1982).
99. Paula R. Pietromonaco & Karen S. Rook, Decision Style in Depression: The Contribution of
Perceived Risks Versus Benefits, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 399, 405 (1987). This pattern
holds even when the risky decision also promises social benefits, such as respect or liking. IdM How-
ever, the decisional style employed by the depressed subjects in this study did not differ significantly
from that of the nondepressed subjects when the scenario involved decisions relating to asserting
one's rights or remaining dissatisfied, experiencing financial gains or losses, or validating or compro-
mising one's morals. Id. at 401, 405. While divorce negotiations clearly involve some of these other
issues, they also inevitably involve intense and long-term social contact. This mixture of issues in
divorce negotiations suggests then that depressed individuals will remain at a disadvantage, even on
financial issues, because of their unwillingness to take risks.
100. A study exploring problem solving interactions in married couples with depressed wives
showed the wives exhibited less problem-solving behavior than their husbands. Anthony Biglan et.
al., Problem-Solving Interactions of Depressed Women and Their Husbands, 16 BEHAV. THERAPY
431 (1985).
101. Gotlib & Asarnow, supra note 96.
102. Eg., Baucom & Weiss, supra note 96, at 1075; Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Sex Differences in
Unipolar Depression: Evidence and Theory, 101 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 259 (1987).
103. Rosenfield, supra note 42, at 77. See also Esther D. Rothblum, Women's Socialization and
the Prevalence of Depression: The Feminine Mistake, 1 WOMEN & THERAPY 5, 5 (1982) (women
consistently present higher rates of depression than men, usually at a two-to-one ratio).
104. Carol E. Ford & John M. Neale, Learned Helplessness and Judgments of Control, 49 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1330, 1330 (1985).
105. Baucom & Weiss, supra note 96. Competing with learned helplessness and sex role identity
as causes of depression are explanations based on physiological differences between men and women.
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low power and their disadvantaged access to society's opportunity struc-
ture, experience less control over outcomes than men. Consequently,
they more frequently develop a learned helplessness response set and
concomitant depressive symptoms. 10 6 A woman's sex role identity also
can exacerbate her tendency toward learned helplessness. In response to
failure, women with a feminine sex role identity tend to exert less control
over a subsequent task than do women with a masculine sex role iden-
tity.10 7 Moreover, other people are reluctant to grant control to women
of a feminine sex role identity. One study found that others gave control
over enjoyable and creative tasks to women high in masculinity, whereas
they allowed feminine women control only over unenjoyable methodical
tasks and tasks requiring interpersonal skills.108 Consequently, because
they do not seek control and because others do not allow them control,
women with a feminine sex role identity likely will exhibit depression
more frequently than women with a masculine sex role identity.
Married people show the greatest differences between men and wo-
men in anxiety and depression." Wives' low decisionmaking power in
marriage and their consequent lack of control over outcomes lead to de-
pression.110 Even if a wife gains decisionmaking power through employ-
ment outside the home, she still may have a greater tendency toward
depression than her husband. Frequently the wife's employment remains
coupled with primary responsibility for housework and children.11 Her
role overload leads to perceptions and feelings of lack of control which
See Sarah Rosenfield, Sex Differences in Depression: Do Women Always Have Higher Rates?, 21 J.
HEALTh & Soc. BEHAV. 33, 35 (1980).
106. Rosenfield, supra note 42, at 77.
107. For example, in a study exploring the desire for control, college women were exposed to an
initial failure experience and then requested to choose the amount of control they would like to exert
in an upcoming two-person task. Seventy-one percent of the masculine sex-typed women chose to
exercise control over the upcoming task, whereas none of the feminine sex-typed women chose the
control option. Donald H. Baucom, Sex Role Identity and the Decision to Regain Control Among
Women. A Learned Helplessness Investigation, 44 J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 334 (1983).
108. The researchers conclude that this lack of control over desirable tasks might make femi-
nine sex-typed women more vulnerable to depression than more masculine women. Baucom &
Weiss, supra note 96, at 1979.
109. Rosenfield, supra note 42, at 77.
110. Id. at 77-78. See Mirowsky, supra note 84 (inequity in marital power produces depression);
Robert B. Schafer & Patricia M. Keith, Equity and Depression Among Married Couples, 43 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 430 (1980) (inequity in long-term marriages associated with depression).
111. For instance, Radloff's study indicated that only 23% of husbands worked around the
house or yard daily, whereas 69% of employed wives performed household chores daily. Leonore
Radloff, Sex Differences in Depression: The Effect of Occupation and Marital Status, 1 SEx ROLES
249, 260 (1975).
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then create depression and anxiety.' 12 However, if high family demands
do not exist, the employed wife remains less susceptible to depression
than a housewife because of her greater control over marital
decisioning. 113
Divorce strengthens the likelihood of depression in wives. Among
all marital status categories, depression rates are highest for separated
and divorced women. 14 One might expect a wife's depressive symptoms
to lift on divorce because of her greater decisional control in her hus-
band's absence. Many divorcing women, however, become overwhelmed
by their acquisition of unfamiliar roles, such as single parent and primary
wage earner.1 1 5 Furthermore, most divorced women face substantial fi-
112. Rosenfield, supra note 42, at 79-81. Unsurprisingly, the researcher found full-time em-
ployed women with children significantly higher than men in anxiety and depressive symptoms. In
contrast, no significant differences in symptoms emerged between men and full-time employed wo-
men without children or part-time employed women with children. Id. at 84.
113. Rosenfield's research supports this analysis. She found that employed women with high
work and high family demands evidenced significantly higher levels of anxiety and depression than
housewives. Employed women with low work and low family demands, however, had significantly
lower symptoms than housewives. Id. at 85. See also Rothblum, supra note 103, at 7.
114. Eg., KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 58; Rothblum, supra note 103, at 7 (citing Robert M.
Hirschfeld and Christine K. Cross, Psychosocial Risk Factors in Depression, in RISK FACTOR RE-
SEARCH IN THE MAJOR MENTAL DISORDERS 81 (Darrel A. Regier & Gordon Allen eds., 1981)).
The significantly higher depression rates of divorced women discussed is a post-divorce finding
that may not indicate accurately the likelihood of a wife's depression during pre-divorce negotiations
with her husband. However, this research does suggest that the wife is more likely than her husband
to be depressed during divorce negotiations if the husband and wife have been physically separated
for a period of time, the wife has assumed diverse and unfamiliar roles, and/or the wife's pre-divorce
financial situation is adverse. Furthermore, the marriage's initial disruption seems to trigger depres-
sion more frequently in women than in men, because more women than men react adversely to
events that precipitate divorce, such as the other spouse's adultery or the other spouse's request for
divorce. Rothblum, supra note 103, at 7-8 (citing C. William Briscoe & James B. Smith, Depression
and Marital Turmoil, 29 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 811 (1973)).
115. In speaking of the psychological distress surrounding the divorce negotiation period, for
instance, Kressel notes:
For the divorced mother, the changes set in motion by the separation are usually even
more radical than those experienced by her ex-husband. Residential instability may be
nearly as common among women as it is among men, and as bad as divorce is financially
for men, for women it may amount to an economic disaster. Because of these economic
pressures most divorced women are obliged to work outside of the home, for which,
because of economic discrimination, they can generally expect to be paid about half of
what a man doing comparable work would earn.
While adjusting to the new and unremunerative responsibilities of employment, the
divorced wife is simultaneously playing the role of both mother and father to her chil-
dren. Mastering all of these challenges is not easy.
KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 44-45 (citations omitted). Kohen explains how a wife's transition from
married parenthood to single parenthood differs from more positive role transitions:
The role transition between married motherhood and divorced single parenthood does
not share the characteristics of adult role change described above. Divorced mothers are
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nancial hardship" 6 that precipitates stress and depression. And, finally,
loss of a major role can devastate an individual, particularly if other ma-
jor roles do not supplement the lost role.' 17 Wives generally consider the
marital role more important than do husbands,' 11 thereby enhancing the
likelihood of depression at divorce.119 Moreover, a traditional house-
wife's major roles normally consist of wife and mother. The husband, on
the other hand, usually has numerous occupational and extrafamilial
roles, leaving his self-identity less dependent upon his spousal role.
Thus, the traditional housewife more likely will experience depression at
the loss of her marital status than will her husband.2 0 Role loss, transi-
not trained in the skills necessary for their new role as head of the family; they are not
socially validated in that role; and they often have less access to power and other re-
sources than they had through their marriages. Furthermore, family, friends, and com-
munity reinforce marital roles, seeing them as based on women's sex role and merging
them with women's identities. Thus, heading a family requires mastery, control, and
assertiveness - skills and attitudes that are neither consciously taught nor valued for
women either before or after divorce. Access to social and economic opportunities -
authority, respect, jobs, and income - that provide rewards to men who head their
families are generally limited for women who head their families. Family and friends
who supported divorced mothers' marital roles often find their single parenthood un-
comfortable if not unacceptable. Given the discontinuity between the roles of the mar-
ried and divorced mothers and the absence of training and social support for
accomplishing a transition between them, we should expect that most women will have
difficulty, at least initially, both in giving up their identity with marriage and in develop-
ing an identity based on heading their families. Without social patterns which support
the adoption of their new role, we should also expect that identification with it, when it
occurs, will be a function of individual abilities and circumstances.
Janet A. Kohen, From Wife to Family Head: Transitions in Self-Identity, 44 PSYCHIATRY 230, 231
(1981) (citations omitted).
It is conceivable, of course, that a wife might avoid depression even under the conditions noted by
Kressel and Kohen. However, because of these major role transitions and losses, a wife's stress level
likely exceeds her husband's. Decisionmaking under high stress promotes premature closure of is-
sues and nonsystematic scanning of alternatives. Eg., Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress:
Scanning of Alternatives Under Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 639 (1987). Consequently, even were a wife to avoid depression, she is still likely to be
disadvantaged, compared to her husband, in decisionmaking during divorce negotiations due to her
higher stress level.
116. See, eg., LENORE J. WEIrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); see also
infra note 319 for further discussion.
117. See Kohen, supra note 115.
118. See William A. Barry, Marriage Research and Conflict: An Integrative Review, 73
PSYCHOL. BULL. 41-42 (1970).
119. Those husbands who have made parenting a major role and who likely will lose physical
custody of their children upon divorce, will, of course, be at risk for depression.
120. Research reveals a strong correlation between a wife's traditional orientation and depres-
sion at the loss of the wife role. The researchers concluded that "women who have traditional self-
concepts are uniquely vulnerable to the loss of their status as wives." Richard D. Cartwright et al.,
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tion, and overload, as well as diminished financial status thus contribute
to the wife's enhanced vulnerability to depression during divorce.' 2 '
All of the foregoing suggest the greater likelihood of the wife's, as
opposed to the husband's, depression during divorce mediation, as well
as the devastating effect that depression will have on her ability to negoti-
ate effectively. Significantly, Bruch notes: "Data indicate that women
are more depressed during mediation than during litigation and feel that
they have lost more and gained less in mediation. Mediation is viewed
more favourably, both procedurally and substantively, by men." '122
5. Self-Esteem. Self-esteem proves critical to negotiating power
because people with high self-esteem negotiate better outcomes than peo-
The Traditional-Liberated Woman Dimension: Social Stereotype and Self-Concept, 44 J. PERSONAL-
rrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 581, 586 (1983). This study, however, did not compare the wives' depression
rates to those of their husbands. Nonetheless, research in other areas has consistently found women
more emotionally vulnerable than men to undesirable life events. Eg., Ronald C. Kessler & Jane D.
McLeod, Sex Differences in Vulnerability to Undesirable Life Events, 49 Am. Soc. REV. 620, 620
(1984). This greater vulnerability seems attributable to women's greater emotional involvement in
others' lives. Id. Finally, when women and men are asked to comment upon the traumatic nature of
their divorce experience, women indicate they experienced more trauma and stress, Stan L. Al-
brecht, Reactions and Adjustments to Divorce: Differences in the Experiences of Males and Females,
29 FAM. REL. 59, 62 (1980), and depression, KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 58, than do men.
121. Although well grounded in theory and research, the conclusion that wives are more likely
than husbands to exhibit depression during divorce negotiations is not unassailable. A seemingly
contradictory study found that women experience more severe psychological symptoms of general
emotional discomfort, neurosis and psychosomatic disorders prior to marital separation, whereas
men evidence more of these symptoms after separation. Bernard L. Bloom & Robert A. Caldwell,
Sex Differences in Adjustment During the Process of Marital Separation, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
693 (1981). Since for most couples divorce negotiations probably occur after separation, this study
suggests that husbands might be disadvantaged by their emotional states during divorce negotia-
tions. However, the symptoms of emotional trauma mentioned in the foregoing study are not de-
pressive. They simply illustrate that few can divorce without emotional discomfort. More
importantly, none of these symptoms necessarily diminish the individual's capacity to negotiate ef-
fectively. Other research also suggests that men, perhaps because of their socialized tendency to
deny or suppress emotional problems, have more difficulty than women facing and processing the
emotional issues in divorce. See David A. Chiriboga & Loraine Cutler, Stress Responses Among
Divorcing Men and Women, J. DIVORCE, Winter 1977, at 95, 104. In response to divorce men
frequently engage in extreme instrumental behaviors, such as excessive work or social activity, to
temporarily avoid their emotional problems. Women, on the other hand, tend to face and process
the emotional problems precipitated by divorce more willingly and more quickly. Id. These obser-
vations suggest that at the time of divorce negotiations, husbands will be highly instrumental and
wives will be processing emotions. Therefore, since divorce negotiation is a highly instrumental
activity, husbands should be better prepared for it than their wives. In summary, then, the research
that seems to contradict the conclusion that wives are more likely than husbands to be depressed
during divorce negotiations either supports that conclusion or addresses different symptoms.
122. Bruch, supra note 38, at 119 (citing Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, Child Custody
Mediation and Litigation: An Experimental Evaluation of the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULT.
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 179 (1987)).
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ple with low self-esteem,' 2 3 and high self-esteem leaves one less vulnera-
ble to persuasion. 24 Low self-esteem, on the other hand, can inhibit
bargaining ability and cause acceptance of extremely unfavorable
terms.'25 A large disparity in self-esteem between negotiating spouses
then can influence the outcomes reached in divorce mediation.
An individual's self-esteem comes from: (1) self-efficacy, the belief
that one's own actions and abilities cause one's success in the world, and
(2) internalization of other's reflections regarding one's effectiveness and
worth.'26 Women do not attribute their worldly successes to their own
efforts and abilities, but rather to outside sources such as luck, fate, or
powerful others.127 Men attribute their successes to their own innate
123. John F. Stolte, Self-Efficacy: Sources and Consequences in Negotiation Networks, 119 J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 69 (1983). Other scholars also have noted the importance of self-esteem to power in
marital negotiations. SCANZOM & SZINOVACZ, supra note 13, at 31.
124. Eg., Steven J. Sherman, Internal-External Control and Its Relationships to Attitude Change
Under Different Social Influence Techniques, 26 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 23 (1972); David
Vern Stimpson, The Influence of Commitment and Self-Esteem on Susceptibility to Persuasion, 80 J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 189 (1970).
125. "[D]iminished feelings of self-worth may inhibit the ability to bargain constructively and
effectively, or worse, produce an abject acceptance of almost any terms dictated by the other."
KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 83. While Kressel was writing about the low self-esteem of the non-
initiating spouse, no reason exists to think that low self-esteem attributable to another source would
have a less potent impact.
126. Viktor Gecas & Michael L. Schwalbe, Beyond the Looking-Glass Setf Social Structure and
Efficacy-Based Self-Esteem, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 77 (1983).
127. !g., Hilary M. Lips, Gender and the Sense of Power: Where Are We and Where Are We
Going, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 483 (1985). In the social psychological literature, this attribu-
tional pattern is called an external locus of control. Kg., Julian Rotter, Generalized Expectancles for
Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement, in 80 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS (American Psy-
chological Association General & Applied Psychological Monograph No. 1, Whole No. 609, 1966).
This persistent and negative attributional pattern in women may relate to their employment and
social position. Not taking credit for their successes facilitates women's acceptance of the inequita-
ble reward distributions of income and occupational status they endure in the employment context,
while simultaneously allowing them to perceive their worlds as just. If they attributed their suc-
cesses to their intrinsic worth, they would have to face squarely the unfairness of reward distribu-
tions and question the benevolence of their employers as well as the justness of their worlds. This
change in perception could lead to depression or open confrontation with employers. Open confron-
tation for those allowed only marginal and tenuous participation in high status occupations or for
those whose employers are (usually) male elites, however, could prove costly. Perhaps these poten-
tially costly consequences help explain why many professional women deny the existence of discrimi-
nation and their membership in a minority group. Edward LaFontaine, Forms of False
Consciousness Among Professional Women, HUMBOLDT J. SOC. REL., Spring-Summer 1983, at 26.
Attributional patterns inhibiting recognition of discriminatory treatment, thus, might have func-
tional utility for women in today's employment and social context.
In contrast to their attributional style regarding success, women's tendency to attribute failures to
external causes might reflect their accurate, yet perhaps not yet conscious, awareness that powerful
others are responsible for such failures. A research project by William J. Doherty & Cynthia Bald-
win, Shifts and Stability in Locus of Control During the 1970s: Divergence of the Sexes, 48 J. PER-
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abilities. 2 ' Even high achievement-motivated women explain success
and failure in terms of effort and luck, whereas high achievement-moti-
vated men tend to attribute their successes to their abilities and their
failures to external causes. 129 To the extent then that self-esteem comes
from self-efficacy, women should have lower self-esteem than men.
Moreover, to the extent self-esteem comes from positive feedback
from one's environment, women should have lower self-esteem than men.
Rather than credit women for their successes, those who evaluate male
and female performances attribute women's success to external causes
such as luck or powerful others, whereas they attribute men's success to
ability and competence.13 Women also receive more negative evalua-
tions by others than they deserve. For example, in mixed-sex small
groups peers consistently evaluate female leaders more negatively than
male leaders,1 31 even when both sexes perform identically,1 32 and both
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1048 (1985), suggests this explanation. Doherty and Baldwin found
that in the late 1960's and early 1970's, females and males showed close similarity in locus of control
scores. However, by 1976-78, the same groups of women had moved substantially toward the exter-
nal end of the scale, attributing their successes and failures to outside forces. The attributional
patterns of the same groups of men, however, remained essentially unchanged. Demographic factors
did not account for the shift. The researchers suggested, rather, that a "cultural-shift" had occurred:
women in the mid-70's became more aware of the external constraints on their ability to meet the
labor force and social goals that they developed during the liberal years of the late 1960's and early
1970's. Attributing their failures to external forces simply reflected their experiences. Men as a
group had not met the same barriers as women in the fulfillment of their goals and their attributional
patterns reflected continued success. Andirsani and Nestel also found labor force failure to be posi-
tively related to external locus of control scores, lending credence to Doherty and Baldwin's explana-
tion. Paul J. Andrisani & Gilbert Nestel, Internal-External Control as Contributor to and Outcome
of Work Experience, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 156 (1976).
128. Eg., Lips, supra note 87; Lips, supra note 127. In the social psychological literature this
attributional pattern is known as an "internal locus of control." E.g., Rotter, supra note 127.
129. Daniel Bar-Tal & Irene Hauson Frieze, Achievement Motivation for Males and Females as
a Determinant of Attributions for Success and Failure, 3 SEx ROLEs 301 (1977).
130. Eg., Kay Deaux & Tim Emswiller, Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked
Tasks" What Is Skill for the Male Is Luck for the Female, 29 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 80
(1974); Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 63.
131. E.g., Brown & Geis, supra note 70; Kelly et al., supra note 70; Wood & Karten, supra note
69.
132. Brown & Geis, supra note 70. This relatively negative evaluation of female leaders seems
grounded in observers' beliefs that the sexes differ in competence. Wood & Karten, supra note 69.
Several studies have found that women themselves judge men as more competent than women in
a variety of professional fields. These results suggest that women have internalized their lower sta-
tus. However, the age, geographic location, and educational level of the evaluating women also seem
to influence their perceptions of the relative competence of males and females. Liliane Tawil &
Carol Costello, The Perceived Competence of Women in Traditional and Nontraditional Fields as a
Function of Sex-Role Orientation and Age, 9 SEx ROLES 1197, 1197-98 (1983). For example, Tawil
and Costello found that younger women tended to find females equally competent to or more compe-
tent than men. Id. at 1201-02.
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women and men tend to evaluate female-authored articles more nega-
tively than identical male-authored articles.
133
Coupling the above observations with women's own attributional
patterns, research findings that indicate women have lower self-esteem
than men 134 should come as no surprise. Similar to depression, some
women have greater susceptibility to low self-esteem than others. Fe-
males with a feminine sex role orientation exhibit lower self-esteem than
women with a masculine sex role orientation,1 35 and wives in the labor
force generally have significantly higher self-esteem than housewives. 136
Divorce exacerbates the disparity in self-esteem between men and
women. A wife's self-esteem more strongly corresponds to her marital
status than does the husband's.1 37 Unless she anticipates prompt remar-
riage, the impending divorce deprives the wife of her marital status. This
deprivation creates an all-time low in her self-esteem, 138 making her ex-
tremely vulnerable during divorce negotiations.
The attributional patterns underlying self-esteem also independently
offer to influence divorce negotiations. Individuals attributing their suc-
133. Nancy L. Toder, The Effect of the Sexual Composition of a Group on Discrimination
Against Women and Sex-Role Attitudes, 5 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 292 (1980). However, in all-women
groups women did not devalue female-authored articles. Id. at 304.
134. Eg., Jon W. Hoelter, Factorial Invariance and Self-Esteem: Reassessing Race and Sex
Differences, 61 Soc. FORCES 834 (1983); Sharron Koffman & Hilary M. Lips, Sex Differences in Self-
Esteem and Performance Expectancies in Married Couples, 8 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 57
(1980). But see Marlene Mackie, The Domestication of Self. Gender Comparisons of Self-Imagery
and Self-Esteem, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 343 (1983) (finding no self-esteem differences between hus-
bands and wives).
135. Bernard E. Whitley, Jr., Sex Role Orientation and Self-Esteem: A Critical Meta-Analytic
Review, 44 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 765, 770, 775 (1983).
136. Eg., Mackie, supra note 134.
137. Eg., Barry, supra note 118; Mackie, supra note 134; see also Anne Statham Macke, et a.,
Housewives' Self-Esteem and Their Husbands' Success: The Myth of Vicarious Involvement, 41 J.
MARRIAGE & FAm. 51 (1979) (housewives' self-esteem related to perceived marital success).
138. In their study Gecas and Seff found an individual's self-esteem strongly influenced by those
things psychologically central to the individual, such as work or family. Viktor Gecas & Monica A.
Seff, Social Class and Self-Esteem: Psychological Centrality, Compensation, and the Relative Effects
of Work and Home, 53 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 165 (1990). The stronger link between marital status and
women's, compared to men's, self-esteem is unsurprising. For most of history success for women
has been defined as the proper execution of wife and mother roles. As Elaine Ognibene notes in her
essay:
For an American woman the formula for success was simple and decreed by tradition:
she was to await passively the arrival of a man who would marry her and make her a
mother. In 1868, Elizabeth Lynn Linton wrote in MODERN WOMEN: "What business
and profession are to most men, marriage is to most women. Women, compelled to
await at home for the wooing which changes their destiny, busy themselves with attrac-
tions .... "
Ognibene, supra note 24, at 11 (citing ELIZABETH L. LUNroN, MODERN WOMEN 16 (1886)).
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cess on a task to their efforts allocate more of the available reward to
themselves than those attributing their success to external causes. 139
Conceptualizing marriage as a joint task and employing standard attribu-
tional patterns, the husband will attribute the acquisition of marital as-
sets and his earning power to his efforts, whereas the wife will attribute
marital acquisitions to luck or perhaps to her husband's efforts. These
attributional patterns which credit the husband more than the wife thus
should encourage husbands to award more of the marital assets to them-
selves and wives to accept this distribution as appropriate. 14 Moreover,
to the extent that information generates power in divorce negotiations,
husbands will negotiate more effectively than wives, because those who
credit themselves for success actively seek information relevant to a par-
ticular task, whereas those who attribute their success to outside forces
appear passive regarding acquisition of relevant information.
14 1
In conclusion, the husband's higher self-esteem provides him a sig-
nificant advantage during divorce negotiations with his wife.
6. Reward Expectation. Negotiators with higher aspirations tend
to obtain larger distributive shares than do bargainers with lower expec-
tations. 42 Divorce negotiations then should favor the spouse with a
higher reward expectation than the other. Because women face both
structural and ideological inequality 43 and tend to accept the inequality
139. Michele Andrisin Wittig et al., Luck Versus Effort Attributions: Effect on Reward Alloca-
tions to Self and Other, 7 PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 71 (1981).
140. Other research supports this conclusion. Those who attribute success to their own efforts
depend more on themselves and seek control when circumstances warrant, whereas "externals" tend
to defer to others' judgements. Herbert M. Lefcourt et al., Internal vs. External Control of Rein-
forcement and Attention in a Decision-Making Task, 36 J. PERSONALITY 663, 664 (1968).
141. William L. Davis & Jerry Phares, Internal-External Control as a Determinant of Informa-
tion-Seeking in a Social Influence Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY 547 (1967). The more active partici-
pation of "internals" in information seeking is due to their underlying belief that their actions can
influence outcomes. Id. at 548.
142. DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 99 (1989)
(citing CHESTER KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME: How TO GET WHAT You WANT 18
(1970); Donald L. Harnett et al., Personality, Bargaining Style and Payoff in Bilateral Monopoly
Bargaining Among European Managers, 36 SOCIOMETRY 325, 342 (1973)); PRuITr, supra note 11, at
26 (citing John G. Holmes et al., The Effects of Prenegotiation Expectations on the Distributive Bar-
gaining Process, J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 582 (1971)).
143. Women's disadvantaged position, compared to men, with regard to access to valued socie-
tal resources, see supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text, is bolstered by an ideology that persist-
ently devalues women and their contributions to society. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying
text. After experiencing relative deprivation and a discrediting ideology, many women internalize
their relative valuelessness and, ultimately, perceive their inferior status as legitimate. In discussing
why individuals accept the legitimacy of a social hierarchy that disadvantages and discredits them,
Stolte notes:
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as legitimate,"M they expect less for their societal contributions than men
making similar or identical contributions.
145
Because women receive lower rewards than men despite their
equivalent performances, women's low expectations receive strong rein-
forcement and should prove difficult to change.' 46 Moreover, women
formulate reward expectations based on what other women, rather than
men, in similar situations obtain. 4 7 Since most women receive lower so-
The negative reflected appraisals and the obvious facts of the situation lead the person to
attribute his/her relative deprivation to the "objective" inferiority of the self. Conse-
quently, the person will come to believe that s/he deserves to be located where s/he is
located in the structure of inequality. Both advantaged and disadvantaged actors will
therefore come to accept the structure of inequality as legitimate, right, and reasonable.
John F. Stolte, The Legitimation of Structural Inequality: Reformulation and Test of the Self-Evalu-
ation Argument, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 331, 332 (1983). Many scholars, in a variety of contexts, recog-
nize that social norms define an individual's expectations. See, eg., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE
AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 22 (1986); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y RE v. 631, 643 (1980-1981).
144. Women's acceptance of their inequality's legitimacy is illustrated beautifully in the follow-
ing statements of a political activist for the Infant Custody Bill of 1839:
The wild and stupid theories advanced by a few women, of "equal rights" and "equal
intelligence," are not the opinions of their sex. I, for one (I, with millions more), believe
in the natural superiority of man, as I do in the existence of a God.
The natural position of woman is inferiority to man. Amenl That is a thing of God's
appointing not of man's devising. I believe it sincerely, as a part of my religion. I never
pretended to the wild and ridiculous doctrine of equality.
JANE G. PERKINS, THE LIFE OF MRS. NORTON 149-50 (1909).
While, perhaps, few today would openly admit to this perspective, to believe that women, in just
eighty years, have eradicated such total thought domination seems naive, particularly in light of
research suggesting the persistent and pervasive devaluation of women. See generally SUSAN
FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991).
145. Unequal distribution of rewards leads recipients to believe they possess unequal ability.
This belief, in turn, encourages the recipients to accept the unequal reward distribution as an appro-
priate reflection of their unequal merit. Wendy Jean Harrod, Expectations from Unequal Rewards,
43 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 126, 129 (1980).
146. The experience of relative powerlessness in obtaining rewards decreases women's belief
that they can obtain equal rewards as well as their motivation to attempt obtaining them. See Wiley
& Eskilon, Scaling the Corporate Ladder, supra note 70, at 358 (suggesting that women managers
would exhibit poorer organizational performance if they believed organizational mobility and power
were determined by gender rather than quality of performance). A field study of 98 male and female
employees in two organizations offers additional tangential support. In investigating responses to
powerlessness, the researcher found women more likely than men to report acceptance of and resig-
nation to perceived power imbalances. Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 69 (citing Lisa A.
Mainiero, Coping with Powerlessness: The Relationship of Gender and Job Dependency to Empower-
ment-Strategy Usage, 31 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 633 (1986)).
147. Social comparison theory and equity theory suggest that individuals formulate expectations
and judgments of fairness in reward allocations by comparing what they receive to what others of
similar qualities and attributes receive. See, g., BLAU, supra note 143, at 143-60; Leon Festinger, A
Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117, 121, 136 (1954). Women, consequently,
compare themselves to other similarly situated women. Brenda Major & Blythe Forcey, Social Coin-
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cietal rewards than men, comparison to other women perpetuates wo-
men's low reward expectations. Research on men and women's pay
expectations illustrates women's lower reward expectations. Women feel
they deserve less pay for their work than do men,148 irrespective of
whether they work in a male- or female-dominated job, 4 9 and when they
lack comparison data they pay themselves less than men despite their
perception of equivalent work inputs.150 Women management students
also exhibit significantly lower expectations than male management stu-
dents with respect to their beginning and maximum salaries. 51 And,
finally, women managers characteristically expect lower salaries and or-
ganizational ranking than do male managers.1
52
In divorce mediation then many wives will believe they are entitled
to a relatively small share of the marital assets even if they believe their
marital contributions are as valuable as those of their husbands.15 3 Ne-
gotiating with these expectations, wives naturally will obtain smaller
shares of the marital assets than their husbands.
7. Fear of Achievement Divorce mediation proponents obscure
the competitive nature of negotiations during divorce mediationI 54 by la-
parisons and Pay Evaluations: Preferences for Same-Sex and Same-Job Wage Comparisons, 21 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (1985); Brenda Major et al., Overworked and Underpaid:
On the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement, 47 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1399, 1401 (1984). For example, both women's and men's self-pay, in the absence of social compari-
son information, reflected what they thought same-sex others would pay themselves. Major et al.,
supra, at 1405.
148. A low sense of reward entitlement is even more probable if the wife has remained a tradi-
tional homemaker, because individuals occupying female-dominated jobs expect lower pay than
those holding male-dominated jobs. Major & Forcey, supra note 147, at 403.
149. Id.
150. Eg., Charlene M. Callahan-Levy & Lawrence A. Messe, Sex Differences in the Allocation
of Pay, 37 J. PERSONALIrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 433 (1979); Major et al., supra note 147.
151. Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 72 (citing Major & Konar, An Investigation of Sex
Differences in Pay Expectations and Their Possible Causes, 21 ACAD. MGMT. 1. 777 (1984)).
152. Ragins & Sundstorm, supra note 31, at 72 (citing Myra H. Strober, The M.B.A.: Same
Passport to Success for Women and Men?, in WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 25 (Phyllis A. Wallace
ed., 1982)). Some argue that women have lower salary expectations because they do not value in-
come as highly as do men. Major et al., supra note 147, at 1400 (citing FAYE J. CROSBY, RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION AND WORKING WOMEN (1982)). However, this explanation has failed to receive any
consistent support in research findings. For instance, one study found that women did not value the
monetary reward any less than did men. Id. at 1405.
153. Research indicates that males take more than half the reward when their performance is
superior, whereas females take "only" half the reward when their performance is superior. Gerald S.
Leventhal & Douglas W. Lane, Sex, Age, and Equity Behavior, 15 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 312, 314-15 (1970).
154. Proponents of divorce mediation underestimate the divorce situation's competitive nature.
See, e-g., KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 24, 28.
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beling the mediation process cooperative and by emphasizing relational
and emotional issues. "I Yet bargaining over scarce marital resources is
fundamentally competitive"5 6 and induces the use of competitive negotia-
tion tactics."'7 Research on women's attitudes toward competition and
achievement sheds light on their capacity to negotiate effectively during
divorce mediation.
In the early 1970's, Homer found women motivated to avoid
achievement and inhibited in achievement-oriented behavior.' These
women felt their feminine sex role identity inconsistent with displays of
competence, independence, competition, intellectual acumen and leader-
ship. 59 They also feared that displaying such behaviors risked social re-
jection, loss of femininity, or personal or social destruction.' 6° Even
155. By focusing on emotional issues rather than substantive outcomes and pretending that no
one wins or loses in mediation, mediators obscure the unwitting disputants' awareness that what
actually occurs in divorce mediation is distribution of scarce resources. See Abel, supra note 1, at
294-95; see also AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 63-67 (discussing how proponents of arbitration be-
tween southern planters and newly freed slaves and arbitration between labor and management em-
ployed the rhetoric of harmony and consensus to obscure class conflict and preserve preexisting
social hierarchies); Hofrichter, supra note 9, at 243 (ideology of accommodation in informal neigh-
borhood justice centers obscures the conflicting nature of disputants' interests).
Mediation's emphasis on compromise and accommodation, and its view of conflict as a social evil,
is consistent with liberal legal reformism. In the liberal reform tradition, only conflict that does not
threaten existing social hierarchies is legitimate. All other conflict, such as the competition for
scarce resources between divorcing men and women, is denied and obscured by transformation into
apolitical issues (preserving post-divorce relationships) and by separation from struggles that tran-
scend the specific couple (economic oppression of women). See Hofrichter, supra note 9, at 213.
156. In conflict theory bargaining over scarce resources is considered a competitive situation.
See, eg., KENNETH E. BOULDING, CONFLICT AND DEFENSE: A GENERAL THEORY 4-5 (1962);
DEUTSCH, supra note 11, at 20-25; Morton Deutsch, The Effects of Cooperation and Competition
Upon Group Processes, in GROUP DYNAMICS 462 (Dorwin Cartwright & Alvin Zander eds., 1968);
see Clinton F. Fink, Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict, 12 J. CONFLICT
REsOL. 412, 448 (1968); June Starr & Barbara Yvgesson, Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-In on
Compromise Decisions, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 553, 560-61 (1975). The time with children available
for allocation between divorcing parents, as well as financial assets and income, are limited marital
resources. If the wife has the children 300 days of the year, the husband can only have them for 65
days. If she bargains for more than 300 days, he necessarily loses. The same can be argued for
allocation of marital assets and income. Bargaining over marital resources, then, in divorce media-
tion can be conceptualized as a competitive, rather than a cooperative, negotiation situation. Cf
Barbara J. Lonsdorf, Coercion: A Factor Affecting Women's Inferior Financial Outcome in Divorce, 3
AM. J. FAM. L. 281, 288 (1989) (arguing that women are urged to behave cooperatively with respect
to child issues, whereas competition sets in over financial issues the couple perceives as scarce).
157. See Morton Deutsch, Conflict and Its Resolution, National Tech. Info. Serv., Tech. Rep.
No. 1, 7 (October 1, 1965); Lonsdorf, supra note 157, at 288; Starr & Yvgesson, supra note 156.
158. Matina S. Homer, Toward an Understanding ofAchievement-Related Conflicts in Women,
28 J. Soc. IssuEs 157, 173 (1972).
159. Id. at 171.
160. Id. at 162.
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though the women, many of whom had high ability and high achieve-
ment orientation, realized that competitive behavior was necessary to
success, they hesitated to behave in this fashion. 161 Their hesitation was
greatest when they were competing with men 62 or when important
males, particularly husbands or intimates, or parents disapproved of the
women's achievement-oriented behavior.
63
Recent research reveals that a greater percentage of women than
men associate violence with competitive success and separation from re-
lationships. 64 Other research confirms that men, as well as women, ex-
perience threat when women dominate in an achievement situation.1
65
Taken together these findings suggest that women will avoid competi-
tion, or will perform beneath their abilities in competitive situations, par-
ticularly when they compete with males to whom they meaningfully
relate.166 Moreover, women evidence more reluctance than men to be-
161. Id. at 171. The negative consequences anticipated by these women seem quite reasonable
when one considers research indicating that women's popularity is adversely affected by aggressive,
assertive behavior, Edward K. Sadalla et al., Dominance and Heterosexual Attraction, 52 J. PERSON-
ALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 730, 731-34 (1987), and that women's recent advances have precipitated a
powerful backlash. See generally FALUDI, supra note 144.
162. Homer, supra note 158, at 173.
163. Id. at 168-69. In the years since Homer's original research, her studies have received criti-
cism on methodological grounds, eg., Adeline Levine & Janice Crumrine, Women and the Fear of
Success: A Problem in Replication, 80 Am. J. Soc. 964, 969-71 (1974); Ragins & Sundstrom, supra
note 31, at 71, and have proven difficult to replicate. Eg., Levine & Crumrine, supra (finding no sex
differences in fear of success imagery). However, recent research lends support to Homer's original
conclusions. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
164. Men and women were asked to write stories in response to various scenes. Some of the
response stories contained violent imagery. When the violent imagery in men and women's stories
was compared, a greater percentage of women than men associated violence with competitive
achievement and separation from relationships. The men's fantasies contained a greater incidence of
violence than the women's and a greater percentage of men than women associated violence with
interpersonal intimacy. Susan Pollak & Carol Gilligan, Images of Violence in Thematic Apperception
Test Stories, 42 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 159, 161 (1982).
This research, like Homer's, also has suffered attack, Cynthia J. Benton et al., Is Hostility Linked
With Affiliation Among Males and With Achievement Among Females? A Critique of Pollak and
Gilligan, 45 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1167 (1983); Bernard Weiner et al., Compounding
the Errors: A Reply to Pollak and Gilligan, 45 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1176 (1983), and
sparked controversy, Susan Pollak & Carol Gilligan, Differing About Differences: The Incidence and
Interpretation of Violent Fantasies in Women and Men, 45 J. PERsONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1172
(1983), perhaps more, as Pollak and Gilligan note, because of the unwelcome-message it bears than
for methodological reasons. Susan Pollak & Carol Gilligan, Killing the Messenger, 48 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc PSYCHOL. 374 (1985). Nevertheless, a recent study by Helgeson and Sharpsteen repli-
cated Pollak and Gilligan's findings. Vicki S. Helgeson & Don J. Sharpsteen, Perceptions of Danger
in Achievement and Affiliation Situations: An Extension of the Pollak and Gilligan Versus Benton et
al. Debate, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 727 (1987).
165. Helgeson and Sharpsteen, supra note 164, at 732.
166. This conclusion receives support from the study finding that women have more difficulty
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have competitively in situations where competition meets with disap-
proval.16 In divorce mediation the wife competes with her husband with
whom she has a significant relationship and mediators encourage com-
promise and accommodation rather than competition.168 The wife,
therefore, might fear engaging in the assertive behavior necessary to en-
sure expression and fulfillment of her needs.
This conclusion receives support from research indicating that wo-
men tend to employ weak, indirect influence tactics, whereas men tend to
use strong, direct influence tactics.1 69 Furthermore, wives tend to use
more accommodative, compromising, and facilitative conflict resolution
styles than their husbands and they provide more support for their hus-
bands during marital conflicts than their husbands provide for them.
170
If a wife initially makes a fair financial request,1 71 mediation's insistence
on compromise endangers her by reinforcing her conditioned conflict
styles and making accommodation by her more likely than by her more
asserting themselves with their husbands than they do with other men. See supra note 91 and ac-
companying text.
167. Sheryle Whitcher Alagna, Sex Role Identity, Peer Evaluation of Competition, and the Re-
sponses of Women and Men in a Competitive Situation, 43 . PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 546,
553 (1982). Moreover, after reviewing negotiation and social science literature, Kressell acknowl-
edges that men are stronger than women in competitive negotiation contexts. KRESSEL, supra note
1, at 52-53. Social psychological research also suggests individuals with high power tend to exploit
those with low power when negotiating in an inherently competitive situation. Eg., Dean Tjosvold,
Unequal Power Relationships Within a Cooperative or. Competitive Context, 11 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 137, 147 (1981).
168. See Brunet, supra note 1, at 4 (compromise the norm in ADR).
169. See generally Gloria Cowan et al., The Effects of Target, Age and Gender on Use of Power
Strategies, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1391 (1984) (suggesting women's use of weak,
indirect power strategies in intimate relationships with men results from women's inferior power
position); Toni Falbo & Letitia Anne Peplau, Power Strategies in Intimate Relationships, 38 J. PER-
SONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 618 (1980); Judith A. Howard et al., Sex, Power and Influence Tactics
in Intimate Relationships, 51 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 102 (1986) (people in weak power
positions tend to use weak influence tactics in intimate relationships); David Kipnis et al., Metamor-
phic Effects of Power, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 127 (1976) (use of strong, direct influence tactics is
related to control).
While some research on negotiations indicates women are more likely than men to exploit a soft
opponent, eg., Dean G. Pruitt & Helena Syna, Mismatching the Opponent's Offers in Negotiation, 21
. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 103 (1985), this research cannot be generalized to divorce negoti-
ations between spouses because the power disparities between husbands and wives may not exist
between negotiating strangers.
170. Leonard H. Chusmir & Joan Mills, Gender Differences in Conflict Resolution Styles of
Managerz At Work and At Home, 20 SEX ROLES 149, 151 (1989).
171. The wife's initial request might also be low because of her low expectations, see supra notes
142-53 and accompanying text, or her lack of the knowledge necessary to detect her true financial
vulnerability. See infra notes 197, 199 and accompanying text.
19921 POLITICS OF POWER
competitive husband.17 2 That the husband just as easily could curtail
conflict and produce agreement by acceding to his wife's fair requests
goes unnoticed in the mediator's quest for peace through compromise. 7 '
The wife's predisposition and the mediator's constant pressure to accom-
modate then will cause the wife to accommodate her husband's interests
with greater ease and frequency than he will accommodate hers.
In summary, resource-based power disparity between spouses ex-
poses the significant disadvantage of many wives in divorce mediation.
Part II explores how sex role ideology exacerbates the wife's disadvan-
tage on financial issues and how this ideology, when combined with me-
diator bias, promotes the divorcing father's control over children.
II. SEX ROLE IDEOLOGY
Sex role ideologies 74 currently fall along a continuum from egalita-
172. Divorce mediation prepares the wife for compromise in several ways. First, by fully ex-
ploring both sides of the dispute and encouraging the wife's sensitivity to her husband's perceptions,
the mediator urges the wife to change her perspective of the issues and the conflict. As Dworkin and
London note:
Parties are invited through refraining to reperceive their conflict from a vantage point
that can incorporate the whole or blend the differing points of view. The focus of the
family is redirected from concrete issues to... superordinate goals.
Joan Dworkin & William London, What Is a Fair Agreement, 7 MEDIATION Q. 3, 6 (1989) (citation
omitted). The wife may lose focus on her firm request for a fair portion of her husband's retirement
plan by subsuming that request under the superordinate goal of preserving post-divorce relationships
with her husband. The tactic of seeing all points of view as equally valid also encourages the wife to
accept partial responsibility for the divorce and/or her husband's dissatisfactions. The wife's sense
of moral vindication, then, cannot thwart the mediator's press for compromise. A second way the
mediator prepares the wife for compromise is through denigration of legal rights. This weakens the
wife's normative basis for specific financial requests. And, finally, cutting the weaker wife off from
the assistance and support of legal counsel or friends during mediation, encourages the continuation
of marital dominance patterns. See generally Abel, supra note 1, at 293 (discussing how informalism
prepares the grievant for compromise).
173. See Abel, supra note 1, at 285 (discussing this phenomenon in informal justice generally).
174. An individual's ideologies or systems of belief serve as a source of self-definition, provide a
guide for making decisions and choosing among available behaviors, and motivate behaviors consis-
tent with one's ideological perspective. Chafetz defines ideology as:
[A] coherent system of ideas that helps its adherents to understand their world, explain
and evaluate events, structures and processes, and make decisions in terms of their un-
derstanding and evaluation of their world and their role in it. It thus has cognitive,
evaluative, and motivational components.
CHAFETZ, supra note 62, at 32. See ScANzoNI & SzINovAcz, supra note 13, at 22-28 (explaining
how sex role ideology influences spouses' decisionmaking).
The degree of commitment one has to an ideology determines how strongly that ideology will
control the individual's perceptions and behaviors that relate to that belief system. See Cynthia J.
Voelz, Effects of Gender Role Disparity on Couples' Decision-Making Processes, 49 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1532, 1540 (1985) (importance couple attaches to sex role ideology a significant
variable in gender role-related decisions).
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rian/modem to traditional.' 75 Egalitarian sex role ideology contem-
plates an equal partnership between spouses: a sharing of roles and equal
power in marital decisionmaking. Traditional sex role ideology antici-
pates a very different marital relationship: a spousal partnership exists,
but equality and role interchangeability do not.'76 Traditional sex role
ideology depicts husbands as competent, assertive and rightfully domi-
nant, and wives as emotive, nurturing, passive'77 and rightfully submis-
sive. ' The public domain becomes the husband's proper sphere of
action, while the private family domain remains the wife's. 79 As elo-
quently stated by Justice Joseph P. Bradley:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
... The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the
noble and benign office of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.'s8o
These traditional notions of male and female roles still dominate.'
While some studies find an increase in egalitarian attitudes among hus-
bands and wives, others show that these attitudinal changes have little
175. For women increased education and career involvement are related to egalitarian sex role
ideology, whereas large families and fundamentalist Protestantism are related to traditional sex role
ideology. Eg., Arland Thornton & Deborah Freedman, Changes in the Sex Role Attitudes of Wo-
men, 1962-77 Evidence From a Panel Study, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 831 (1979); see also Carolyn Stout
Morgan & Alexis J. Walker, Predicting Sex Role Attitudes, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 148 (1983) (older,
less-educated, lower-income women with lower feelings of personal competence supported tradi-
tional sex roles for women).
176. Eg., ScANzoNi & SzlNovAcz, supra note 13, at 15-28, 94, 101-104, 114-116; Voelz, supra
note 174, at 1532.
177. Cf. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 2.
178. Nyquist and Spence argue that high-dominant women's deference to the decisions of low
dominant men 65% of the time, compared to high-dominant men's deference to the decisions of low
dominant women only 10% of the time, indicates the continued viability of traditional sex roles that
require men to lead and women to follow. Nyquist & Spence, supra note 93, at 92.
179. Eg., CHAFEtZ, supra note 62, at 16; LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 23; Sharon Berlin
& Craig G. Johnson, Women and Autonomy: Using Structural Analysis of Social Behavior to Find
Autonomy Within Connections, 52 PSYCHIATRY 79, 80 (1989).
A recent study suggests that sex role specialization (development of sympathy, nurturance, anger
suppression, and reliance on the male) occurs for women from age 21 to 27 years old. Ravenna
Helson & Geraldine Moane, Personality Change in Women From College to Midlife, 53 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 176, 185 (1987). These younger women, then, may be as vulnerable as their
older counterparts to the power implications of traditional sex role ideology.
180. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
181. Eg., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COM-
MrrMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 85-87 (1985); LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 2-34, 38-41;
SCANZONI & SZINOVACz, supra note 13, at 16; John H. Scanzoni & Greer Litton Fox, Sex Roles,
Family and Society: The Seventies and Beyond, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 743, 744 (1980).
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relationship to behavioral adjustments. For instance, when both hus-
band and wife work full time, their attitudes reflect that housework
should be shared equally. Nevertheless, in all but very few of these
couples, the wives actually carry a far heavier housework burden than
the husbands and claim to prefer it that way. 1 2 Research that only taps
sex role attitudes rather than behavioral changes, thus, suggests a more
significant shift to modem sex role ideology than actually exists.183 Fur-
thermore, the fifty percent employment rate of married women suggests
that for many couples the husband's sphere remains the public domain,
whereas the wife's consists of home and hearth.'"
A. Legitimating Male Dominance
Because traditional sex role ideology pervades this culture and ideol-
ogies affect disputants' behaviors,"' sex role ideology will influence nego-
182. Spitze, supra note 42, at 602. See also Donna Hodgkins Berardo et al., A Residue of Tradi-
tion: Jobs Careers, and Spouses' Time in Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 381 (1987) (women
surveyed performed more housework than men); Margaret M. Poloma & T. Neal Garland, The
Married Professional Woman: A Study in the Tolerance of Domestication, 33 1. MARRIAGE & FAM.
531, 533-35 (1971) (some women perform more housework and state that they prefer it); Sara
Yogev, Do Professional Woman Have Egalitarian Marital Relationships?, 43 J MARRIAGE & FAM.
865 (1981).
Some also suggest that women's movement into and success in the traditionally male-dominated
public sphere threaten a social structure partially founded upon sexual stratification. They argue that
this perceived threat has sparked a public backlash against women's progress in challenging tradi-
tional sex role ideology. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 41, 183; Ognibene, supra note 24, at
14-15. See also FALUDI, supra note 144.
183. Many researchers have noted this discrepancy between attitudinal shifts toward modern
sex roles and the lack of corresponding behavioral adjustments. Eg., Scanzoni & Fox, supra note
181, at 745; Thornton & Freedman, supra note 175, at 834. Scanzoni and Fox offer the following
possible explanation:
Though women hold stronger egalitarian preferences than men, many women may be
unwilling to risk the potentially negative consequences to their total marital relationship
that might ensue should they actually seek to negotiate those preferences. Likewise, men
who profess egalitarianism may seldom find themselves confronted with women insisting
that they should negotiate more equitable behaviors. In short, changes in preferences
may have exceeded behavioral change because the preferences have not been accompa-
nied by the kinds of decisioning processes necessary to translate them into actual reality.
Scanzoni and Fox, supra note 181, at 746.
An equally plausible explanation for this discrepancy, however, is that husbands only are willing
to articulate egalitarian preferences when those preferences do not precipitate actual changes in role
allocations.
184. Studies suggest that the more modern a woman's sex role ideology, the higher her income
and the greater her workforce continuity. Eg., Alan C. Acock & John N. Edwards, Egalitarian Sex-
Role Attitudes and Female Income, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 581 (1982).
185. Eg., GULLIVER, supra note 11, at 10 (disputants in arbitration influenced by traditional
sex role ideologies). As Merry and Silbey note:
Yet this model tends to underestimate the role of cultural norms and values for the -
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tiations between many divorcing husbands and wives." 6 For instance, a
wife with resources equivalent to her husband's will have less negotiating
power than expected if her sex role ideology prescribes submissiveness.
18 7
Moreover, people do not perceive how strongly normative prescriptions
influence their behaviors.""' Without this awareness, a mediator might
substance and process of dispute behavior.... Perceptions of behavior and ways of
dealing with them derive from habits and customs embedded in social groups and cul-
tures. Ideas about how to respond to grievances are linked with socially constructed
definitions of normal behavior, respectability, responsibility and the good person.
Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute,
9 JusT. SYs. J. 151, 157 (1984).
186. Sex role ideology influences negotiations in intact marriages. For instance, the results of
Kingsbury and Scanzoni's research on decisionmaking power in dual career couples suggest that
tangible resources and sex role ideologies held by the spouses interact to produce marital power.
Nancy M. Kingsbury & John H. Scanzoni, Process Power and Decision Outcomes Among Dual-
Career Couples, 20 J. COMp. FAM. STUD. 231, 242 (1989). Many other researchers and theorists also
acknowledge the importance of sex role ideology in moderating the effect of resource power in mari-
tal decisioning. Kg., SCANZONI & SZINOVACZ, supra note 13, at 26-28; Mirowsky, supra note 84;
Boyd C. Rollins & Stephen J. Bahr, A Theory of Power Relationships in Marriage, 38 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 619, 622 (1976); Spitze, supra note 42, at 602; Voelz, supra note 174 (discussing gender role
disparity in the context of married couples' decisionmaking processes generally). Because divorcing
couples bring marital dispute resolution patterns into mediation, see supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text, sex role ideology's influence on marital negotiations sheds light on possible patterns in
divorce negotiations.
187. In their research on power in dual career couples, Kingsbury and Scanzoni suggest that the
wife's sex role ideology might have greater impact on marital decisioning than the husband's. The
more modern wife seems willing to negotiate with her husband for her interests, whereas the tradi-
tional wife seems to accept her husband's position. Kingsbury & Scanzoni, supra note 186, at 243.
Of course, a husband high in tangible resource power might also curtail his use of that power if he
subscribes to a sex role ideology that prescribes egalitarian marital decisioning. However, in a recent
study of dual career couples, when the husband's sex role ideology was egalitarian and the wife's was
traditional, the husband exercised significantly more power than the wife. The researchers offered
one possible explanation: "Mhese more traditional wives were less willing to negotiate for their own
points of view in deference to their partners' 'legitimate' power." Id. at 243.
188. For example, in their research on group decisionmaking, Kaplan and Miller found their
subjects largely unaware of how strongly their judgmental decisions had been normatively influ-
enced. Rather, these strongly influenced subjects reported experiencing low levels of influence. Mar-
tin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative Versus Informational
Influence Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
306, 312 (1987).
MacKinnon contextualizes this observation in male/female relations:
Consciousness raising discovered that one form of the social existence of male power is
inside women. In this form, male power becomes self-enforcing. Women become
"thingified in the head." Once incarnated, male superiority tends to be reaffirmed and
reinforced in what can be seen as well as in what can be done. So male power is and is
not illusory. As it justifies itself, namely as natural, universal, unchangeable, given and
morally correct, it is illusory; but the fact that it is powerful is no illusion. Power is a
social relation. Given the imperatives of women's lives, the necessity to avoid punish-
ment - from self-rejection to involuntary incarceration to suicide - it is not irrational
for women to see themselves in a way that makes their necessary compliance tolerable,
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have difficulty convincing a wife that her deference to her husband's sug-
gestion results from her socialized beliefs rather than her free choice.189
Traditional sex role ideology then lends additional legitimacy to male
dominance and female submissiveness during divorce negotiations. 190
B. Public Sphere
Traditional sex role ideology further imbalances power relations be-
tween spouses by designating different spheres of action and authority for
men and women.19 Assignment to the public sphere advantages the
husband in several ways. Serving as the family's spokesperson with other
social institutions, he gains additional negotiation experience that bene-
fits him in divorce mediation. 192 Moreover, mediators sometimes align
themselves with the more experienced negotiator because the "pro" can
better fulfill the mediator's primary goal of generating an agreement.
1 93
even satisfying. Living each day reconvinces everyone, women and men alike, of male
hegemony, which is hardly a myth, and of women's innate inferiority and men's innate
superiority, a myth that each day's reliving makes difficult to distinguish meaningfully
from reality.
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 99-100 (1989).
189. Other ideologies also influence behaviors relevant to divorce negotiations between mediat-
ing spouses. For instance, most major religions support sexual inequality and different roles for men
and women. Eg., BELLAH ET AL., supra note 181, at 96-97; CHAFETZ, supra note 62, at 12. A
couple's religious commitment, thus, might intensify a wife's disadvantage during divorce negotia-
tions by increasing the couple's adherence to traditional sex role ideology. For example, in a longitu-
dinal panel study, researchers found that fundamentalist Protestant women tended to retain
traditional sex role attitudes from 1962-1977 despite significant attitudinal shifts in other populations
of women. Thornton & Freedman, supra note 175, at 838. See also Charles W. Peek & Sharon
Brown, Sex Prejudice Among White Protestantr Like or Unlike Ethnic Prejudice?, 59 Soc. FORCES
169 (1980) (prejudice against women's participation in politics greater among white Protestants than
among unaffiliated whites).
However, most religions also prescribe a concern for others, BELLAH ET AL., supra note 181, at
223, that might limit self-interested bargaining and mitigate the exaggerated effect of traditional sex
role ideology in religious couples. Because of the potential for religious ideologies to positively and
negatively affect behaviors of negotiating spouses, they are omitted from this article's analysis.
190. See generally BLAU, supra note 143, at 205-11; SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING, supra
note 13, at 80-82.
191. For instance, a study of newlyweds indicates that traditional sex role attitudes significantly
diminish the likelihood of the wife participating in the workforce as well as the likelihood of the
husband participating in household tasks. Jean Atkinson & Ted L. Huston, Sex Role Orientation
and Division of Labor Early in Marriage, 46 J. PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330 (1984).
192. The advantage the experienced negotiator has in mediation receives open acknowledge-
ment by some mediators. DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 134 (1983). See also Christopher
Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 J. Disv. RESOL. 141, 141-42; Kenneth Kressel &
Dean G. Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41 J. Soc. ISSuES 179, 187 (1985).
193. See KOLB, supra note 192, at 94, 115-17 (noting the value mediators place on and their
deference to pro negotiators in union/management mediation).
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The husband's assignment to the outside world also assures his role
as primary provider. As a result the couple and other societal members
perceive his earnings as generating the marital assets, whereas the wife's
financial contribution, if any, remains secondary. 194 This makes the hus-
band's claim to marital assets presumptively more legitimate than the
wife's. 9 A mediated outcome awarding him more of the marital assets
than his wife then will seem fair and just.
196
Assignment to the public sphere also reinforces male authority on
financial issues. Financial expertise and authority within a traditional
marriage belong to the husband. Little surprise then that in divorce
mediation:
194. Even when the wife contributes considerable income to the family, her salary frequently is
not perceived as having the same central importance to family survival as the husband's salary.
Rather, her income is perceived as providing "extras." Mirowsky, supra note 84, at 567.
195. The greater legitimacy of the husband's claim to marital assets has been acknowledged in
the divorce literature. Lonsdorf, supra note 156, at 288.
Furthermore, divorce mediators recognize the husband's potential reluctance to share marital
assets, particularly his income, because he perceives his entitlement to them as greater than hers.
When the husband does not believe that the wife should share in the family assets which
have resulted from his earning power, he may be indignant when his wife expects spousal
support for more than a few years believing she is not entitled to the fruits of his labor
now that she is no longer emotionally nurturing him.
Ricci, supra note 35, at 58.
196. The husband's successful fulfillment of and belief in the propriety of his primary provider
role might influence him to retain some sense of financial responsibility for his soon-to-be ex-wife
and their children during divorce mediation. Mitigating this sense of responsibility, however, might
be the husband's desire to remarry and his awareness that upon remarriage he again will assume the
primary provider role for a different family system. In order to maintain his potential to resume the
provider role in his new family, he would need to retain sufficient marital assets, particularly his
income. Research indicating men's tendency to abandon social responsibility in favor of maximizing
their own outcomes and women's tendency to remain socially responsible to those dependent on
them supports this assertion. John Schopler & Nicholas Bateson, The Power ofDependence, 2 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 247 (1965). Moreover, in my private conversations with numerous
divorce mediators over the past three years, they have candidly admitted the difficulty of getting a
husband to agree to provide spousal maintenance. This observation corresponds to the importance
of income to men. See Ulbrich, supra note 31, at 123 (men believe that their earnings objectively
indicate success in employment and illustrate their worth in society). With income level so strongly
related to the husband's well-being, one understands why mediators have difficulty convincing him
to part with that income to support an ex-wife.
Moreover, the inevitable pain and resultant hostility and resentment that accompanies divorce
should decrease the husband's willingness to provide for his ex-wife. The husband's reluctance to
share financial assets with his wife may be worse when she, rather than he, initiates the divorce. See
Ricci, supra note 35, at 58.
Certainly the same reluctance also exists when lawyers negotiate the divorce agreement. How-
ever, in lawyer negotiations the wife's attorney is motivated to protect the wife's legal right to
spousal maintenance and has the force of formal substantive law behind her. See infra pp. 101-05
and notes 313-20 for further discussion of differences between mediation and lawyer negotiation.
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[A]lithough husbands were frequently uninformed about financial matters,
they were paragons of financial expertise in comparison to their wives.
Husbands had almost exclusive control of important financial documents
and were aware of financial arrangements of which their wives were igno-
rant .... 197
The husband's legitimate authority over finances can hurt the di-
vorcing wife in at least three ways. First, she may accept without ques-
tioning whatever inadequate proposal he makes.198 Second, to the extent
her husband has dominated financial planning and decisions, she lacks
the experience and knowledge of her financial vulnerability necessary to
develop a sound financial plan for her future.199 Third, if she does create
a sensible financial plan, her lack of legitimate authority over finances
may cause her husband to ignore, resent, discount and/or refuse her
requests.2o
While the husband's assignment to the public sphere enhances his
negotiation experience and authority, confinement of the wife's authority
to the private sphere diminishes her negotiating power in mediation.
C. Private Sphere
Some argue the wife's responsibility for the day to day care of the
family promotes a moral orientation of care and relatedness.2"'
197. KRESSEL, supra note I, at 53.
198. As MacKinnon notes: "In a society of gender inequality, the speech of the powerful im-
presses its view upon the world, concealing the truth of powerlessness under a despairing acquies-
cence that provides the appearance of consent and makes protest inaudible as well as rare."
MACKINNON, supra note 188, at 205.
199. Mediator Isolina Ricci acknowledges that the wife's familial role may result in her inability
and reluctance to engage in the long-range planning necessary for effective negotiation on the sup-
port, custody, and property issues in mediation. Ricci, supra note 35, at 53. Additionally, as noted
by Arendell, many women fail to anticipate the financial hardships of divorce. ARENDELL, supra
note 6, at 53.
200. Social psychological research suggests that individuals with high power may ignore the
interests and reject the offers of those with low power. Tjosvold, supra note 167, at 138.
201. Gilligan's work is cited most frequently in support of this proposition. See CAROL GILLI-
GAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
While Gilligan's work has received negative criticism on methodological grounds, eg., John M.
Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's
Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. RES. 597 (1983), her findings have found support in other
social science research. For instance, Wine notes that women evidence greater interpersonal sensi-
tivity than men and define themselves in relation to family and others, whereas men define them-
selves in term of their work. Jeri Dawn Wine, Models of Human Functioning: A Feminist
Perspective, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 188 (1985). See also Maureen Rose Ford & Carol
Rotter Lowery, Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning: A Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care
Orientations, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 777 (1986) (in response to questionnaires posing
moral dilemmas females were found more consistent than males in the use of care orientation,
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Whatever the origin of women's care orientation,2"2 it compounds the
power imbalance between spouses on financial issues. The wife's focus
on relationships and care encourages her to overlook the importance of
economic arrangements and to sacrifice economic goals in order to pre-
serve her relationship with her husband.20 3
Mediators recognize the wife's care orientation can interfere with
her ability to negotiate effectively with her husband. For instance, Ricci
reports that in order to preserve family peace a wife might act as the
husband's economic equal, when objective reality reveals her economic
inferiority. With her income only one-fifth of her husband's, this wife
might agree to pay for half of the child's college education in order to
preserve the family peace.2° Coupling the traditional husband's legiti-
whereas males were found more consistent than females in the use ofjustice orientation); Sara E.
Snodgrass, Women's Intuition: The Effect of Subordinate Role on Interpersonal Sensitivity, 49 J. PER-
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 146, 153 (1985) (women more sensitive to men than to other women,
whereas men equally sensitive to men and women); Janice C. Stapley & Jeannette Haviland, Beyond
Depression: Gender Differences in Normal Adolescents' Emotional Experiences, 20 Sax ROLEs 295,
306 (1989) (girl's affiliative experiences more emotionally elaborated than boy's, and boys deny many
emotional experiences). Gilligan's findings also remain intuitively, as well as scientifically, appeal-
ing. However, some attribute their intuitive appeal more to a need to perpetuate cultural myths than
to reality. Mary Brabeck, Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences Between Males and
Females, 3 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 274, 286-90 (1983).
202. Some suggest women's care orientation originates in early responsibility training or sociali-
zation. Because women, either as adults or as older siblings, care for children, they of necessity learn
to place others' needs before their own, to anticipate and experience others' emotions, and to restrain
harmful impulses. Avonne Mason & Virginia Blankenship, Power and Affiliation Motivation, Stress
and Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 208 (1987).
Others argue that women value relatedness more than do men because of the past oppression of
women by men, not because of any innate differences between women and men. See generally
MAcKINNON, supra note 188, at 37-80. To the extent that the powerful define morality in ways that
serve their ends, what is moral for men serves men's ends and what is moral for women serves men's
ends. Id at 162, 201. Women's moral orientation toward care and relatedness serves men's ends by
providing men and their offspring with nurturance and by blunting and/or diverting women's com-
petitiveness. See id. at 64-67, 109-12. Additionally, women may value relatedness simply because
their survival frequently is contingent upon their successful relatedness to powerful men. Id. at 51-
52; Snodgrass, supra note 201, at 153 (noting that subordinates' greater sensitivity to their leaders
might be due to the subordinate's need to gain the leader's favor by fulfilling the leader's needs).
Women's moral orientation, then, that Gilligan sees as natural and others see as positive socializa-
tion, may be little more than women's response to male oppression. See generally MAcKINNON,
supra note 188, at 51-52.
For an interesting discussion of how stereotyping women as relationship-centered can produce
and perpetuate women's economic marginalization, see Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
McH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
203. Ricci, supra note 35, at 53-54. As noted by Kressel, "[t]he research suggests that the wife
is highly reactive to the interpersonal messages emanating from her husband, while the husband is
focused instead on the tangible and concrete demands and objectives of the bargaining situation."
KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 56.
204. Ricci, supra note 35, at 53-54.
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mate authority with the wife's care orientation, the wife's precarious po-
sition on financial issues during divorce negotiations stands in bold relief.
As Ricci notes:
[T]he reciprocity on the emotional investment she assumed she generated in
her past family relationships with her husband is not uniformly honored in
the business world of divorce, where facts, figures, projections and written
agreements are the norm, rather than attentiveness to interpersonal feelings
or attitudes. When she does develop a utilitarian parenting or financial
plan, the husband might call her "cold," "calculating," or "selfish." With-
out interventions, these attributional labels may be taken to heart rather
than identified as a part of the husband's bargaining tactics, and the wife
may pull back and revise her plan to gain his approval.2 °5
Mediators often enhance the threat women's care orientation poses
to financial negotiations by appealing to emotional and relational inter-
ests20 6 and by denigrating the importance of monetary issues. 2 7 This
emphasis reinforces the traditional woman's socialization and obscures
that obtaining an equitable financial agreement from a reluctant husband
might require the wife to sacrifice relatedness and good feeling.20" In
such an atmosphere, the wife likely will refrain from the needed sacri-
fice.Y Mediation, in essence, encourages and rewards the wife's failure
205. Id. at 53.
206. Some argue the formal legal system is vulnerable to the same criticism. For instance, Si-
mon contends that the formal doctrinal tradition in legal theory and education is under attack by
proponents of a new formalism, the "Psychological Vision." He argues that the Psychological Vi-
sion advocates, as does mediation, a focus on the client's intimate feelings and obscures the critical
issues of lawyering and legality. William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus" Notes on a New Legal
Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REv. 487, 488-89 (1980). Approaching the same problem from a different
direction, Fineman exposes the formal legal system's growing dependence on the decisions of mental
health professionals on child custody issues. Fineman, supra note 1. Perhaps divorce mediation,
with its dependency on mental health professionals and its focus on emotions and relatedness, simply
sits at the extreme end of the jurisprudential continuum between legal/rational/public and psycho-
logical/emotional/private formalism.
207. Grebe admits mental health mediators' tendency to focus on custody (emotional) issues to
the exclusion of financial concerns. Sarah Childs Grebe, Family Mediation Training Programs: Es-
tablishing Standards, MEDIATION Q., Spring 1988, at 13, 24. Vanderkooi and Pearson found an
interesting, yet predictable, difference in focus between custody mediators who were lawyers and
those with a mental health background. Whereas lawyer mediators asked questions about economic
aspects of the divorce (funds for college educations, medical and dental care), mental health
mediators asked about relational and emotional issues (the children's developmental needs and ad-
justment to divorce, custody and visitation arrangements). Vanderkooi & Pearson, supra note 16, at
561.
208. Cohen also points out that an equitable financial agreement might do more to improve
relations between divorced spouses than emotional ventilation in mediation. Cohen, supra note 1, at
1.
209. As stated by Barbara Hart:
Mediation privitizes divorce, moving it back "into the closet." Mediation produces the
1992]
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to recognize the threat her care orientation poses during negotiation of
financial issues.210
While assignment to the private family sphere disadvantages the
wife on financial issues, it should give her some power over child issues.
In the family's private realm the wife has primary responsibility for child
care and possesses legitimate authority on issues concerning the chil-
dren's welfare. Consequently, during divorce mediation the traditional
wife should have authority over child custody and visitation issues simi-
lar to the authority the husband has over financial issues. She could use
this power to retain control of the children or she could pit it against her
husband's power in hammering out the financial terms of the divorce
agreement. Counterintuitively, however, the wife has no such authority
in mediation.
D. Mediator Coercion On Child Issues
In divorce mediation the wife confronts a mental health mediator
surrounded by an aura of professional expertise regarding the children's
best interests.21 Mediators claim expert authority by describing their
training and experience to the couple and by sharing their allegedly ex-
pert knowledge on children's developmental needs.2" 2 The wife's legiti-
mate authority over the children pales in the shadow of the professional's
expert authority.
21 3
If the expert mediator remained neutral, the wife still could use her
child-centered power in direct negotiation with her husband. Or, if the
situation where the traditional conciliatory cultural script for women is encouraged, e.g.,
"Gee I hope that we can make it. All right, the problem is my fault. Anyway, this
wouldn't have fallen apart if I had done it right. I want to be sophisticated and civilized
about this." It is very difficult for women to move out of that kind of conciliatory script
when we are in the process of negotiation - even for those of us who are trained and
have been advocates for a long time.
Barbara Hart, False Prophets, False Promises and False Advertising, Speech presented at the First
National Conference on Mediation in Battered Women and Family Law Cases, New York, New
York (March 25, 1985).
210. Abel discusses how informal dispute resolution processes refocus the grievant's attention
from gaining tangible relief to emotional catharsis, in effect, "cooling-out" the grievant. Abel, supra
note 1, at 293-94.
211. See supra notes 19-20 for studies indicating that most custody mediation is done in court
affiliated mediation programs and most of the mediators in these programs have mental health,
rather than legal, backgrounds.
212. See Vanderkooi & Pearson, supra note 16, at 560.
213. Expertise is a widely recognized basis of power. !Eg., DEurrscH, supra note 11, at 87; LIPs,
supra note 87, at 50; Ragins & Sundstrom, supra note 31, at 52. See also PRUrrr, supra note 11, at
216 (an expert's communications are more persuasive than a nonexpert). Closely aligned with expert
power is informational power, see generally Lips, supra note 127; see also Lips, supra note 87, at 50,
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formal law that recognizes the caretaking mother's superior right to chil-
dren remained relevant in mediation, it might enhance the wife's power
over child issues. But formal law does not dictate mediated outcomes
214
and mental health mediators do not remain neutral. Emboldened and
legitimated by their professional expertise,21 divorce mediators abandon
their prescribed neutrality and zealously intervene to protect defenseless
children from the custody and visitation decisions of their allegedly de-
structive parents.21 6 Mediator intervention results in custody arrange-
ments more favorable to fathers than fathers could obtain in direct
negotiations with their authoritative wives.
Divorce mediators have a strong bias in favor of joint custody217 and
coerce divorcing mothers into this arrangement. 218  Irving and Benja-
min2" 9 unwittingly provide an illustrative case. At mediation's begin-
ning, the mother requested sole custody of the couple's two girls, aged
ten and six.22 The case report nowhere indicates the mother's unfitness.
which psychologist mediators also allegedly possess regarding the best interests of the children of
divorce.
Mediators in court affiliated programs also may acquire legitimate authority with the divorcing
couple because of their association with the court. KRassEL, supra note 1, at 214.
214. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
215. The acceptance and dependence of judges on psychologists' expertise in resolving child
issues, see Fineman, supra note 1, at 740, reinforces and validates coercion by court affiliated mental
health mediators.
216. See, eg., KREssEL, supra note 1, at 118-19; Dworkin & London, supra note 172, at 7-8;
Judith S. Wallerstein, Psychodynamic Perspectives on Family Mediation, MEDIATiON Q., Winter
1986-Spring 1987, at 7, 12-13, 16, 19.
217. Eg., Girdner, supra note 20, at 142-43; Linda K. Girdner, Adjudication and Mediation: A
Comparison of Custody Decision-Making Processes Involving Third Parties, 8 J. DIVORCE, Spring-
Summer 1985, at 33, 42 [hereinafter Girdner, Adjudication and Mediation]; Grillo, supra note 1, at
1594-95. Lawyers, as well as mental health mediators exhibit this bias. See Andrew Schepard et al.,
Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and Modification, 48 ALB. L. REV. 616, 625-26 (1984). Profes-
sor Fineman notes that mediators often consider a party's opposition to joint custody pathological,
Fineman, supra note 1, at 766, and mental health professionals favor joint custody because of its
seeming fairness and its ability to symbolically accommodate fathers' interests. See id. at 732-35.
218. Vanderkooi and Pearson's study revealed that custody mediators frequently coerced di-
vorcing parents regarding custody plans and sometimes dictated the agreement's terms. Vanderkooi
& Pearson, supra note 16, at 565. They also found that directive mediators who actively participate
in generating custody agreements have significantly higher success rates than passive mediators, id,
suggesting that most mediated custody agreements reflect mediator coercion. Likewise, Girdner's
article exposes the coercive attitudes and tactics of many family mediators regarding the imposition
of joint custody upon the divorcing couple. Girdner, supra note 20, at 142-47. While Girdner
points out that not all mediators impose their views regarding joint custody upon the divorcing
couple, id. at 147-51, the less coercive mediators about whom she speaks tend to work in elite private
programs. See id. at 141-42. These programs process small numbers of divorces compared to
mandatory court affiliated programs where obvious coercion is more prevalent.
219. Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37.
220. See id at 123-24.
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The mother, however, did raise some question about the quality of the
father's prior involvement with the girls.22 1 During the course of the
mediation, the mediators convinced the mother that, irrespective of the
father's past behavior,222 the children "needed" and "loved" their father
and suggested the mother should behave in accordance with the chil-
dren's best interests.223 In seeking to persuade the mother, the mediators
engaged the children in the mediation as well as the maternal grand-
mother who, at the outset, had insisted the girls' mother should have sole
custody.224 At mediation's end, the agreement reflected a joint physical
custody arrangement with the girls spending weekdays with their mother
and weekends with their father.225 The couple, however, continued hav-
ing difficulty and returned for follow-up mediation.226 With the
mediators' assistance, the couple arrived at a new custody arrangement:
the girls would stay with their father two evenings per week as well as the
weekends, leaving them with their mother only three days per week.227
Only the mother's resistance offers to control a biased mediator's
imposition of joint custody. However, the mother's insistence upon sole
custody or her threat to walk out of mediation seems unlikely because of
the mental health professional's expert authority and because the
mother's sex role socialization makes her susceptible to manipulation by
the mediator.2 28 Her belief in her responsibility to maintain familial rela-
221. Id at 124.
222. In her article Professor Grillo explains how mediation's focus on future, to the exclusion of
past, events, mediation's denigration of rights, and mediation's treatment of husband and wife as
formally equal assist the mediator in coercing the caretaking mother into a joint custody arrange.
ment. Grillo, supra note 1, at 1563-64.
223. Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37, at 124.
224. Id at 126.
225. Id
226. Id. at 127.
227. Id at 127. In reading this case history I cannot escape the impression that the mediators
simply wore down an exhausted and embattled mother, much the same as they did in Professor
Grillo's case example. See infra note 228.
228. In her article Professor Grillo provides the following startling example:
Kenny spent ten days with his father Jerry before Thanksgiving, and was scheduled
to return on a flight arriving on Thanksgiving afternoon. That morning, Jerry called and
said that flying was expensive, and that he was returning to the area at Christmas any-
way. He said he intended to keep Kenny with him until then; his wife would care for
Kenny at home. Linda, her Thanksgiving dinner in the oven and relatives scheduled to
arrive, thought of going herself to pick up Kenny or going to court, but decided that the
worst thing for Kenny would be a custody battle.
When Kenny returned at Christmas, his behavior was odd; for the first time in his life
he was violent and aggressive towards other children. Upon questioning Kenny, Linda
discovered that he had not been cared for by his stepmother during the day as promised,
but had instead been sent to an unlicensed day care where the teacher had regularly used
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tionships 229 predisposes her to joint custody because mediators present
that arrangement as the one best designed to preserve the children's rela-
tionship with their father. Moreover, as the above case illustrates,
mediators appeal to the traditional mother's care orientation by empha-
sizing the father's emotional importance to the children. 230  The tradi-
corporal punishment, to which Linda was passionately opposed and to which Kenny had
never before been exposed.
In mediation, Linda asks that she be given primary custody of Kenny. She says that
Jerry had been untruthful, unreliable, and has risked Kenny's emotional and physical
well-being. She tries to argue that such a young child needs one home base, and it
should be hers since she was effectively his sole parent for most of his first three years of
life. The mediator does not allow her to make these points. Instead, she says that the
past is not to be discussed; rather they must plan together about the future. She says
that whether Jerry participated in Kenny's life for his early years is irrelevant; he is here
now. The Thanksgiving situation is past history, and she is sure that they both have
complaints about the past. Blaming one another is counterproductive. The mediator
tells Linda that she has to recognize that the parent who has the child is responsible for
choosing day care. Linda must learn to give up control.
Grillo, supra note 1, at 1562-63.
In a footnote following this story, Professor Grillo explains that after a year of Kenny's alternat-
ing months between parents in a traumatic joint physical custody arrangement, Linda's concern for
Kenny's psychological well-being led her to relinquish custody to Jerry. Linda explained that re-
questing sole custody for herself would have been futile because she felt the mediator again would
side with Jerry. Id, at 1563 n.73.
229. See supra notes 201-03 (discussing women's care orientation).
230. Throughout her article, Professor Grillo warns of women's susceptibility to mediator ma-
nipulation because of women's care and relatedness orientation. Grillo, supra note 1, at 1601-06.
Highlighting this danger is the recognition by family sociologists that even within intact families the
traditional wife's focus on and responsibility for familial relationships inhibits her ability to effec-
tively bargain on her own behalf. Scanzoni and Szinovacz note in discussing the role sex role ideol-
ogy plays in determining the theory of negotiation a wife uses:
[W]omen who conform to long-standing (traditional) prescription regarding the four sex
roles are likely to carry on their decisioning in such a way as to promote primarily the
well-being of the marriage, or the family, as a whole. They perceive their own well-being
to be achieved if the well-being of their husband and child(ren) is achieved. But women
who fall more toward the modern end of the same continuum carry on their decisioning
in such a way as to promote their own weli-being alongside the well-being of other family
members ....
SCANZONI & SZINOVACZ, supra note 13, at 27.
The authors go on to explain how traditional sex role ideology influences men's marital negotia-
tions quite differently:
Men who turn up on the traditional side of the same continuum expect women to
carry on decisioning by keeping group goals uppermost. Traditional men do not expect
women to equate their own goals or rewards with those of the family group. At the
same time, those men carry on decisioning by keeping their own interests (especially
occupational) primary - based on the assumption that if they do well the family will
too. Traditional men expect women to recognize the primacy of men's interests - "for
the sake of all of us."
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tional mother then falls victim to a skillful mediator armed with such
rhetoric.231 Unsurprisingly, mediation produces a significantly greater
percentage of joint custody arrangements than any other process of cus-
tody dispute resolution.23
The joint custody agreements reached in mediation, however, more
231. The mental health profession's recent focus and insistence upon the value of fathers to
children's well-being, reflected in its bias in favor of joint custody, is puzzling when no evidence
indicates that joint custody is a superior custody arrangement for children. While the profession
continues to cloak its preference for joint custody in rhetoric emphasizing the best interests of the
children, some suspect that this bias is simply one more example of the use of the psychological
profession to control women and support preexisting hierarchy. See Scarlet Pollock & Jo Sutton,
Fathers' Rights, Women's Losses, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 593 (1985).
This suspicion finds support in history. In the past the male dominated psychological profession
has marginalized women's concerns, portrayed women as inferior hysterical human beings, and
urged women to happily assume their proper subordinate position to men. Sanity in women often
meant little more than proper accommodation to male dominance. See PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN
AND MADNESS (1972); HEWLETr, supra note 21, at 244-52; MAcKINNON, supra note 188, at 152-
53, 283 n.42; Wine, supra note 201, at 189. But see Michael Smyth & Gregory McFarlane, Sex-Role
Stereotyping by Psychologists and Psychiatrist" A Further Analysis, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 130
(1985) (suggesting some evidence exists that the more negative evaluation by mental health profes-
sionals of female, in contrast to male, patients is changing, especially among female mental health
professionals).
Currently the psychological profession has seized significant control in child custody decision-
making. See generally Fineman, supra note 1. It has done so at a time when men have politically
organized and successfully pushed for joint custody legislation in many states. See Dan Menzie,
Note, Fathers are Parents Too: Pros and Cons of the New Missouri Domestic Relations Statute, 57 U.
Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 963 (1989). The ability of the psychological profession to retain its new-
found decisional control on child issues likely depends upon placation of elite males who now ac-
tively seek increased parental rights. The psychological profession's bias in favor of joint custody
can therefore be better understood as another accommodation to pre-existing hierarchy as opposed
to a concern for the best interests of the children.
This accommodation, as opposed to concern with the child's best interests, is illustrated by the
following case example. In mediation an admitted alcoholic father requested overnight visits by his
four year old daughter. He refused treatment for his alcoholism, lived alone, and smoked in bcd.
When the child's mother expressed concern for the child's physical safety, the court mediator coun-
tered by insisting the mother had an obligation to cooperate with the father. Bruch, supra note 38, at
119. Further calling into question the mediators' concern with children, rather than accommodation
of fathers, is their continued insistence that mediation is better for children than adjudication despite
evidence that no correlation exists between children's adjustment to divorce and the custody dispute
resolution process used by the parents. Id. at 117 (quoting Jessica Pearson et al., The Effects of
Divorce Mediation and Adjudication Procedures on Children, 24, 25 (1984) (unpublished manu-
script available from the Research Unit of the Ass'n of Family & Conciliation courts, 1720 Emerson
St., Denver, Colorado 80218)).
232. For example in their study of a Colorado custody mediation program, Pearson and Thoen-
nes found that nearly 70% of the mediating couples agreed to joint custody, whereas those couples
choosing an alternative form of dispute resolution only agreed to joint custody in 30% of the cases.
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal
Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 506 (1984) [hereinafter Pearson & Thoennes, Longitudinal Study].
See also, eg., Christine Leick, Guidelines for Mediator/Attorney Cooperation, MEDIATION Q., Spring
1989, at 37, 43; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 1, at 60; Ray & Bohmer, supra note 6, at 18.
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commonly seem to reflect joint legal, rather than joint physical, cus-
tody. 33 In contrast to joint physical custody where the child spends ex-
tended periods of time living with each parent, joint legal custody
requires the parents only to share control over important child related
decisions. Because this form of custody superficially seems less threaten-
ing to mothers, its subtle political implications frequently go unnoticed.
Joint legal custody often perpetuates the preexisting patriarchal family
structure by allocating the day-to-day care of the children to the mother,
while solidifying the ex-husband's power over important child related de-
cisions. The mother can make decisions as long as they reflect her ex-
husband's wishes. The moment, however, her opinion differs from his,
he has veto power.234 This veto power, or the threat of its use, invades
the ex-wife's consciousness and makes her ex-husband, and the male con-
trol he represents, an ever-present force with which to contend. The
message is clear: she may escape the marriage but will remain subject to
male domination.235 This implicit, yet powerful, message keeps women
aware of their required submissiveness and thus strengthens
patriarchy.
236
The effect joint legal or physical custody has on the children of di-
vorce also reinforces existing hierarchy between men and women. The
father's absence from the family unit interferes with socialization of the
children into patriarchal patterns.237 How, for instance, does a little girl
233. However, other reports "from the trenches" indicate that joint physical custody may be
more prevalent in mediation than limited research results suggest. See Leick, supra note 232, at 43.
Furthermore, agreement to joint physical custody in mediation often seems based on a naive misun-
derstanding of its practical and legal implications. Id
The joint physical custody agreed to in mediation seems to mimic the timesharing found in con-
ventional sole custody arrangements. Girdner, supra note 20, at 137. However, one study indicates
that mediated joint physical custody agreements provided the father two to three more days per
month with the children than nonmediated agreements. Pearson & Thoennes, Longitudinal Study,
supra note 232, at 507. Consequently, joint physical custody agreements negotiated in mediation
probably provide the father greater access to the children than other dispute resolution processes.
234. Girdner, supra note 20, at 138.
235. See Bruch, supra note 38, at 107.
236. See generally Ann M. Delorey, Joint Legal Custody: .4 Reversion to Patriarchal Power, 3
CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 33 (1989); Ray & Bohmer, supra note 6.
237. As Pollock and Sutton state:
fIsewhere we have explored the authority of fatherhood as the means of instilling in
family members a recognition and acceptance of, and acquiescence to, male authority in
general. It is a means through which male supremacy is self-perpetuated. Fatherhood
ensures that male children grow up "normal" - that is, heterosexual, practising broth-
erhood, and eventually growing into fathers. Through fatherhood, girls are taught femi-
ninity - the proper place of women subordinate to men, the art of loyalty and service to
men, and a thorough disrespect for women. While the rhetoric of mutual parenthood
may seem to convey equality and exchange, the social position of each parent is hierar-
1992]
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learn proper submissiveness to male authority in the absence of a power-
ful male figure and in the presence of an independently decisive mother.
Likewise, how can a little boy learn proper domination of women if he
lacks his father's modeling, his mother dominates the household, and he
observes his mother operating as an autonomous adult. While certainly
children's exposure to patriarchal patterns in other areas of life will influ-
ence them, the absence of these patterns in their homes makes their so-
cialization less effective. Joint legal and joint physical custody
reintroduce male power into the post-divorce family and ensure that chil-
dren remain aware of male dominance. The significant increase in joint
custody, whether physical or legal, generated by mediation thus reflects a
corresponding increase in the male dominance characteristic of
patriarchy.
238
Not only does mediator bias in favor of joint custody reinforce patri-
archy through custody arrangements, it also further weakens the wife's
already precarious financial position in divorce mediation by eliminating
the wife's ability to use her child-centered power during negotiations
over financial issues. Moreover, a mother intent upon sole custody de-
spite mediator coercion might attempt to circumvent the mediator and
appeal directly to the father by offering to accept a grossly inequitable
financial arrangement in exchange for sole custody.239 While those
chically organized. The powerlessness of women is made clear and is continually af-
firmed by the father's authority over mothers and motherhood.
Arguments in support of the heterosexual family are couched in terms of the "best
interests" of the child. This is a circular argument for what is seen to be in the best
interests of the child is to have a social father, and thus to live in a heterosexual family.
The possibility for women to break away from this patriarchal family structure is ex-
tremely limited. It is currently being made more difficult as both right- and left-wing
positions support the ideal family as if it were based upon equality, and in the best
interests of children.
... State concern with the problem of fatherless families is less a consideration of
poverty and stigmatization than an attempt to impose male authority ....
Pollock & Sutton, supra note 231, at 595-96 (citations omitted).
238. That most divorced women remarry seems to diminish the force of this argument. The
step-father can provide the needed socialization into patriarchal patterns. This counter-argument
ignores, however, the lower legitimacy of a step-parent's authority, especially with older children.
Moreover, the mere spectre of women raising children without male influence, causes alarm in a
patriarchal society, see Pollock & Sutton, supra note 231, at 594 (discussing the alarm expressed in
Britain's Law Commission Reports over the perception that more women than before choose to have
illegitimate children and bring them up without men), and promotes the popularity of joint legal
custody among the mental health mediators entrusted with defending the bulwarks of patriarchy.
See sources cited supra note 231.
239. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Divorce: Natu-
ral Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RuTGERs L. REv. 1093, 1111 (1988). Dworkin and London
provide a relevant case example in which the father wanted joint custody of the younger child and
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working in family law recognize that fathers frequently threaten to dis-
pute custody in order to strengthen their financial position,24° the media-
tor's advocacy of joint custody enhances the father's coercive power.
Considering the foregoing, women's highly ambivalent response to
custody mediation causes no surprise:
Although a complete analysis is not available, there is reason to think that
women are significantly more likely to regard mediation as threatening and
balanced against them than are men. While women did report that media-
tion helped them in understanding themselves and their spouses, they were
also far more likely than men to report a sense of being pressured into
agreement, a lack of comfort in expressing their feelings, anger during me-
diation sessions, and a sense that mediators essentially dictated the terms of
the agreement. 241
In conclusion, traditional sex role ideology enhances the husband's
the mediators suspected the mother of reducing her financial requests in order to assure her sole
custody of that child. Dworkin & London, supra note 172, at 9-11. The mother initially agreed to
retaining only 15% of the marital assets, while the husband was to receive 85%. Id. at 10. Con-
cerned that the wife implicitly was trading marital assets for sole custody and that the court would
not accept such an inequitable property division, the mediators told the couple they would not ap-
prove the agreement. Id. at 11. Although the couple was displeased with mediator nonconcurrence,
they finally did agree to a more equitable split of the property: the wife retained 36% and the hus-
band received 64% of the marital assets. Id
This case differs from the situation described in the text, but it nevertheless supports the proposi-
tion that a firm joint custody request, regardless of its proponent, can induce the mother's accept-
ance of inequitable financial results. Furthermore, the case described by Dworkin and London is
more favorable to the mother than the scenario described in the text because in their case, the hus-
band alone, rather than the mediators in addition to the husband, pushed for joint custody, and the
mediators uncharacteristically intervened in the face of gross financial inequity. See id. One could
expect, then, the text example of a mother appealing directly to the father to result in an agreement
reflecting even greater financial inequity than the agreement in the case example reflects.
240. Eg., Lonsdorf, supra note 156, at 281; Neely, supra note 3; see Teitelbaum & DuPaix,
supra note 239, at 1124. o
In the words of one divorcing wife who negotiated through her lawyer:
My husband.., was threatening that if I went for half (the property) he would go for
custody .... assuming that he would not get it, but he would drag it out as long as
possible and have as nasty a battle as possible. I really didn't want the kids to have to go
through that ... didn't want to go through that prolonged fight. So, I decided to go
ahead with what we had come up with ... even though I knew it was not a fifty-fifty
split.
Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the
Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 585 (1987).
241. Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 239, at 1121 (citation omitted). The women expressed
this high level of ambivalence in an elite mediation program where conditions are far better than
most court affiliated programs. Id See also Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, A Systematic
Comparison of Child Custody Mediation and Litigation, FAIRSHARE, Feb. 1988, at 10, 11 (women
who mediated their custody arrangements were more depressed than women who litigated custody).
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power over financial issues and, when coupled with mediator bias for
joint custody, strengthens the father's position in custody matters as well.
Because mediators perceive themselves as advocates for the chil-
dren, they ignore how their bias harms divorcing mothers and acknowl-
edge no need to protect either spouse in child centered negotiations.
Some proponents and critics express concern, however, that the weaker
wife might have difficulty negotiating with her husband on financial is-
sues. Mediation proponents assuage this concern by offering mediator
power balancing and lawyer and judicial review of mediated agreements
as protection for the weaker spouse on financial issues. In Part III, how-
ever, I argue that mediators cannot power balance because they do not
know what creates power, they cannot detect power disparities, and they
lack the skills necessary to power balance. Moreover, mediator igno-
rance and mishandling of power issues will continue because they are
encouraged by mediator self-interest. Next I argue that even if mediators
possessed the knowledge and skill necessary to power balance, mediator's
role and ethical prescriptions prevent meaningful efforts to eliminate
power disparities. Mediators will not abandon these inhibiting role and
ethical demands because they support the interests of many powerful ac-
tors. And, finally, I explore why lawyer and judicial review of mediated
agreements also provide inadequate protection.
III. PROTECTION FOR THE DISADVANTAGED WIFE
A. Balancing The Power: A Rhetorical Smokescreen242
1. Mediator Self-Interested Ignorance on Power Issues. Given the
importance of power balancing, divorce mediation literature carefully
should explain the factors that create power, how those factors normally
are distributed among husbands and wives, and methods for detecting
0
242. The mediation model contemplated in this section remains a mandatory court affiliated
program staffed primarily with mental health mediators. While many court affiliated divorce
mediation programs address only custody issues, NANCY H. RoGERs & CRAIG A. MCEWEN,
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 11.2, at 76 (Supp. 1991), the trend is to expand mediation
services to include financial issues because the issues are seen as interrelated. See Koopmen, supra
note 1, at 119, 122; Susan Myers et al., Court-Sponsored Mediation of Divorce, Custody, Visitation,
and Support: Resolving Policy Issues, STATE CT. J., Winter 1989, at 24, 26. (of 118 mediation
programs responding to national survey, two-thirds mediated child support as well as custody and
visitation issues); Pearson, supra note 1, at 180 (a recent study of four public and ten private divorce
mediation programs which entertain the financial as well as the child-related issues in divorce);
Vanderkooi & Pearson, supra note 16, at 561 (stating that custody mediation programs sometimes
entertained financial issues because resolution of custody and financial issues were interdependent).
Additionally, private sector mediators frequently address both financial and child issues. Dworkin &
London, supra note 172, at 9.
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these factors as well as techniques for correcting power disparities rooted
in different factors. As I mentioned earlier, however, the literature
proves insensitive to power issues.243 Characteristically, a recent book on
divorce mediation devotes only sixteen of over four hundred pages to
power imbalances. 2' In those sixteen pages the authors deny the exist-
ence of power imbalances24 or suggest that if they exist they do not af-
fect mediation.246
Divorce mediation training programs show equivalent insensitivity
to power issues. The better divorce mediation training programs require
trainees to devote a maximum of forty hours, usually over a five day
period, to becoming a mediator.247 In that short time the program direc-
tor attempts to instill in the trainees an expertise in basic mediation
243. For instance, mediators in a private mediation program indicated that approximately 70%
of their 200 mediation clients were not ready to negotiate when they first entered mediation. Irving
& Benjamin, supra note 37, at 116-20. In explaining why, they listed numerous criteria in which
power imbalances were implicit: nonacceptance of divorce, dysfunctional dominant patterns of inter-
action, lack of coping skills, inappropriate emotional attachment, lack of future planning, inadequate
financial, emotional and/or social resources. Id at 118-19. However, the participating mediators
never mention power imbalance or suggest how to manage such imbalances.
Some writers do acknowledge that significant power disparities between husband and wife may
exist, but give little guidance, aside from terminating the mediation, on how to empower the weaker
spouse. Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 472,477-
78 (1987). See also infra notes 265-82 and accompanying text discussing mediator strategies for
power balancing.
244. LENARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE MEDIATION
103-19 (1990).
245. Id. at 104, 111-13.
246. Id. at 104-09, 113-19. Christopher W. Moore's book on mediation, THE MEDIATION PRO-
CESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986), as well as John M. Haynes' book
on divorce mediation, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUN-
SELORS (1981), pay only cursory attention to power issues. And, finally, while Rogers and Salem
devote more attention to the issues of fairness and power imbalance than most, the nature of their
book does not lead them into the specific power problems in divorce mediation. ROGERS & SALEM,
supra note 1.
Articles on how to practice mediation, with rare exception, likewise sidestep the issue of power
imbalance. When how-to articles recognize power imbalance issues, the authors commonly assume
that informing the weaker spouse of his/her legal rights is sufficient to equalize the power relation-
ships. See, eg., Ricci, supra note 35, at 55-57.
247. There are no uniform standards for divorce mediator training. While many think
mediators should have a firm foundation in the psychological, economic, tax and legal aspects of
divorce, there is no agreement as to the precise quantity of knowledge that should be required.
KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 181.
While a strong movement exists to specify training and qualification criteria for divorce
mediators, ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 242, at 179-86 (discussing the proliferation of diverse
standards for mediation generally), this push for specification seems fruitless. Before training and
qualification criteria can be delimited rationally, realistic and clear goals for mediation must be
established. At the moment mediation claims to accomplish all things, suggesting that mediators
must be, at least, omnipotent: a qualification rather difficult to train.
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skills, the psychology of divorce, child psychology, and the complex fi-
nancial and legal issues presented in divorce. During this ambitious
agenda, power issues remain unacknowledged or receive scant
attention.248
Because mediation literature and training fail to address and explain
power adequately, mediators can avoid acknowledging the seriousness of
unequal power between divorcing spouses and the need for mediator in-
tervention. Moreover, because of insufficient training, even those who do
recognize the need to power balance have knowledge and skills inade-
quate to the task. Deficient in both skills and awareness, mediators lack
the motivation and the ability to power balance.
More importantly, the mediation profession cannot be expected to
correct its inadequate response to power issues: their ignorance serves
their purposes. Candid exposition of the depth, breadth, and tenacity of
power disparities between spouses threatens the survival of this budding
profession because it suggests the impossibility of power balancing. In
order to alter a power disparity, a mediator must first be able to detect its
existence. Yet diagnosis of a disparity based on intangible power factors
or sex role ideology proves difficult. For instance, if a highly educated
professional wife earns a high income and the husband does not make
obvious his greater power during mediation by dominating conversation,
the mediator has little reason to suspect an imbalance. This wife, how-
ever, may agree to her husband's inadequate financial proposal because
her adherence to traditional sex role ideology, her depression, and her
low self-esteem override her more obvious tangible power bases. The me-
diator, insensitive to the wife's low power based on intangible factors,
will assume the wife freely has chosen to accept her husband's proposal
and will see no need to power balance. Because many of the bases for
power disparity remain elusive, the need to power balance frequently will
go unrecognized. Without this recognition power balancing cannot
occur.
Moreover, the severity and complexity of power disparities between
most spouses suggest that power balancing requires skills most mediators
do not and cannot have. It defies imagination to think of the skill and
248. During the time I spent formulating my thoughts on power issues in divorce mediation, I
was trained as a divorce mediator in a program identical to the one described in the text. During the
training, I repeatedly attempted to raise the issue of power imbalance. My trainer, however, proved
more adept at evasion than I was at confrontation. At the training session's end power issues re-
mained unexplored. In the time since, I have observed several similar training sessions. In none of
these training programs were power issues adequately acknowledged, developed, or resolved.
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knowledge required to empower a depressed wife with low self-esteem
who believes in traditional sex role ideology, fears confronting her hus-
band, and has no occupation outside the home. Certainly the mediator
cannot alter the wife's occupation during mediation. Nor can the media-
tor significantly improve the wife's psychological and emotional state.
Even if the mediator has knowledge of counseling psychology, mediation
focuses on the task of reaching agreement,24 9 rather than on therapy for
troubled spouses.2 50 The extensive therapy required to balance a power
disparity grounded in a wife's low self-esteem, depression, fear of con-
frontation, and traditional sex role ideology would require a mediator
willing to redefine mediation and develop complex skills.
Even if a sufficiently talented mediator was willing to assume this
task, the efficiency rationale justifying court affiliated mediation pro-
grams makes therapy a practical impossibility. The efficiency focus of
these programs pressures the mediator to produce agreements quickly.
251
For instance, studies indicate that custody mediation in court affiliated
programs takes an average of about four hours.252 In contrast, two ther-
apeutic mediators in a private mediation program acknowledged that
"detection" of the twenty percent of their clients who were totally inap-
249. Eg., Emery & Wyer, supra note 243, at 472 (exploration of emotional issues should only
occur to the extent necessary to facilitate the primary task of agreement); Steven C. Bowman, Com-
ment, Idaho's Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26 IDAHo L. REv. 547, 553 (1990).
250. Bowman, supra note 249, at 553. Girdner, supra note 20, at 147-48. For some mediators,
however, mediation is therapy. Eg., id. at 144-47. This form of mediation also harbors immense
risk for women. In the case example reported by Irving and Benjamin, the mediators focus on
therapeutic intervention with the divorcing couple. Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37, at 121-26.
Their therapeutic approach allows them to successfully manipulate the mother, who initially re-
quested sole custody, into a joint physical custody arrangement. See id. See supra note 227 and
accompanying text for fuller discussion of the case. Under the guise of therapy, the lesser powered
wife is not given support capable of providing greater empowerment. Rather, she is subtly, or not so
subtly, coerced into accepting the mediator's bias in favor of joint custody. Therapeutic mediation
by mental health professionals, consequently, seems more an accommodation of men's interests than
"therapy." See supra note 231 and accompanying text for further discussion of this possibility.
251. E-g., Girdner, supra note 20, at 146-47.
252. A 1981 survey revealed that in the public sector mediations averaged 6.3 hours and 40%
were completed in four hours or less. In contrast, the average mediation in the private sector took
8.7 hours and 52% were completed in nine or more hours. Pearson, et al., supra note 19, at 12. A
more recent study of three court affiliated programs found the following average times for comple-
tion of custody mediation: in Minnesota 4.3 hours; in Los Angeles 3.0 hours; in Connecticut 2.3
hours. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 1, at 7. See also Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37, at 116
(private mediations averaged between sixteen and twenty-three hours).
While power balancing efforts seem unlikely in public mediation, Kressel suggests that private
mediators may also lack motivation to inquire into a party's suitability for mediation because of their
zealous belief in mediation and their desire to make a living in the face of little demand for their
mediation services. KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 206.
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propriate for mediation and the other fifty percent who needed a thera-
peutic "premediation" stage to prepare them for mediation, required an
approximately six hour assessment stage.25 3 Mediator power balancing
through extensive therapy thus proves a practical impossibility.
25 4
In summary, full exploration of power issues by mediation propo-
nents would require the corresponding admission that detection difficul-
ties, lack of skill, and program constraints make power balancing
impossible for most, if not all, mediators. With power balancing no
longer available as a rhetorical safeguard, judicial administrators and the
public would understand mediation for what it is: an informal process
that places the low powered spouse, usually the wife, fully at the mercy
of her more powerful husband. This recognition might cause the demise
of this new profession. Mediation proponents thus have a vested interest
in remaining ignorant of power issues.
The above only scratches the surface of mediator reluctance and in-
ability to power balance. Even if one makes the questionable assumption
that mediators can detect and mitigate power imbalances, conflicting role
and ethical demands inhibit mediator power balancing efforts.
2. Conflicting Role and Ethical Prescriptions. Contrary to media-
tor advocacy on child issues, on financial issues the mediator role re-
quires neutrality. 5 While some mediators cleverly rationalize their way
around this prescription," 6 many others take it quite seriously.25 7 Neu-
253. Irving & Benjamin, supra note 37, at 118-120. The private mediators also admitted that
their relatively affluent clientele presented far fewer problems than the couples seen in court affiliated
programs. Id. at 116. One could expect, then, that mediators in court affiliated programs would
need even more time to detect those couples needing lengthy preparation in order to mediate success-
fully. However, the time consuming approach by private therapeutic mediators contrasts starkly
with time statistics from court affiliated mediation programs.
254. As Abel notes, informal dispute resolution programs typically promise therapeutic inter-
vention despite program constraints and party and dispute characteristics that make such interven-
tion impossible. Abel, supra note 1, at 278-79.
255. See, e-g., ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 1, at 139 (stating that neutrality is the norm in
mediation in the United States).
256. I am reminded of a mediation program director in a large metropolitan area who told me
that he dealt with clients who challenged his neutrality by saying that neutrality meant he did not
favor or personally know either party at the mediation's beginning. It did not mean, however, that
he could not side during the mediation with a spouse he felt was disadvantaged.
Mediation literature also contains numerous examples of mediator intervention to promote the
mediator's vision of fairness. However, these examples do not mean mediation will produce eco-
nomic results as equitable as those produced through lawyer negotiation. See infra notes 313-20 and
accompanying text for exploration of lawyer negotiation. First, the mediator may think the wife is
entitled to only slightly more than her husband. For example, one mediator suggests that mediators
should intervene only when gross inequality is present: modest inequality demands mediator re-
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trality, in its pure form,2 8 requires the mediator to refrain from attempt-
ing to influence the substance of mediated agreements.25 9 Mediators
straint. Donald E. Matz, Why Disputes Don't Go to Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1987, at 7; see
infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (discussing the equity norm in mediation). The media-
tor's intervention, then, may improve the wife's position only slightly and may not reflect the wife's
full legal entitlements. Second, many of the examples of coercive mediator behavior concern custody
issues. Use of coercive tactics on custody issues does not mean mediators will intervene with equal
vigor on financial issues. See infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text for discussion of lack of
mediator authority on financial issues and the threat of husband withdrawal from mediation. Third,
Greatbatch and Dingwall describe a case in which a mediator in Britain advocated a specific prop-
erty division between the husband and wife: the wife was to retain the marital home and the husband
was to retain a second, less valuable, house. Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 9, at 617-36. This
example, however, cannot suggest that mediators in the United States would do the same. In Brit-
ain, a stronger emphasis is placed on children's needs and, unlike the United States, children are
entitled to a share of the family's wealth and property. WErrZMAN, supra note 116, at 95 (citing
California as an example of the parent-centeredness of American divorce settlement). In Greatbatch
and Dingwall's case study, the divorcing couple had two young children who were to remain with
the mother. Consequently, the mediator's insistence that the wife receive the family home may have
reflected different notions of children's entitlements from those found in the United States, and the
mediator's attitude may have had more to do with protecting the children's economic interests than
with imposing economic justice upon the divorcing couple. This case study, thus, cannot be used to
suggest that mediators in the United States will vigorously intervene to promote economic justice for
divorcing women.
Besides self-serving rationalizations, some urge the mediator has a duty in certain contexts to
assure outcomes consistent with important social policies and public perceptions of fairness. Law-
rence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REv. 1, 17-18
(1981) (urging that environmental mediators have such duties).
257. See, eg., Gregg B. Walker, Training Mediators: Teaching About Ethical Concerns and Obli-
gations, MEDIATION Q., Spring 1988, at 36-37 (discussing the Association of Family and Concilia-
tion Court's "model standards for family and divorce mediation"); Wallerstein, supra note 216, at
15-16.
258. Confusion abounds regarding the precise meaning of neutrality in mediation. Cf Teitel-
baum & DuPaix, supra note 239, at 1126 n.1l0 (when referring to neutrality, ABA standards for
mediators equate non-alignment with value-neutrality). This confusion may allow some mediators
to rationalize non-neutral behaviors, but an ethical requirement of neutrality, whether or not ill-
defined, still constrains mediators from actively participating in substantive financial decisions.
259. Strict neutrality is a human impossibility. See Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 239, at
1125. Mediators inevitably bring with them their social class, ethnicity and ideologies. Hofrichter,
supra note 9, at 242. Mediators who adhere to neutrality thus can influence an agreement's sub-
stance by subtly and unknowingly indicating their preference to the couple through emphasizing or
deemphasizing various options. Honeyman, supra note 192, at 141. Furthermore, many mediators
admit their willingness to deviate from their formal role prescription to avoid grossly unfair results.
E.g., Girdner, supra note 20, at 147-51. However, the neutrality role requirement keeps mediators
uncertain about the propriety of intervention, see, eg., Walker, supra note 257, at 34-37 (acknowl-
edging the dilemma, but advocating that the decision to intervene be left to the discretion of individ-
ual mediators' "subjective ethics"), and inhibits their willingness to substantively intervene to
promote fairness.
The standards adopted by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association do little to
alleviate mediator role confusion. The standards acknowledge a mediator's duty to be impartial but
also state that impartiality does not mean substantive neutrality: a mediator must be impartial as
between the participants while retaining an obligation to avoid unreasonable results. Id. at 35-37.
504 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
must not give advice on what alternatives they think superior, for doing
so represents a biased infliction of the mediator's value preference upon
the divorcing couple.2" Mediator neutrality places the responsibility for
generating alternatives and outcomes solely on the parties.
The ethic of party empowerment firmly buttresses mediator neutral-
ity. Empowerment in mediation allegedly respects and fosters individual
autonomy and dignity while simultaneously limiting state intrusion."
In marketing mediation to clients mediators contrast mediation to the
spectre of the intrusive judge imposing formal, external, and insensitive
criteria on private family matters.262 In place of this threatening alterna-
tive, mediators offer couples the chance to make their own decisions on
how to order their post-divorce lives.263 Under this ethic, as with neu-
trality, the responsibility for generating alternatives and outcomes lies
exclusively with the parties.2 "
Some mediators intuitively sense the tension between neutrality and
empowerment and mediation's ability to protect the weaker party from
unfair outcomes. Faced with this tension they do not abandon their role
and ethical prescriptions. Nor do they use the drastic and time-consum-
ing measures necessary to meaningfully power balance. Instead
mediators assume they can resolve the tension and generate fair out-
comes if they simply control the process of mediation while ignoring the
substance of emerging agreements.265 Mediators believe process tactics
This double speak utterly fails to acknowledge that a mediator who promotes a fair outcome for the
lesser powered spouse will inevitably seek to influence the agreement's substance and will be per-
ceived by the other spouse as highly "partial."
260. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 53.
261. Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 9, at 614.
262. In one study of a custody mediation program, mediators presented litigation to the couples
as a painful and expensive alternative that produces unpredictable and unsatisfactory results.
Vanderkooi & Pearson, supra note 16, at 560.
263. Eg., Haynes, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing a mediator must be committed to the client's
right of self-determination). As stated by Folberg and Taylor:
Mediation is a process that emphasizes the participants' own responsibility for making
decisions that affect their lives. It is therefore a self-empowering process.... It is a finite
process that produces specific outcomes by utilizing the values, norms, and principles of
the participants rather than those of the mediators.
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 7-8.
264. Eg., Folberg, supra note 16, at 9-10.
265. This tendency to focus exclusively on process to the exclusion of concern for substantive
justice reflects the continual struggle to preserve the public's belief that the legal system fulfills its
articulated liberal ideas while continuing to maintain the hierarchical power structures in this soci-
ety. HOFRICHTER, supra note 36, at xxv; Abel, supra note 1, at 294-95 (informal dispute resolution
mechanisms primarily yield cathartic, rather than equitable, relief); Brunet, supra note 1, at 13-14;
Galanter, supra note 8 (arguing that legal rules generally favor "culturally dominant interests");
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like allowing both spouses ample opportunity to speak,266 or requiring
both spouses to submit detailed budgets, allow them neutrally to balance
power and generate fair outcomes.267 Yet neither these, nor other alleg-
edly neutral process tactics,268 however, assure balanced power or fair
outcomes. A wife actually may speak more than her husband, yet his
few words may command her deference. The wife may submit a thor-
ough budget, yet the budget may reflect her low expectations or her de-
pression may blunt her ability to effectively negotiate for her financial
needs reflected in the budget. Once the multifaceted nature of power is
understood, tactics designed to control only process do little to protect
the disadvantaged spouse.
Moreover, mediators concerned with fairness cannot use substantive
legal norms to balance power and assure outcomes that, at least, some-
what reflect society's perception of justice.269 Imposition of legal norms
would violate neutrality and empowerment. Furthermore, if mental
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WLs.
L. REv. 29, 99-101.
266. See, e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 57 (stressing the need for "equality in
communication"). Other methods frequently mentioned are clarifying statements, providing infor-
mation regarding legal entitlements, and caucusing. Eg., Girdner, supra note 20, at 148-49. None
of these tactics, however, assure fair outcomes. See infra notes 267-89 and accompanying text for
additional discussion.
267. Kg., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 185.
268. I do not mean to suggest that these tactics really are neutral. As do all procedures, they
have substantive impact. Rather, I speak of these as neutral process tactics only because they are
perceived as such by mediators.
269. I am not suggesting that the employment of substantive law in the formal system produces
financial equity for divorcing women. Most evidence points to the contrary conclusion. See infra
note 319. Nor am I suggesting that uniform application of substantive laws occurs in the formal
system. Again, research suggests the opposite conclusion. See Kenneth R. White & R. Thomas
Stone, Jr., A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM.
L.Q. 75, 75-76, 83 (1976) (a study of judicial opinions in Florida revealed little consistency among
judges in the selection of or emphases placed on a range of variables used to determine child support
or alimony awards). However, as I argue throughout this article, the leap from acknowledging the
formal system's problems to believing mediation the cure is unwarranted.
The use of mediation to resolve divorce disputes significantly inhibits the very reform necessary to
correct the inequities now existing in the formal system. Before reform can occur, both private
individuals and the public must become sensitive to the need for change. Mediation's privacy makes
monitoring results more difficuit than in the more public formal system and limits the public's ability
to detect and press for correction of unjust results. See AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 124-26 (discuss-
ing how shuffling consumer grievances into the more informal arbitration process inhibited public
disclosure of consumer fraud and retarded the formal system's ability to generate meaningful re-
form). Mediation's privacy also inhibits the disputant's ability to measure her results against those
obtained by others and, consequently, to voice complaint when her results seem unfair, in compari-
son. In addition, because legal norms are not relevant in mediation and parties are urged to shape
their own idiosyncratic agreements, mediated results defy evaluation. The inability to evaluate medi-
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health mediators impose law or give legal advice, they expose themselves
to accusations of unauthorized practice of law. Law then remains just as
irrelevant to financial issues in mediation as to child custody issues."'
Mediators instead encourage couples to fashion idiosyncratic financial
agreements unconstrained by the rigid dictates of formal law.271 The
wife freely can relinquish her legal right to a portion of her husband's
pension fund or her right to spousal maintenance.272 Mediation cloaks
ated results further obscures detection of unfairness. Thus, the much celebrated privacy and flexibil-
ity of mediation are questionable virtues from the standpoint of legal reform.
Even were unfairness obvious in mediation, the formal legal system could not correct the problem
by creating different substantive laws. Without the cases before them, judges have no way to create
new precedent in response to compelling factual situations and persuasive attorney argument. Shuf-
fling the majority of divorce cases into mediation, thus, retards the development of new and more
just substantive laws. See generally Owen W. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87
(1984) (arguing that settlements inhibit the evolution of formal substantive law); Hofrichter, supra
note 9, at 242 (informalism's ideology of accommodation results in settlement and inhibits the for-
mation of general criteria applicable to future injurious behavior). And, finally, even were judges to
occasionally entertain a novel divorce case and articulate more just substantive laws, or even were
the legislature to articulate new reformative laws, these new norms would do little to create better
justice in mediation where legal norms remain irrelevant. Reforms in the formal system, thus, would
have even greater difficulty trickling down to the public through mediation than through the formal
system. Galanter, supra note 8, at 123-24 (discussing how in the formal system, substantive laws
frequently fail to reach, and thus aid, the disadvantaged).
270. Ignoring substantive legal norms on financial issues should be particularly easy for mental
health mediators. Simon argues that those possessing the "Psychological Vision" treat social norms,
rules and values as obstacles to fulfillment of one's affective self - the only legitimate and valuable
goal. Simon, supra note 206, at 495.
271. Eg., Brunet, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that proponents of alternative dispute resolution
perceive substantive law "as frustrating creative results"); Rifkin, supra note 17, at 27 (noting that,
theoretically, law is an irrelevant constraint on mediator's ability to bring parties to agreement).
The irrelevance of formal distributional law and the lack of objective fairness standards creates
great confusion for mediators. Dworkin and London express this confusion:
Fairness in property division and allocation of material resources involves a number of
external or objective criteria, but even in this area, internal factors play a role. How do
you assess whether the "bottom line" is fair? A 50/50 agreement somehow inherently
appears to be fair. Some jurisdictions legally require such a settlement, as in California.
In equitable property jurisdictions, a 50/50 agreement is most often used as a starting
point. However, in mediation the couple has an opportunity to develop their own stan-
dards of equity, which may not be the same as those prevailing in the community. To
what extent does the mediator allow these standards to deviate from the prevailing ones?
And what percentages are within the parameters of fairness?
Dworkin & London, supra note 172, at 8-9. Tellingly, the authors defer the answer to the important
question they pose to the parties themselves, trusting a somewhat foggy commitment to "self-deter-
mination." See id. at 11.
For arguments regarding the importance of formal substantive and procedural law in promoting
quality outcomes in alternative dispute resolution, see Brunet, supra note 1. Ironically, the ways to
"fix" the problems of informality seem always to introduce more formality.
272. Mediators sometimes point to a study by Heister to illustrate the fairness of property divi-
sion in mediation. Cf. Dworkin & London, supra note 172, at 8-9 (discussing John W. Heister,
19921 POLITICS OF POWER
her right to forgo these legal entitlements in the seductive and obscuring
Appendix. Property Allocation in Mediation: An Examination of Distribution Relative to Equality and
to Gender, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1987, at 97-98). The study involves data collected over three and a
half years from 141 couples who employed a male mediator. Results showed that 43% of the
couples divided marital property almost equally. Another 11% deviated from equal distribution by
5-10%, whereas 35% of the couples deviated by 10-25%. The remaining approximately 12% of the
couples departed from equal distribution by more than 25%. John W. Heister, Appendix Property
Allocation in Mediation: An Examination of Distribution Relative to Equality and to Gender, MEDIA-
TION Q., Fall 1987, at 97. The data also revealed that of the 57% of the cases in which property
division was not equal, approximately 46% of the men received more than the women and approxi-
mately 54% of the women received more than the men. Id at 98. Task forces investigating out-
comes obtained in New Jersey and New York's formal justice system, in contrast, suggest that
women in equitable distribution states frequently receive less than 50% of the marital assets.
WErrZMAN, supra note 116, at 106-107 (unscientifically obtained estimates are that women receive
between 35 and 40% of the marital assets).
Heister's study, however, does not support the conclusion that mediation inevitably produces
better financial outcomes for women than the formal system. The data on the formal system were
obtained through informal and unscientific investigations rather than methodologically sound stud-
ies. The data's validity, therefore, is questionable. Heister also fails to give any specific financial
information. The women who received more than men might have clustered in the small deviation
ranges, receiving, for example, only 6% more than the men; whereas the men who received more
than women might have clustered in the higher deviation ranges, receiving 15-25% more than the
women. Second, even if the questionable assumption is made that the above statistics indicate this
mediator generated fairer property distributions than the formal system, all the mediations studied
were conducted by a male mediator. Because of his sex, the male mediator likely is imbued with an
authority over financial issues that approximates that of the husband. A male mediator then might
be able to gently coerce a reluctant husband into an equitable agreement. See supra notes 211-31 and
accompanying text for discussion of the relationship between legitimate authority and the ability to
successfully coerce. Furthermore, all the mediations were conducted by the same mediator. I do not
contend that all mediators generate inequitable financial agreements. Some mediators consider fair-
ness more important than neutrality and party empowerment, and impose financial fairness on medi-
ating couples. This does not mean, however, that most mediators, particularly those in court
affiliated programs who take neutrality and party empowerment seriously, will produce better eco-
nomic outcomes than lawyer negotiation. See supra notes 313-20 and accompanying text for a fuller
comparison of lawyer negotiation to mediation. In essence, one cannot generalize about all
mediators based on results obtained by a single mediator. And, finally, the study contains no assess-
ment of whether spousal maintenance would have been appropriate for any of the women. As noted
by Lenore Weitzman in her landmark study of the California domestic relations courts, because so
few couples have significant amounts of property, spousal maintenance may be a far more important
vehicle for achieving financial equity between divorcing spouses than property distribution. Lenore
J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony
and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1191, 1197 (1981) (from data collected in 1978
Weitzman determined that approximately 50% of the couples had less than $10,000 net worth, and
approximately 60% had less than $20,000 net worth). The mediated property divisions in Heister's
study that imply fairness thus might mask a deeper inequity.
A more recent study by Jessica Pearson found that mediated financial results differed little form
lawyer negotiated or judicially assisted outcomes. Pearson, supra note 1, at 192-93. However, all the
couples studied initially participated in mediation and resolved some of their divorce issues in media-
tion. Id. at 180-84. Consequently, mediation may have influenced lawyer negotiated results by de-
creasing the lawyer's sense of responsibility for her client, see infra note 306 and accompanying text,
reinforcing the wife's predisposition for compromise, see supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text,
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rhetoric of autonomy and empowerment.7 3
Mediators do, however, urge the divorcing couple to treat each
other with fairness. Cut loose from its moorings in formal distributional
law and set upon the stormy seas of divorce negotiations, this fragile skiff
of equity will not promote fair financial results for women. Because of
their social power men, not women, determine and occupy the roles soci-
ety perceives valuable and deserving of reward.274 The husband's role of
primary economic provider, for instance, commands more value than
the wife's provision of a clean home, properly dressed children and well
prepared meals. When divorce occurs and only a vague equity norm de-
termines a fair distribution of marital income and assets, 275 a result giv-
or resolving the custody/visitation issues that might have provided the wife a bargaining chip in
lawyer negotiations, see supra notes 214-32 and accompanying text. Moreover, the researcher can-
didly acknowledges other methodological problems. Id. at 184.
273. Legal norms have diminished relevance in divorce mediation for yet another reason. In
mediation, the divorce dispute is expanded to include emotional and relational issues not considered
legally relevant. The resolution of the divorce dispute in mediation is expected to incorporate and
reflect a concern for these issues. However, expansion of the dispute in this manner also implies that
a legal principle will no longer be sufficient as a principle of resolution and that a strictly legal
remedy likely will be inadequate or insensitive. Cf Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed
Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145, 150-51 (1988)
(proponents of alternative dispute resolution assert that its discretionary characteristics facilitate
"speedy, flexible, and non-intimidating" agreements).
274. MacKinnon describes how consciousness raising facilitates women's realization that their
economic dependency on men results from the low value placed on their work by dominant men and
capitalist ideology:
For instance, when they first seriously considered never marrying or getting a divorce,
women often discovered their economic dependency, having been taught to do little they
can sell or having been paid less than men who sell comparable work. Why? To under-
stand the precise causation would be to identify the supportive dynamics of male
supremacy and capitalism. But an equivalency, at least, was clear: women's work is
defined as inferior work, and inferior work is defined as work for women. Inferior work
is often considered appropriate for women by the same standards that define it as infer-
ior, and by the same standards that define "women's work" as inferior work - its pay,
status, interest or complexity, contacts with people, its relation to cleanliness or care of
bodily needs.
MAcKINNON, supra note 188, at 91-92.
275. Interestingly, men and women differ in the norm they prefer to employ in reward distribu-
tions. Focused on individual gain and competition, men prefer to distribute rewards on the basis of
equity: the reward size should be commensurate with the contribution made to reward acquisition.
Women, on the other hand, focused on relational issues rather than competition or gain maximiza-
tion, prefer equal distribution: the reward size should promote group solidarity rather than reflect
individual contribution. Men are thought to prefer equity over equality because they are exploitive
and because the equity norm inevitably creates and/or perpetuates status differences, whereas wo-
men are thought to prefer equality because they are accommodative and because the equality norm
preserves relationships. See, eg., Imat R. Amidjaja & W. Edgar Vinacke, Achievement, Nurturance,
and Competition in Male and Female Triads, 2 3. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 450 (1965)
(suggesting that males and females might be characterized as exploitative and accommodative, re-
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ing the husband a greater share than the wife might seem equitable to the
couple and the mediator because of his more deserving marital duties.276
Moreover, when one considers the value men attach to their income and
wealth,27 7 reliance upon an unspecified norm of fairness to induce the
husband to part with income or assets seems, at best, naive. The equity
norm used by mediators to balance power and produce fair outcomes
provides a thin reed, indeed, of protection for the disadvantaged wife.
Since mediators cannot power balance effectively by altering the
causes of power disparity, by blindly relying upon process control, by
employing formal distributional law, or by appealing to an informal eq-
278uity norm, mediator efforts at power balancing prove insufficient to
protect the weaker wife. Mediators, however, could achieve power bal-
ancing's goal of equitable financial agreements by closely monitoring the
substance of the emerging agreement, and, when necessary, intervening
spectively); Arnold Kahn et al., Cooperation and Optimal Responding in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game. Effects of Sex and Physical Attractiveness, 17 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 267 (1971)
(finding that females, unlike males, vary behavior according to the interpersonal situation); Edward
E. Sampson, On Justice as Equality, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1975, at 45, 55-57; Elaine Walster & G.
William Walster, Equity and Social Justice, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1975, at 21, 26-27.
276. Eg., Lonsdorf, supra note 156, at 287 (noting that in the divorce context, reliance upon an
equity norm means that resources belong to the one who earned them - normally the husband); see
also, eg., David Kipnis, Does Power Corrupt?, 24 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 33 (1971)
(discussing research that shows a tendency of the more powerful to devalue the contributions made
by the less powerful).
Some argue that dominant men, sensitized only to their burden of public and economic responsi-
bility, fail to accord due weight to the contributions of women and less powerful men. See LIPMAN-
BLUMEN, supra note 23, at 23-24 (arguing that male economic dominance devalues feminine contri-
butions). Furthermore, they attribute women's success to the wrong causes: to luck rather than
competent performance. Their insensitive attitude toward women's contributions and their inaccu-
rate attributional patterns make them reluctant to share power and societal rewards with women
because they do not see women as "deserving."
Mediators are as vulnerable to a concept of equity favoring husbands as the husbands themselves.
As noted by Kolb in discussing labor/management mediation:
Less often appreciated, however, are the contributions the mediators make to preserving
the existing social order. This is not only because their efforts may minimize the in-
stances and duration of overt conflict but because their efforts serve to reinforce and
maintain the ideology of the system. This may be the major institutional role played by
mediators.
KOLB, supra note 192, at 173.
277. "Earnings are an objective indicator of a man's success in the employment sector and
hence, an important indicator of worth in our society." Ulbrich, supra note 31, at 123. Also, see
supra notes 40-41, 195-96 and accompanying text, for a discussion of a male's perceived responsibil-
ity of financial matters.
278. Kolb notes in her book on labor/management mediation that many observers of the pro-
cess believe that outcomes are more reflective of the respective parties' political and economic posi-
tions than of any strategies employed by mediators. KOLB, supra note 192, at 134.
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to promote fairness. 279 Herein, however, lies the problem. Mediator
neutrality and party empowerment norms require the mediator stead-
fastly to avoid interference with the parties' right to self-determina-
tion.280 Active substantive intervention lacks neutrality and violates
party empowerment.281 Consequently, even a mediator concerned with
fair results will feel obligated to refrain from using this tactic, 282 and will
cling, instead, to ineffective process tactics and a biased equity norm.
Abandonment of neutrality and party empowerment as guiding
279. Another option is termination of the mediation. Eg., Girdner, supra note 20, at 148;
Schepard et al., supra note 217, at 650-51. However, terminating mediation compromises the media-
tor's self-interest in reaching agreement, and is, therefore, an unpopular and unlikely option. See
infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text discussing mediator reaction to the husband's threat of
termination.
The following passage illustrates mediator discomfort with termination as a way of coping with
power imbalances:
The mediator may decide that the inequality is a permanent condition or one that cannot
be effectively dealt with in mediation - such as physical abuse or intimidation, a total
disparity in financial sophistication, significantly lower intelligence of one participant, a
language or physical handicap, or a long-standing behavior or mental problem. In such
cases the mediator has an ethical responsibility to notify both participants of the evalua-
tion, suspend the mediation process, and refer them to lawyers, psychologists, or other
helpers outside of mediation. This ethical position should not become a professional es-
cape clause, however-a way of hiding a mediator's lack of skill by refraining it as the
participant's problem. In divorce it is important to realize that the basic inequality be-
tween the spouses has often led to the decision to part. Mediators are not charged with
the responsibility of balancing all relationships. They must ensure, however, that partici-
pants are not railroaded into choices that are unconscionable
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 185-86 (emphasis added).
280. In their study of custody mediations, Vanderkooi and Pearson found that mediators fre-
quently emphasize the couple's right to self-determination. Vanderkooi & Pearson, supra note 16, at
560.
281. Kressel acknowledges no agreement exists among mediators whether the mediator has an
obligation to secure fair outcomes or whether the mediator must refrain from imposing her concept
of fairness upon the divorcing parties. KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 215.
282. Matz, supra note 256 (suggesting mediators should intervene only when gross inequality is
present, whereas modest inequality demands mediator restraint). Dworkin and London present a
case example in which the mediators did intervene to protect the wife from what seemed to the
mediators a grossly inequitable property division. However, Dworkin and London implicitly ac-
knowledge that their intervention violated their commitment to self-determination. They also ex-
press the confusion mediators experience because the ethic of party empowerment inevitably
conflicts with and requires the mediator to compromise any commitment to fairness:
If the process has been fair and the couple has reached agreement and by their standards
believe that the agreement is fair, how and when should the mediator intervene if the
mediator disagrees? To what extent should local court practices influence the couple's
agreement? We offer to allowparties to create their own agreements with our help, with an
implicit or explicit commitment to self-determination....
But the mediator is a professional with a body of knowledge and expertise and an
obligation to alert if he or she believes some harm might result from an agreement ....
Dworkin & London, supra note 172, at 11 (emphasis added). Even with mediator intervention,
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principles in mediation and adoption of mediator responsibility for fair
outcomes provide obvious ways for mediation to afford some protection
for the weaker spouse. Mediator self-interest, however, prohibits this so-
lution. First, mental health professionals' lack of financial expertise,
their discomfort with their lack of financial sophistication," 3 and the low
value they place on financial, as opposed to emotional and relational con-
cerns,284 should make them unwilling to accept responsibility for deter-
mining and imposing fair financial agreements.285
Moreover, administrators in efficiency-driven court-affiliated pro-
grams measure a mediator's success by how many agreements he can
however, the wife in the case example received only 36% of the marital assets valued at $800,000.
The husband received the remaining 64%. Id.
Ingram and Markowitz provide another example of mediator reluctance to engage in effective
power balancing behavior. These mediators argue that strict neutrality must be balanced against the
need to protect the unrepresented (weaker) spouse. They suggest assisting the lesser powered spouse
by assuring that each party give equally valued input into the decisionmaking process. They even
state that a mediator might teach effective negotiation to a weak spouse. However, throughout their
article they stress the dangers inherent in empowerment of the weaker party, openly acknowledge
that too much empowerment might be an extremely serious mistake, and empowering the weaker
spouse must not "harm" the more powerful spouse. In the end they state:
Notice that in this example we are not advocating that the mediator propose a solution.
A mediator who makes a proposal in a divorce situation is likely to be expressing his or
her own biases and may be violating several ethical principles.
Pamela S. Engram & James R. Markowitz, Ethical Issues in Divorce Mediation: Divorce and Labor
Compared, MEDIATION Q., June 1985, at 19, 24. Thus, even these mediators who recognize the
importance of fairness far fall short of advocating mediator behaviors that might actually balance the
power between spouses.
283. Grebe, supra note 207, at 22-24.
284. See Simon, supra note 206, at 519-20 (discussing the value. psychologists place on feelings
and their corresponding disdain for social, practical, and material concerns). Simon also argues that
the psychologist's focus on feelings and relations, as opposed to practical, social or material concerns
masks a political agenda:
Here are some of the basic notions of the Psychological Vision: Satisfaction does not
depend on the material world: it is merely a function of how people feel. Individuals do
not need money so much as they need to be "accepted" as "people." To treat individuals
as "people" means to ignore the distinctions of class, of wealth and power, which sepa-
rate them, and to emphasize the abstract affective needs they share. It means to flatter
them, to encourage them to retreat from the social and material world to a world of
passive self-love. The price of being treated as "human" is acquiescence in the prevailing
social and material inequalities.
Id. at 521.
285. Some suggest, however, that mediators are less than neutral on financial issues. Rather
mediators tend to stress the importance of women becoming economically independent of their hus-
bands. Marilyn Ray, Divorce Settlements: Comparing Outcomes From Three Processes for Resolv-
ing Disputes (1988) (unpublished manuscript, available from Marilyn Ray, Executive Director, The
Finger Lakes Law & Social Policy Center, Inc., 96 Besemer Road, Ithaca, New York, New York
14850).
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produce and how long he takes to produce them.2" 6 Pressing for finan-
cial fairness might threaten a mediator's success by provoking the hus-
band to terminate mediation before reaching an agreement. While
divorcing mothers likely will succumb to the expert mediator's coercion
on child issues, the husband likely will walk out in response to mediator
coercion on financial issues because the mental health mediator lacks le-
gitimate authority over financial issues.287 Moreover, husband resistance
to mediator coercion on finances288 seems more likely than a mother's
resistance to coercion on child issues because the mediator's insistence on
financial fairness overtly conflicts with the husband's interest in retaining
marital income and assets. In contrast, the mediator manipulates the
traditional mother into joint custody by explaining how this custody ar-
rangement coincides with the mother's interest in maintaining relation-
ships. The threat then of the husband's walkout should inhibit a
mediator concerned with success from pressing the husband on financial
issues and should encourage mediators to retain neutrality and party em-
powerment as guiding principles.289
Mediators also resist abandoning these guiding principles and taking
responsibility for fair financial outcomes because these norms provide
several layers of insulation from malpractice liability. First, they place
responsibility for substance exclusively on the parties. Additionally, the
empowerment ethic creates the expectation that mediated agreements
will reflect the idiosyncratic needs of the couple. No objective standard
then exists against which to measure the fairness of mediated agree-
ments.290 Since mediators cannot be accountable for what they do not
286. Eg., Hofrichter, supra note 9, at 241 (mediation success usually measured by the number
of disputes they resolve); KRESSEL, supra note 1, at 214; Sally Engle Merry, Defining "Success" in
the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING
IDEA 172-77 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feely eds., 1982) (discussing how efficiency norms
drive mediation programs generally). See also note 294 infra.
287. Kressel notes that one of the most difficult mediator tasks is maintaining the husband's
good will while simultaneously strengthening the wife's position. KRlESSEL, supra note 1, at 232
(discussing his study on couples who exhibited a direct conflict pattern of interaction).
288. The husband also may resist coercion on financial issues because it potentially violates his
expectation of getting a better deal through mediation than he would obtain in other dispute resolu-
tion processes. See Pearson et al., Decision to Mediate, supra note 19, at 30.
289. The spectre of the husband's withdrawal from mediation probably threatens court affiliated
mediators more than private sector mediators because continued employment in the public sector is
often contingent upon the mediator's effectiveness at producing agreements. Reaching agreement,
however, remains a primary motivation of private sector mediators as well. Consequently, their self-
interest in producing agreement may inhibit the willingness of both public and private sector
mediators to press the husband on financial issues.
290. See ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 1, at 140-43 (describing the difficulty of evaluating the
fairness of mediated agreements).
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control and the fairness of mediated agreements defies evaluation,291 the
norms of neutrality and party empowerment artfully insulate the media-
tor from accountability for fair outcomes. Trading these norms for re-
sponsibility, in contrast, would expose the mediator to liability for unfair
results. The spectre of malpractice provides additional disincentive for
abandoning these principles.
The judicial system, with its overwhelming concern for efficiency,292
also has much to lose if mediators publicly declare their intent to shape
the substance of mediated financial agreements. This declaration would
force the divorcing public to choose between a judge sworn to impose
known substantive laws and a mediator sworn to impose his own un-
known sense of fairness on the couple's financial dispute. Facing this
choice the public might prefer the relative predictability of a judge sworn
to impose known substantive law to a mediator whose preferences re-
main a mystery.293 If this were to happen, mediation programs would
fail, forcing the legal system to reassimilate the numerous family law
cases it now shuffles into mediation.294 Active mediator participation in
financial agreements thus ultimately threatens to exacerbate the legal sys-
tem's efficiency problems and judicial administrators will not encourage
mediators to abandon neutrality and party empowerment norms.
Judges, too, have a self-interest in promoting public acceptance of
291. The expansion of the dispute to include legally irrelevant issues peculiar to the particular
couple contributes to the inability to comparatively evaluate mediated outcomes. See Delgado, supra
note 273, at 150-51. For instance, making a specific couple's emotional and relational issues relevant
assures that the resolution of their dispute cannot be compared meaningfully to that of another
couple whose emotional and relational issues are necessarily different.
292. System efficiency remains the major justification employed by justice system administrators
for implementation of court affiliated mediation programs. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 122-27;
HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 73-77; Abel, supra note 1, at 273-75, 279; Riskin, supra note 1, at 31;
Vidmar, supra note 1, at 188.
293. See Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Suss-
kind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 86-87 (1981) (arguing that mediators must remain predictably neutral in
order to encourage the public's willingness to participate).
294. A significant number of actions filed in the formal court system are dissolution of mar-
riages cases. In discussing the alleged increase in filing rates in the United States, Professor Galanter
notes that "[t]he greatest single source of the bulge in filings is the increase in divorce (and post-
divorce) proceedings." Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3,
10 (1986). As a specific example, in 1986 49.3% of all civil actions fied in Florida circuit courts
were domestic actions, including custody and dissolution of marriage cases. J. Fraser Himes &
Richard Y. Feder, Family Law Judicial System: Indictment from Within, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1987, at
11. How much court time is actually allocated to domestic relations disputes, however, remains
unknown. Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser suggest that the overwhelming majority of divorc-
ing couples privately resolve the distributional aspects of their divorce disputes and enter the court
simply to secure the judicial imprimatur necessary for formal dissolution. Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 1, at 951.
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mediation through the promise of mediator neutrality and party empow-
erment. Judges do not like hearing family law cases.29 If mediators
abandon neutrality and party empowerment and as a result the divorcing
public avoids mediation, judges would be forced to entertain distasteful
dissolution cases in greater numbers. Because of their interest in avoid-
ing these cases, judges will not encourage mediators to abandon the
norms and impose their sense of fairness on the divorcing couple.
Moreover, mediator relinquishment of neutrality and party empow-
erment threatens the dignity and legitimacy of the formal justice system.
If mediators impose their ideas of financial fairness upon divorcing
couples, the distinction between mediation and judicial decisionmaldng
blurs. Even though the origins and content of the distributive norms
employed by judges and mediators would differ,2 96 both mediators and
judges would impose external norms on the divorcing couple rather than
effectuate what the couple might prefer. Also, in both dispute resolution
processes a third party rather than the divorcing couple would do the
decisionmaking. In essence, if mediators abandon neutrality and party
empowerment they would act as judges act. The realization then would
emerge that the shift to divorce mediation does little more than change
which third party does the decisionmaking and the public would see me-
295. In a Florida survey of attorney and judicial attitudes toward family law practice, the vast
majority of responding lawyers felt judges either disliked or strongly disliked family law matters
(68.1%) and that judges simply did not want to hear family law cases (71.7%). Himes & Feder,
supra note 294, at 12. Judicial discomfort with dissolution cases is further evidenced by judges'
growing tendency to relinquish decisional control over child custody and visitation issues to mental
health professionals. See, eg., Fineman, supra note 1; Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations in
Divorce Cases, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 713, 724-25.
The following statement made by a judge during a custody proceeding illustrates judicial exasper-
ation with family law cases:
The two of you are before me as parents. We are getting to what frequently happens in
this case, that you are acting as if the other was some stranger .... Has any effort been
made to resolve this? I never understand why parents want to spend all their money on
lawyers' fees for something between themselves. I could care less about the parties. I
look at the children. This is a custody issue. If anyone is using the children as a pawn to
get at the other, I have little sympathy. I can't resolve marital problems. You two are
probably going to fight on and on. We're here and you brought it .... I'm going to
have to have two parents be told by me what to do about their children. Here I am a
total stranger and I'm going to have to tell you when the children can see the other
parent. It's utterly ridiculous.
Girdner, Adjudication and Mediation, supra note 217, at 33, 37-38 (emphasis omitted).
296. The distributive norms employed in judicial decisionmaking spring from a societal consen-
sus of fairness articulated in statutes and/or case law. The distributive norms employed by a media-
tor would emanate from the mediator's individual sense of fairness. Moreover, mental health
mediators cannot employ formal law in dictating the terms of a financial agreement for to do so
would engage them in the practice of law.
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diation as little more than an abdication of judicial responsibility. This
perception would threaten the justice system's legitimacy. Thus, once
again, little pressure from the formal justice system should exist for
mediators to abandon neutrality and party empowerment norms in favor
of mediator activism.
In summary, the ethic of neutrality and party empowerment com-
promises any attempt by the mediator to produce fair financial agree-
ments through power balancing because it denies mediators the
opportunity to use the only effective power balancing technique: interfer-
ence with the substance of financial agreements. Nor will mediators
abandon these norms willingly and accept responsibility for producing
fair outcomes because these norms protect several mediator self-interests
as well as those of judges and efficiency minded judicial administrators.
Even if mediators could, if they chose, power balance, these numerous
constraints make that choice highly unlikely. Power balancing thus
proves a rhetorical, rather than real, protection for the weaker spouse.
Not only then does divorce mediation strengthen patriarchy by as-
suring men greater access to and control over their children and by keep-
ing male dominance ever present in the ex-wife's consciousness, it also
promotes men's economic superiority by facilitating the husband's ability
to retain his income and marital assets upon divorce. Yet, argue media-
tion proponents, one need not worry: lawyer and judicial review of medi-
ated agreements remain safeguards against injustice.297 I now turn to
this final line of defense.
B. Ineffectiveness Of Lawyer And Judicial Review
Lawyer review of mediated agreements does not assure results as
favorable to the weaker spouse as lawyer negotiated agreements. Some
couples participating in court affiliated divorce mediation programs will
not have legal representation.298 For them, there will be no attorney re-
view. Some argue mediation is superior to no legal representation, be-
cause it provides a knowledgeable third party who can help the parties
make thoughtful decisions.29 However, given mediator bias for joint
custody that weakens the wife's power base over children, mediator re-
297. Mnookin and Kornhauser suggest that judicial review can protect one against power dis-
parities in mediation. Mnookin & Ko.rnhauser, supra note 1, at 993. However, they caution that the
lack of articulated standards often prevents unfairness from being checked in individual cases. Id.
298. This statement is based on the observation that pro se divorce is becoming more popular
and that one spouse sometimes goes unrepresented in divorce proceedings. Jay Folberg, Divorce
Mediation: Promises and Problems, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 315, 316-17.
299. Id. at 316.
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luctance to push the husband on financial issues, and mediator insistence
on compromise, the wife might well negotiate a better outcome without
mediator intervention. For spouses represented by attorneys, lawyer re-
view of mediated agreements frequently comes too late to provide mean-
ingful protection.
Many mental health mediators dislike lawyers and believe that at-
torney oversight in mediation only interferes with the mediator's ability
to bring the couple to agreement. 3" These mediators discourage couples
from seeking legal advice during mediation. They sometimes will, how-
ever, recommend that an attorney review the final product.30 1  This
proves a difficult to impossible task because the lawyer has no idea what
information, other than what the client can recall, shaped the agree-
ment's terms. 3 2 Furthermore, because of the unavailability of formal
discovery in mediation,30 3 the lawyer cannot know whether the client's
decisions were based on full disclosure by the other spouse. When the
push for speed in court affiliated programs is considered, the lack of full
disclosure during mediation seems likely. The mediation process thus
severely restricts the lawyer's ability to review knowledgeably the medi-
ated agreement.
Assuming that, in spite of these difficulties, the lawyer undertakes
review of the agreement, several client interests compromise the attor-
ney's ability to provide protection. The client's emotional and psycho-
logical condition at mediation's conclusion might inhibit the lawyer's
ability to convince the client to reopen negotiations to alter unfair provi-
sions. Most divorcing couples find the uncertainty surrounding un-
resolved child and financial issues highly threatening. Resolving those
issues generates intense relief and a sense of closure. The prospect of
reopening closed issues and exposing oneself again to anxiety proves
unattractive to many clients. Furthermore, the mediation process itself is
300. Kg., Emery & Wyer, supra note 243, at 476. Not only mental health mediators, however,
frown on lawyer interference during mediation. Schepard, Philbrick and Rabino, all lawyers, refuse
to allow attorneys to participate in mediation because they believe lawyers promote an adversarial
atmosphere and hinder direct communications between husband and wife. Schepard et al., supra
note 217, at 637-38 (mediation of both custody and child support issues).
Additionally, not all mental health mediators harbor hostility for lawyers. Some, primarily those
in the private sector, see legal counsel as a way to balance power. See, eg., Ricci, supra note 35, at
57, 59.
301. Kg., Schepard et al., supra note 217, at 638.
302. A Dialogue on Legal Representation in Divorce Mediation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra
note 5, at 337, 339.
303. See Brunet, supra note I, at 31-39 (arguing that the lack of formal discovery in ADR risks
inaccurate and low quality results).
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difficult and emotionally draining. The exhaustion many clients feel will
inhibit their willingness to face the thought and task of another media-
tion. The client's psychological commitment to the agreement com-
pounds these difficulties. As mediation proponents argue, people who
actively participate in the process that produces an agreement become
psychologically committed to the agreement.3" Dislodging that com-
mitment might prove difficult for the attorney who believes the agree-
ment unfair.
Financial concerns also might make a client resistant to further ne-
gotiations. The client may have expended a considerable sum on media-
tor fees and may hesitate to spend more. The client's uncertainty as to
whether any better results actually can be obtained also might increase
the client's reluctance to finance further negotiations. And, finally, the
client's awareness that an expensive trial might ensue if the reopened
negotiations failed provides further disincentive to follow the lawyer's
advice. Financial considerations as well as the client's emotional state
therefore compromise a lawyer's ability to provide protection against un-
fairness at the end of the mediation. Tellingly, a recent study found that
most of the divorcing parties in public mediation programs had legal
counsel but few reported changing agreements in response to attorney
advice.
305
Attorney interests also work against effective lawyer review of medi-
ated agreements. Similar to the client, the attorney likely experiences
some relief that the client's case has settled. A reluctance to reopen
closed issues thus affects both attorney and client. Additionally, many
attorneys believe in mediation's rhetoric and think that mediation pro-
duces client satisfaction, empowers the spouses, and generates agree-
ments that reflect client interests. The attorney consequently lacks the
motivation to challenge the agreement's fairness and might relax her pro-
fessional obligation to protect client interests.
Moreover, a mediated agreement generates fewer reputational con-
cerns for the lawyer than a settlement the lawyer negotiates. A poor
divorce settlement negotiated by the lawyer threatens her reputation for
competence. A poor mediated agreement, however, does not create the
same threat to the lawyer's reputation because the lawyer can justify the
poor results in ways that do not implicate her own competence. For
304. See, eg., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce" The Benefits Out-
weigh the Costs, 4 FAM. ADvoc. 26 (1982) (relitigation rates lower in mediated than in other types of
divorce cases).
305. Pearson, supra note 1, at 194.
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example, she can rely on mediation's rhetoric and maintain the client has
responsibility for the result or that, irrespective of its substance, the
agreement reflects her client's interests. She also can maintain that chal-
lenging the agreement would have caused reprisal from the judge that
mandated mediation. A lawyer will not have then the same incentive to
protect her client's interests when reviewing a mediated agreement that
she experiences when she alone has responsibility for the divorce settle-
ment's terms.3 °6
The mandatory nature of court affiliated mediation programs also
reduces the effectiveness of attorney review. When a judge orders a di-
vorcing couple into mediation, the representing counsels know that fail-
ure to reach agreement likely will evoke judicial displeasure. If an
attorney does advise her client to reject the mediated agreement, judicial
reprisal may injure the client in subsequent hearings. A reviewing attor-
ney thus might urge acceptance of an otherwise unacceptable agreement
out of fear of judicial retaliation.
The confidentiality of mediation should protect against judicial
backlash at recalcitrant parties. Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize
confidentiality in mediation. For instance, some California courts allow
the custody mediator to make a recommendation to the court in the
event the spouses fail to reach agreement.3"7 Furthermore, in court affili-
ated mediation programs many informal communications take place be-
tween judges and mediators that severely compromise confidentiality. 30 8
And, finally, opposing counsel always can facilitate judicial backlash by
subtly exposing which client caused the mediation's failure. Thus, con-
cern with the possibility of judicial retaliation blunts the reviewing attor-
ney's effectiveness in protecting her client.
While the protection offered by attorney review is questionable, the
safeguard of judicial review is even more so. Some mediators suggest
judges should exercise more restraint in reviewing mediated agreements
than agreements negotiated by lawyers.30 9 Even if judges ignore such
advice, however, their ability to assess the agreement's fairness suffers
from the same informational deficit confronting reviewing lawyers.310
Furthermore, judges have their own reasons for paying only cursory at-
306. Pearson, supra note 1, at 194.
307. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 1, at 138.
308. Several mediators, in jurisdictions where mediation is supposed to be confidential, have
told me of judicial insistence that the mediators inform the court which party was responsible for
mediation's failure.
309. Schepard et. al., supra note 217, at 660-61.
310. As admitted by one judge, "Under the law we can disapprove an agreement. But if evi-
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tention to mediated divorce agreements. If a judge reviews and rejects a
mediated settlement, her actions compromise the efficiency of the court
affiliated program and might necessitate her having to hear a distasteful
domestic relations case.
Moreover, judges pay only cursory attention to divorce settlements
generally.311  Little reason exists to expect them to devote more attention
to mediated divorce agreements than ones negotiated by lawyers. To the
contrary, a judge who mandates a case into mediation might be inclined
to pay less attention to the resulting agreement 312 than a settlement nego-
tiated by legal counsel. Judicial review thus promises little protection for
the divorcing wife.
The foregoing calls into question the ability of lawyer and judicial
review to provide protection for mediating wives, and brings to a close
this critique of divorce mediation. To complete the argument that di-
vorce mediation enhances patriarchy, however, the significant differences
between lawyer negotiation and divorce mediation require exploration.
IV. THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAWYER NEGOTIATION
Divorce agreements negotiated by lawyers will be more favorable to
wives than mediated agreements for several reasons. While mediators
must remain substantively neutral, lawyers have a professional obligation
to pursue and protect the client's interests during negotiations.1 3 The
dence isn't presented, we don't know. We wouldn't know if someone was blackjacked into joint
custody. We can't spot lopsided or unfair agreements." Pearson, supra note 1, 194.
311. As noted by Melli, Erlanger and Chambliss in their study of divorce proceedings in Dane
County, Wisconsin, "[Miost striking about our interviews was evidence which demonstrated the
minimal role of the judge as reviewer of the substance of the parties' agreement." Medi et al., supra
note 4, at 1144-45. The researchers went on to note that in their superficial review of divorce settle-
ments judges seemed to focus on whether the parties actually agreed to and understood the agree-
ment's terms, rather than the acceptability of the agreement's substance. Id. at 1145. They quote
one judge as follows:
If they know what they're doing, even if it is out of line, then it is not my job to change
their decision. I'll inquire to make sure they know what they are doing. I have to let
them know what their options are. But I won't usually change it. I don't know if I have
ever changed an amount set by the couple.
Id.
312. Several commentators have noted that the efficiency rationale underlying court affiliated
alternative dispute resolution programs helps create judicial reluctance to participate, even peripher-
ally, in the cases referred to the informal programs. See, eg., Brunet, supra note 1, at 11-12.
313. Even Professor Schwartz, who argues a lawyer should temper her advocacy with a higher
sense of personal morality during non-adversarial negotiations, still maintains that a lawyer should
pursue client interests constrained only by unconscionability in process and substance. Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669 (1978). More-
over, attorneys behave consistently with this role in dissolution of marriage cases and undermine
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lawyer advocate also insulates the disadvantaged wife from her husband
and prevents the tangible, intangible,314 and sex role differences between
them from dictating the terms of the agreement. 315 By forcing the hus-
band and wife to deal directly with one another, mediation, in contrast,
sharpens the wife's disadvantages. Even lawyers who might compromise
their clients' concerns in order to fulfill their own interests316 have an
advocacy role and professional ethic to constrain their self-interested be-
haviors. The mediator, as a neutral, has no counterbalancing role or eth-
ical prescription to mitigate the mediator's interest in obtaining an
agreement irrespective of its substance. The lawyer's advocacy role thus
differs markedly from mediator neutrality and offers far greater protec-
their clients' decisional autonomy by acting as non-legal and personal counsel when their clients are
particularly vulnerable and in need of guidance. See Bruce W. Callner, Boundaries of the Divorce
Lawyer's Role, 10 FAM. L.Q. 389, 391-92 (1977).
The finding that claimants injured in automobile accidents recover more frequently when repre-
sented by an attorney reflects the importance of legal representation to the outcome for lesser pow-
ered individuals. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 193 (1970). This observation, of course, does not refute that the
quality of legal representation will be affected by the social position and wealth of the individual
client and the lawyer. It does support, though, the central theme of this section: lawyer representa-
tion, with its acknowledged deficiencies, produces better results for low power individuals than they
can achieve on their own.
314. While the legal profession also is stratified, eg., Galanter, supra note 8, at 116, most attor-
neys representing divorcing spouses come from the same or approximately equivalent strata. See Id.
315. Cf. Brunet, supra note 1, at 46 (noting the importance of lawyer advocacy in balancing
power between disputants).
316. For example, a personal injury specialist who repeatedly negotiates with the same insur-
ance companies may be tempted to compromise his client's goals in a specific case in order to maxi-
mize his returns from the numerous cases he has with these companies. Ross, supra note 313, at 82.
The same tendency to trade away client interests has been noted in the plea bargaining behaviors of
criminal defense attorneys. Eg., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargain-
ing, 84 YALE L.J 1179 (1975). However, the divorce attorney does not have the same degree of
incestuous interdependency with opposing counsel as does the criminal defense attorney with the
prosecutor and the personal injury specialist with the insurance adjustor. See Herbert Jacob, The
Contours of Divorce Lawyering 9, 10 (1990) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the 1990 Meet-
ing of the Law and Society Association, Berkeley, California, May 31 - June 3, 1990, on file with
author) (found 59% of Chicago divorce lawyers confined in isolated work settings, and between 30
and 40% of them only occasionally handled a divorce case). Furthermore, the personal injury spe-
cialist as well as the criminal defense attorney is insulated relatively well from malpractice liability
because few objective standards exist against which to judge negotiated outcomes. For the divorce
attorney, however, the possibility of a malpractice claim is greater because some expectations flow
from formal substantive law. For instance, a domestic relations attorney knows that a sixty-five year
old traditional homemaker in a thirty-year marriage whose husband's income approaches or exceeds
six figures is entitled to permanent alimony unless she has substantial income or assets of her own.
While outcome parameters are vague for the divorce attorney, they are not as obscure as for the
personal injury specialist or the criminal defense attorney. Consequently, the threat of malpractice
liability should constrain a divorce lawyer's tendency to compromise client interests more than it
does the personal injury or criminal defense attorney.
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tion for a low power spouse.3 17
Market factors provide the lawyer additional motivation to protect
the low powered wife's interests. An attorney's ability to generate busi-
ness turns upon whether professional peers and clients see her as compe-
tent in protecting client interests.318 To remain in business the mediator
in a court affiliated program, on the other hand, need only produce many
agreements quickly. Market factors suggest then that negotiating law-
yers will provide much more protection for client interests than will
mediators.
In addition to role and market factors, liability for professional mal-
practice helps motivate the lawyer to seek legally defined client interests
during negotiations. The possibility of a malpractice claim for failure to
secure the wife's legal entitlement to part of her husband's pension plan,
for instance, motivates the lawyer to negotiate assertively to secure that
right in the divorce settlement. In contrast, the mediator, who lacks ac-
countability for the mediated agreement's substance, will have less diffi-
culty allowing the wife to relinquish her right to a portion of the pension
plan.
The above observation invites recognition of the importance of legal
rights in determining the substance of a lawyer negotiated, as opposed to
a mediated, divorce agreement. Women's ability to avoid substantive law
in mediation might seem attractive to a group these laws consistently
have treated unfairly.319 However, as argued throughout this article,
317. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
318. See Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 265, at 31-32. A recent study of domestic
relations practice in Chicago indicates that 61% of the clients surveyed found their divorce lawyer
through referral by a relative, friend or neighbor. Moreover, the divorce attorneys studied believe a
significant proportion of their clients come from a combination of client and lawyer referral. Jacob,
supra note 316, at 5.
319. I do not maintain that the formal system, either in its substantive norms or in its operation,
produces justice for divorcing women and their dependent children. Quite the contrary. The eco-
nomic devastation experienced by most women upon divorce contribute significantly to the impover-
ization of women and their dependent children. Eg., IEwLETr, supra note 21, at 51-69; RtrrH
SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAsr: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA 27-
47 (1986); WErrZMAN, supra note 116; Ruth A. Brandwein et al., Women and Children Last: The
Social Situation of Divorced Mothers and Their Families, 36 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 498 (1974); San-
ford L. Braver et al., Economic Hardship and Psychological Distress in Custodial Mothers, J. Di-
VORCE, vol. 12, no. 4, 1989, at 19; Carol S. Bruch & Norma 3. Wikler, Factors Contributing to
Postdivorce Poverty: Economic Consequences of Divorce, 63 MICH. B.J. 472 (1984); Mary Corcoran,
The Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution for Women in the Middle Years, 5 SEX ROLES
343 (1979); Ronald D. Day & Stephen J. Bahr, Incomes Changes Following Divorce and Remarriage,
J. DIVORCE, Spring 1986, at 75; Leslie A. Morgan, Economic Well-Being Following Marital Termi-
nation, 10 J. FAM. IssuEs 86 (1986). Perhaps the most commonly cited statistic comes from Lenore
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movement out of a dispute resolution system in which law is relevant
into an informal system where it is not limits law's ability to constrain
power abuses and ensures that preexisting power disparities, rather than
law, will dictate the divorce agreement's terms. In contrast, substantive
legal norms form the expectations of negotiating lawyers and create a
foundation from which they can begin to judge the acceptability of the
negotiated agreement.32 0  Thus, while formal substantive law may not
Weitzman's 1977 study of the California domestic relations courts. She found that within a year of
divorce women experienced a 73% decrease in their standard of living, whereas men experienced a
42% increase. WErrzmAN, supra note 116, at 338-39. Unsurprisingly, then, despite their steadily
increasing workforce participation in the past two decades, ag., SIDEL, supra, at xv (in 1950 approxi-
mately one-third of women in the United States worked outside the home, whereas by 1985 over
50% of women participated in the labor force), an increasing number of women live in poverty.
Equally troublesome is the dramatic contrast in the poverty of male and female-headed house-
holds. While during the past twenty-five years the number of poor people living in white, male-
headed families has decreased significantly, id. at xvi, the number of poor people living in families
headed by women has increased dramatically. While the families headed by women account today
for only 16% of all families, they account for 48% of all poor families. And, finally, nearly 40% of
the American poor are children and over half of them live in female-headed households. Id.; Bar-
bara Ehrenreich, What Makes Women Poor?, in FOR CRYING OUT LOUD: WOMEN AND POVERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES 18, 19-20 (Rocheile Lefkowitz & Ann Withorn eds., 1986). The poverty
statistics for families headed by black and Hispanic women paint an even more dismal picture.
SIDEL, supra, at xvi. Children raised in poverty have poorer health, shorter life-expectancies, dim-
mer educational prospects and a greater likelihood of suffering abuse and neglect than children
raised in adequate material circumstances. HEWLETT, supra note 21, at 109-10. See also Sara Mc-
Lanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 AM. J. Soc. 873 (1985) (the eco-
nomic deprivation and the stress of family disruption commonly associated with growing up in a
female-headed family increases the risk of offspring's lower educational attainment at adulthood).
Rather than provide divorcing women and their dependent children with substantive justice, the
traditional dispute resolution process has helped create a significant social problem. The assertion in
this article that divorce mediation will exacerbate this problem should prompt significant concern. I
am aware of the argument that procedural changes cannot result in better substantive outcomes for
the disadvantaged as long as power differences between adversaries remain the same. See, e.g., Ga-
lanter, supra note 8. This attitude, however, encourages a dangerous complacency when procedural
changes like mediation occur and ignores the interdependency of procedure and substantive out-
comes. Professor Galanter may well be correct that procedural changes cannot "better" outcomes
for the less powerful, but that does not negate the argument made here that procedural changes can
severely disadvantage the already disadvantaged. Moreover, the switch to mediation is not merely a
procedural change: the nonrelevance of law in mediation makes the switch substantive as well as
procedural.
320. In their study of lawyer negotiation of divorce settlements in Dane County, Wisconsin,
Melli, Erlanger and Chambliss note:
In our interviews, there was evidence consistent with this conventional view of the
importance of the courts. Parties who settled were clearly influenced by their lawyers'
predictions of how the court would decide. One husband, who was reluctant to settle
because he thought the settlement was unfair, gave in based upon his attorney's advice:
I told [my lawyer] a number of times how I felt, but he pulls out a stack of law statutes
and law books and says, "the judge is going to look at or take that into consideration."
That came up a number of times... she had a right to ask for it or a right to collect it.
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reflect true distributive justice for divorcing women, because of power
disparities and the lack of meaningful safeguards in mediation women
will obtain more' advantageous outcomes when negotiating lawyers rely
on law than when mediators rely on vague and biased equity norms.
V. CONCLUSION
Today custody law still favors women and recent reforms in family
law create new economic rights for divorcing women. Lawyers negotiat-
ing divorce settlements concern themselves with implementing these
legal entitlements. Mediation proponents believe the lawyer's focus on
rights generates hostility among divorcing parties and unnecessarily in-
fringes upon the couple's right to order their post divorce lives. In con-
trast they maintain mediation preserves relationships, empowers the
parties, and generates good feelings. Legal rights fade into the shadows
of informality.
This shift in focus from rights to relatedness, however, endangers
divorcing women and reinforces male dominance. Mediation proponents
seductively appeal to women's socialized values by speaking softly of re-
latedness. Yet mediation exploits wives by denigrating their legal entitle-
ments, stripping them of authority, encouraging unwarranted
compromise, isolating them from needed support, and placing them
across the table from their more powerful husbands and demanding that
they fend for themselves. The process thus perpetuates patriarchy by
freeing men to use their power to gain greater control over children, to
implant more awareness of male dominance into women's consciousness,
and to retain more of the marital financial assets than men would obtain
if lawyers negotiated divorce agreements.
The insidious nature of mediation for divorcing women, though, re-
mains hidden beneath its carefully crafted marketing rhetoric. This arti-
cle looks beneath that rhetoric. The effects upon women of the political
agenda disclosed should inspire critical debate on the propriety of di-
vorce mediation. At the very least those who structure court affiliated
programs, as well as mediators, now should recognize their complicity in
the continued oppression of women and their dependent children.
Melli et al., supra note 4, at 1143-44 (alteration in original). See also Brunet, supra note 1, at 25
(indicating the importance of law to the lawyer in assessing the likelihood of client success).
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